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Preface
This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing that is the outcome of work 
done in collaboration.
It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for a
degree or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or any other 
University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. I further 
state that no substantial part of my dissertation has already been submitted, or, is being concurrently
submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any
other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text.
The word count of this dissertation is 77, 082.
This falls within the word limit set by the Faculty of Modern and Medieval Languages Degree 
Committee.
Abstract
This dissertation examines identifiable traces of the perpetrators of the 1932-1933 famine in
Ukraine, known as the Holodomor, and their representation in cultural memory. It shows that the 
men and women who facilitated the famine on the ground were predominantly ordinary people 
largely incongruous with the dominant image of the perpetrator in Ukrainian cultural memory.
I organise this interdisciplinary study, which draws on a wide range of primary sources, 
including archival research at all levels – republican, oblast’, district, village and private, published 
and unpublished memoirs and, on one occasion, an interview with a perpetrator; major corpora of 
oral memory, post-memory and cultural texts – into two parts. The first part employs a 
microhistorical analysis of the perpetrators and their actions through. Chapter One, ʻThe 
Mechanism of the Famine on the Groundʼ, outlines the Soviet policies that led to mass starvation 
and identifies various groups of people involved in the famine’s facilitation. It offers an analysis of 
events on village and district level, which reveals previously understudied groups, and employs a 
criminological approach to advance a new typology of the perpetrator. Chapter Two, ʻThe Case 
Studiesʼ, focuses on perpetrators in two villages: Toporyshche in the Zhytomyr oblast’ and Popivka 
in the Poltava oblast’. 
The second part explores the representation of the perpetrator in cultural memory, with a 
particular focus on Ukrainian novel, poetry, drama, film and museum practice, and examines how 
different cultural narratives frame the question of the agency of the perpetrator. While Soviet-era 
Ukrainian texts characterise the perpetrators as purely ideological participants, post-Soviet and 
diaspora artists cast them as the Other, while dissident authors disperse agency altogether. In order 
to support these claims I bring together archival evidence and works of cultural memory.
In this dissertation I show that people who facilitated the famine on the ground were 
predominantly ordinary people as the participants in other cases of mass violence, thus rendering 
the image of the Other, aberrant or exclusively ideological participant in cultural memory inefficient
to explain how this devastating famine was possible. By bringing together archival evidence and 
works of cultural memory, I foreground a central discrepancy between the identity and 
representation of the perpetrators of one of the most catastrophic events of the twentieth century.
Acknowledgements
I wish to thank Holodomor Research and Education Consortium and Marta Baziuk, the 
Faculty of Modern and Medieval Languages, Ukrainian Studies Department at University of 
Cambridge and CEELBAS for making this research project possible. Their financial support was 
significant: it proved my research had a meaning. So too did the willingness of my supervisor Dr 
Rory Finnin to take on a student with abundant enthusiasm but no funding. I am forever in debt for 
his encouragement, guidance and support. I also benefitted significantly from the opportunity to 
lecture and supervise in the Department of Slavonic Studies and the History Faculty in Cambridge 
and grateful to Dr Claire Knight and Dr Mark Smith in particular. Finally, my researching with 
Anne Applebaum for her book on the famine made me confident I could complete this work.
Crucially, I could not have persevered without support of my family: my husband Paul for 
tolerating my being away and obsessions with people long gone; and my father Yuriy Storozhuk 
who accompanied me to the interviews in the far away villages. Archivists, historians, friends and 
my children – they all trusted me along this long journey. Researching this devastating famine made
me realise how fortunate I am. That is why I dedicate this work, in words of Ukrainian poet Taras 
Shevchenko, to: ʻMy fellow countrypeople... living, dead and as yet unbornʼ. 
TRANSLITERATION, TRANSLATION, FILM AND INTERVIEW REFERENCING
In this thesis I have used the Library of Congress system of transliteration (without ligatures) to 
render the quotations from Russian and Ukrainian into Latin script. Where Russian or Ukrainian 
words appear in English language quotations or sources, I have kept the transliteration system used 
by the authors. At the time of writing, the state language in Ukraine is Ukrainian and so place 
names in Ukraine have been transliterated in Ukrainian (e.g. Kyiv not Kiev). Similarly, the names 
of individuals from Ukraine have been transliterated from the Ukrainian language. The intention is 
to provide some degree of consistency rather than to ascribe linguistic preference to any individual 
or place. Where provided, all translations are my own unless otherwise stated. 
The titles of films made at the Ukrainian studios have been transliterated in Ukrainian. At the first 
mention of the film, the title is followed by its translation into English, the last name of the director 
and the year of release in parentheses, unless the name of the director has already been mentioned. 
Interviews are are referenced using transliterated names of the interviewees, except when their 
identity or the last name of the interviewee is kept anomymous. 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ANC African National Congress
CheKa Chrezvychainaia Komissia (The Extraordinary Commission [for 
Combating Counter-Revolution, Profiteering and Corruption])
ChOP Chastyny Osoblyvoho Pryznachennia (Special Assignment 
Detachments)
DAZhO Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Zhytomyrskoii oblasti (State Archive of 
Zhytomyr Province)
DPU Derzhavne Politychne Upravlinnia (The State Political Directorate)
HDA SBU Haluzevyi Derzhavnyi Archiv Sluzhby Bezpeky Ukrainy (The 
Archive Department of the Security Service of Ukraine)
ICTY The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
KNS Komitety Nezamozhnykh Selian (Committees of Non-Wealthy 
Peasants)
KP(b)U Komunistychna Partia (bilʼshovykiv) Ukraiiny (Communist Party 
(Bilshovyk) of Ukraine) 
MTS Mashynno-Traktorna Stantsiia (Machine-Tractor Station)
NKVD Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del  (The Peopleʼs Commissariat 
for Internal Affairs) 
OGPU Obʼiedinennoe Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie (The Joint 
State Political Directorate)
RGASPI Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsialʼno-Politicheskoi Istorii 
(The Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History)
RPK Raionnyi Partiinyi Komitet (District Party Committee)
RSChA Robitnycho-seliansʼka Chervona Armiia (The Workersʼ and 
Peasantsʼ Red Army) 
RVK Raionnyi Vykonavchyi Komitet (District Executive Committee)
SNK Sovet Narodnykh Komissarov (Council of Peopleʼs Commissars)
SVU Spilka Vyzvolennia Ukraiiny (The Union for the Liberation of 
Ukraine)
TORHZIN Torhivlia Z Inozemtsiamy (Trade With Foreigners)
TsDAHOU Tsentralʼnyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Hromadsʼkykh Organizatsii 
Ukraiiny (Central State Archive of Public Organizations of Ukraine)
TsK KP(b)U Tsentralʼnyi Komitet Komunistychnoii Partii (bilʼshovykiv) Ukraiiny 
(Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bilʼshovyk) of Ukraine)
TsK VKP(b) Tsentralʼnyi Komitet Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii 
(bolʼshevikov) (Central Committee of All-Soviet Communist Party 
(Bolshevik)
TSOAviaKhim Tovarystvo Spryiannia Oboroni, Aviatsii i Khimii (Society of 
Assistance to Defence and Aviation-Chemical Construction) 
TsVK Tsentralʼnyi Vykonavchyi Komitet (Central Executive Commitee) of 
Soviet Ukraine
VTsIK Vserossiiskii Tsentralʼnyi Ispolnitelʼnyi Komitet (The All-Russian 
Central Executive Committee)
Table of Contents
Introduction: Heroes and Villains in the Study and Memory of the Holodomor........................1
Purpose of the Study...............................................................................................................2
Historiography on the Rank-and-file Perpetrators of the Holodomor.....................................5




Chapter I – The Mechanism of the Holodomor and Its Lower Rank Participants
Introduction...........................................................................................................................18
Part 1 – The Act of Perpetration............................................................................................18
Part 2 – Identifying Perpetrators...........................................................................................20
Part 3 – District Officials......................................................................................................23
                          3.1 A Watershed: III KP(b)U Conference and the Purges.......................................24
                          3.2 Demographics.....................................................................................................30
                          3.3 Richytskyi Case..................................................................................................31
Part 4 – Search Brigades.......................................................................................................34
Part 5 – Institutional Composition of Brigades..…...............................................................39
                            5.1 KNS.….............................................................................................................40
5.2 Shock-Collective Farmers.................................................................................42
                            5.3 Teachers............................................................................................................46
                            5.4 Komsomol........................................................................................................49
                            5.5 Plenipotentiaries...............................................................................................52
Part 6 – Tugboat Brigades.....................................................................................................55
Part 7 – Variety of Roles.......................................................................................................56
                            7.3 The Informers: Silʼkory and Neighbours.........................................................57
                            7.4 The Field Guards..............................................................................................58
                            7.5 The Spouses......................................................................................................60
Conclusion.............................................................................................................................61
Chapter II – Case Studies
Introduction...........................................................................................................................63
Part 1 – The case of Toporyshche, Khoroshiv district, Zhytomyr Province.........................63
Part 2 – The case of Popivka, Myrhorod district, Poltava Province.....................................71
Conclusion.............................................................................................................................78
PART TWO
Cultural Memory of the Holodomor Perpetrators...........................................................80
Chapter III – Representation of the Rank-and-File Perpetrators of the Holodomor in Prose
Introduction...........................................................................................................................82
Part 1 – Soviet Novels...........................................................................................................83
Part 2 – Samvydav and Tamvydav Novels of the Soviet Period..........................................91
Part 3 – The Ukrainian Novel in Diaspora...........................................................................98
Part 4 – Post-Soviet Ukrainian Prose..................................................................................104
Conclusion...........................................................................................................................111
Chapter IV – Representation of the Rank-and-File Perpetrators of the Holodomor in Poetry
Introduction.........................................................................................................................113
Part 1 – Soviet Poetry..........................................................................................................114
Part 2 – Dissident Poetry.....................................................................................................116
Part 3 – Poetry in the Diaspora and Independent Ukraine..................................................118
Conclusion...........................................................................................................................121
Chapter V – Representation of the Rank-and-File Perpetrators of the Holodomor in Drama
Part 1 – Soviet plays............................................................................................................122
Part 2 – Plays in the Diaspora and Independent Ukraine....................................................124
Conclusion...........................................................................................................................128
Chapter VI – Representation of the Rank-and-File Perpetrators of the Holodomor in Film
Introduction.........................................................................................................................129
Part 1 – Fiction....................................................................................................................129
Part 2 – Documentaries.......................................................................................................137
Conclusion...........................................................................................................................147
Chapter VII – Representation of the Rank-and-File Perpetrators at National Museum 
ʻHolodomor Victims Memorialʼ
Introduction.........................................................................................................................149




ʻIdle, Drunk and Good-for-Nothingʼ:
The Rank-and-File Perpetrators of 1932-1933 Famine in Ukraine 
and Their Representation in Cultural Memory
Introduction: 
Heroes and Villains in the Study and Memory of the Holodomor 
What the eyes do not see, the heart does not suffer.1
In late 1932 a young reporter from Kharkiv, Lev Kopelev, was sent by the party to help 
grain procurement in Kharkiv oblast’. At the height of a catastrophic famine striking the Ukrainian 
countryside, he searched peasant huts and confiscated grain, foodstuffs and valuables – all of which 
led to mass starvation. In his memoirs, Kopelev describes himself as ʻa true believer,ʼ2 for whom 
the ends justified the means, and explains how he eagerly followed the examples set by the fervent 
local Communists. One of them at the time – the head of the village council, Bubyr – was, in the 
words of Kopelev, ʻan epitome of truth and justice... he did not know what fear was.ʼ3 According to 
archival evidence and survivor testimonies, however, Bubyr was nothing but: he used his position 
of power to profit financially, and he was persecuted for cowardly behaviour at the front in 1942 
and reportedly attempted to defect to the Nazis.4 
Kopelev and Bubyr showcase a prominent, tragic divergence between history and memory 
oriented on the role of the men and women responsible for one of the darkest moments in the 
twentieth-century history of Europe. In local post-memory of the events of the famine of 1932-33 in
Soviet Ukraine, known as Holodomor in Ukrainian,5 Kopelev and his colleagues are inaccurately 
remembered as Russians from the North.6 Historians cite them as genuine fanatics enforcing 
collectivization,7 while writers cast them as savage Others in cultural texts.8 In other words, they 
remain subject to a problematic reduction. 
This dissertation – an interdisciplinary study of the traces of such rank-and file perpetrators 
1 Ukrainian proverb: ʽChoho ochi ne bachatʼ, za te sertse ne bolytʼʼ.
2 The title of his memoir reads Education of a True Believer. Lev Kopelev, trans. G. Kern, The education of a true 
believer (London: Wildwood House, 1981).
3 Lev Kopelev, I sotvoril sebe kumira (Kharkiv: Ardis, 2010), p. 260.
4 Upravlinnia SBU v Poltavsʼkii oblasti, f. R, spr. 19254, spr. 10143-c, spr. 15246, spr. 15140; from the interview 
with V. Osheka, the head of the village council in Popivka, 18.10.2015; D. Shupyk, S. Bilan, V. Osheka, Doroha do
ridnoho domu (Istoriia sela Popivky Myrhorodsʼkoho raionu Poltavsʼkoii oblasti) (Poltava, 2013), p. 45. 
5 The term Holodomor, which connotes ʻdeliberate death by hungerʼ in Ukrainian, is used throughout this dissertation 
to underline the famineʼs man-made nature.
6 UCRDC, Kataloh spohadiv, no 99, Oleksii Konoval, selo Petrivtsi.
7 Anne Applebaum, Red Famine: Stalinʼs War on Ukraine (London: Allen Lane, 2017), pp. 116-117; Robert 
Conquest, Znyva skorboty. Kolektyvizatsiia i Holodomor (Kyiv: Lybid, 1993), p. 191; Ronald G. Suny, The Soviet 
Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 227; Robert
C. Tucker, Stalin in Power. The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941 (New York: W.W. Norton&Company, 1992), p.
547.
8 See, for example, Ulas Samchuk, Maria. Khronika odnoho zhittia (Kyiv: Smoloskyp, 2014); Svitlana Talan, 
Rozkolote Nebo (Kharkiv: Klub Simeinoho Dozvillia, 2015); Natalʼia Vorozhbit, The Grain Store (London: Nick 
Hern Books, 2009).
in history and in memory – seeks to shed overdue light on them. The Holodomor was part of a 
Soviet Union-wide famine caused by the policies of collectivization and excessive grain 
procurement. In Ukraine, a number of measures authorized by the Soviet leadership in late 1932 
turned the famine into an event of mass violence and death. It is estimated to have claimed the lives 
of approximately four million people.9 Our understanding of its actors on the ground remains 
unclear.
While it is generally accepted that most perpetrators of mass violence are ordinary people 
with rather banal motives,10 the men and women who facilitated the famine on the ground are 
portrayed as anything but ordinary in cultural memory. In Soviet literature, for instance, they are 
characterised by Soviet writers as heroes and martyrs, while writers in the Ukrainian diaspora and in
independent Ukraine describe them as idlers, savage Others or disillusioned Communists. Such 
contradictory representations in cultural memory circulate alongside each other in contemporary 
Ukrainian society, impeding knowledge of one of the most catastrophic events of the twentieth 
century. Today state ʻmemory makersʼ in Ukraine exhibit symptoms of the problem. For instance, 
the state-funded Ukrainian Institute of National Memory recommends that schools and local 
governments base commemoration of the famine on texts by post-Soviet or emigre literati, while a 
governmental online portal that serves 694 village councils advances a mostly Soviet narrative from
the voluminous Istoriia mist ta sil Ukraiinsʼkoii RSR (History of Towns and Villages of Ukrainian 
RSR (1966-1973). Such entangled, contested memories reflect the complexity of the participation of
ordinary people in an extraordinary catastrophe.
If the cultural memory of the perpetrator is entangled and even contradictory, what does 
history teach us? Indeed, who precisely were the rank-and-file perpetrators of the Holodomor? This 
is a striking question that has received little scholarly attention to this day. In an attempt to answer 
it, I examine the participation of various groups in collectivisation and the famine and consider the 
effects of virulent propaganda and routinized mass habituation to violence on the men and women 
whose actions made the Holodomor possible. While these processes make the famine not unlike 
other cases of mass violence, the Holodomor is distinguished from them in a number of ways. 
Unlike the perpetrators of other crimes, for example, the rank-and-file perpetrators of the 1932-
9 Estimations of the number of victims vary, but the dominant consensus among demographers and historians is 3.9 
million. See: Jacques Vallin, France Meslé, Sergei Adamets, and Serhii Pyrozhkov ‘Kryza 1930 rr,’ eds. France 
Meslé and Jacques Vallin, Smertnistʼ ta prychyny smerti v Ukraiini u XX stolitti (Kyiv: Stylos, 2008), pp. 37-65; 
Omelian Rudnytsʼkyi, Nataliia Levchuk, Oleh Wolowyna, and Pavlo Shevchuk, ‘Famine losses in Ukraine in 1932 
to 1933 within the context of the Soviet Union,’ eds. Declan Curran, Lubomyr Luciuk, and Andrew Newby, 
Famines in European Economic History: The Last Great European Famines Reconsidered (London, 2015).
10 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem – a Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: The Viking Press, 1963); 
Raul Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders – the Jewish Catastrophe (New York: Harper Perennial, 1992); 
Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men – Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (New 
York: Aaron Asher Books, 1992).
1933 famine were not trained, on the whole, to exercise coercion or physical force.
Nor have perpetrators of the famine been put on trial in their lifetimes, despite the general 
condemnation of Soviet crimes. On the contrary: as I will show, perpetrators of the Holodomor 
often exercised more power and authority after the famine. Many of them retained or ascended to 
key positions at the village level: as heads of collective farms and village councils, headmasters of 
schools, history teachers or collective farm brigade leaders. As such, they continued to shape – or 
even efface – the representations of the famine. As village officials and local historians, they even 
provided entries to the Istoriia mist ta sil, unwittingly promoted by the Ukrainian government 
today. 
My use of the term ‘perpetratorʼ merits elaboration. I employ it not to mark a moral or legal
position but to distinguish those whose actions led to the starvation of millions of their fellow 
citizens at peace time. As OʼByrne observes, ʻthere is no single definitionʼ of the term, which 
ʻvaries according to context.ʼ11 I argue in this study that this terminology is apt due to the deliberate,
violent nature of the Holodomor and its vast scope of destruction. Between late 1932 and early 
1933, with famine already gripping much of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin applied a number of 
legislative provisions specifically to Ukraine, leading to what Applebaum, Graziosi and other 
historians of the Soviet Union call ‘a famine within the famine.ʼ12 These policies include the closure
of the borders of the Ukrainian republic; the confiscation of all foodstuffs from starving peasants; 
the extensive ‘blacklistingʼ of entire districts (raiony), which constituted almost half of Soviet 
Ukraine; increased grain requisitions; and the refusal of state relief to the starving. These policies 
and those who executed them on the ground led to the death of millions of innocent people. 
Some scholars might oppose an interpretation of the actors of the famine on the ground as 
‘perpetrators’, especially those who refer to its victims as ‘the human costʼ or inevitable ‘strainʼ of 
the First Five-Year-Plan, which they present as a grand effort aimed at improving the lives of Soviet
citizens through rapid industrialization or the result of ‘a badly conceived and miscalculated 
policy.ʼ13 Such a position, in my view, dehumanises the victims by accepting the epistemological 
authority and rationality of the top perpetrators and their followers. This stance is made possible by 
what Anderson calls ‘the subtle discourse of exoticismʼ: that is, the victims are distant from ‘usʼ in 
11 Darren OʼByrne, ‘Perpetrators? Political Civil Servants in the Third Reich,ʼ T. Williams and S. Buckley-Zistel, eds.,
Perpetrators and Perpetration of Mass Violence: Action, Motivations and Dynamics (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018).
12 Applebaum, Red Famine, p. 193; A. Graziosi, ‘The Soviet 1931-1933 Famines and the Ukrainian Holodomor: Is a 
New Interpretation Possible, and What Would Its Consequences Be?ʼ Harvard Ukrainian Studies 27, no. 1/4 (2004),
p. 102. 
13 In order of citations: Chris Ward, Stalinʼs Russia (London: Edward Arnold, 1993), Chapter 3; R. W. Davies and 
Stephen G. Wheatcroft, The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931–1933 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2009), p. 435, 441; Suny, The Soviet Experiment, p. 228.
time, space or culture.14 Others might argue that those who executed Soviet policy on the ground 
during the famine were merely acting in the service of the state; they were cogs without agency or 
criminals: e.g. ‘All officials involved were either following orders or were removed and most often 
repressedʼ15 and ‘... more often than not did not have any morals, they stole the foodstuffs.ʼ16
According to this logic, confiscating the last scrap of food from a starving child may be 
deviant from a moral point of view, but such actions were ultimately sanctioned by the Soviet state. 
Put differently, this thinking frames the perpetrator as ‘alienated from the product of his actions’, 
just as the worker in Marxian thought is alienated ‘from the product of his labour’.17 Indeed, the 
Soviet Union can be understood in the 1930s as criminogenic (crime-producing)18, as actively 
perpetrating and condoning criminal acts. Gerlach in fact suggests that we should regard the Soviet 
Union of the Stalinist period as a society indelibly marked by excessive violence, most of which 
was conditioned by the experience of the First World War, revolution, and Civil War. Citizens were
socialised to support violent acts through propaganda and within military organizations (RSChA, 
TSOAviaKhim), schools, and organizations for youth (pioneers and Komsomol). 
This abrogation of personal responsibility is ubiquitous in cases of mass violence. It pivots 
on an understanding of the event as ‘a human evil of staggering magnitude without any authors.ʼ19 
Yet such an argument lacks rigour. As Schmidt posits, even if structural political violence helps to 
withhold and obscure individual responsibility, perpetrators in events like the Holodomor still have 
agency, whether they are front-line actors or those whom Hanna Arendt named ‘mask murderers 
who had never killed’ and do not seem to have blood on their hands. This abrogation is summerised
in the words of Eichmann:  ‘I never killed a Jew, or a non-Jew, for that matter – I never killed a 
human being. I never gave an order to kill …’20 His words are echoed in Kopelev’s explanation: 
ʻThanks God, I did not kill anyone, nor imprisoned...’21 But actions of the perpetrators like him 
made the famine possible: they seized food from the starving; beat and tortured them for ‘hording’ 
grain; extorted property from them; kept desperate men, women and children from ʻpilferingʼ fields;
and restricted their movement and travel to destinations that may have saved their lives. These 
14 Kjell Anderson, Perpetrating Genocide. A Criminological Account (New York: Routledge, 2018), pp. 105-106.
15 S. Kul’chyts’kyi, Holod 1932-1933 rr. v Ukraiini iak Henotsyd: movoiu dokumentiv, ochyma svidkiv (Kyiv: Nash 
chas, 2008), p. 120; M. Doroshko, Nomenklatura: kerivna verkhivka radians’koii Ukraiiny (1917-1938 rr.) (Kyiv, 
2012), p. 306; V. Borysenko, ed. Svicha pam’iati: Usna istoriia pro henotsyd Ukraiintsiv u 1932-1933 rokakh 
(Kyiv: Stylos, 2007), p. 32.
16 O. Udod, S. Kulʼchytsʼkyi and V. Lozytsʼkyi, eds. Holodomor 1932-1933 rokiv v Ukraiini: zlochyn vlady – trahedia
narodu (Kyiv: Geneza, 2008), p. 13. 
17 J. Littell, The Kindly Ones (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), p. 16. 
18 Anderson, Perpetrating Genocide, 2018, p. 85.
19 Sybille Schmidt, ‘Perpetrators’ Knowledge: What and How Can We Learn from Perpetrator Testimony?’ Journal of
Perpetrator Research 1.1 (2017), p. 99.
20 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, p. 22.
21 UCRDC, Interview with Kopelev, sound roll 3.
actions had devastating consequences, and these consequences were tragically evident and foreseen.
Locating agency in such individuals raises the question as to whether they should be considered 
auctor delicti, the authors of a crime, or executors delicti, the executors of a crime.22
While it is difficult to establish such degrees of legal responsibility and draw the line of 
perpetration, it is clear that Stalin, like Hitler, would have been ‘nothing but a wineskin bloated with
hatred and impotent terrorʼ without the involvement of ordinary people.23 This study seeks to 
examine the actions of these ordinary people and to explore their diverse itineraries in Ukrainian 
cultural memory; it does not focus on the actions of individuals within the DPU, the police, RSChA 
(the Red Army), or political departments at MTS (Machine-Tractor Stations), for instance, who by 
profession were trained and expected to employ coercion or violence. 
Historiography of the Rank-and-File Perpertrators of the Holodomor
If the rank-and-file perpetrators of the Holodomor do receive attention from scholars, the 
attention tends to be fleeting or underdeveloped. According to Maksudov, for instance, the 
perpetrators ‘pursued their own selfish interests, furthering their careers by establishing control over
the rural population. All Communists and many Komsomol members were armed with pistols.ʼ24 
Kuromiya, meanwhile, observes that survivors of the famine often mistakenly interpreted Russified 
cadre sent to their villages from Ukrainian cities and towns as ‘Russians.ʼ25 Such perceptions fuel a 
simplistic interpretation of collectivization and the famine as a predominantly Russian assault on 
Ukraine, which would later be developed in cultural memory by many diaspora and post-Soviet 
Ukrainian literati. 
The fact that the scholarly discussion of the Holodomor perpetrators is in its infancy is due 
to the relatively recent nature of the Holodomor scholarship more generally. Academic discussion 
of the 1932-1933 famine as such did not start until the Khrushchev Thaw due to a thorough 
silencing of the subject by the Soviet regime. Refusing to acknowledge the famine and referring to 
it by way of euphemisms like ‘food difficulties,ʼ26 Soviet historians identified the following as the 
22 Ibid, p. 100.
23 Littell, The Kindly Ones, 2009, p. 19.
24 Sergei Maksudov and Marta D. Olynyk, ‘Dehumanization: The Change in the Moral and Ethical Consciousness of 
Soviet Citizens as a Result of Collectivization and Famine,’ Harvard Ukrainian Studies 30, no. 1/4 (2008), pp. 130-
131.
25 Hiroaki Kuromiya, Freedom and Terror in the Donbass. A Ukrainian-Russian Borderland, 1870s-1990s 
(Cambridge University Press), p. 197.
26 James Mace, ‘Radians’ka istoriographiia Holodu. Pisliastalins’kyi period,’ Velykyi Holod v Ukraiini. Zvit 
kongresovo-prezydents’koii komisii SShA z doslidzhennia Velykoho Holodu 1932-1933 rr v Ukraiini vol. 4 (Kyiv: 
Vydavnychyi Dim ‘Kyievo-Mohylians’ka Academiia,’ 2008), pp. 70-105; Stanislav Kul’chyts’kyi, ‘Holodomor u 
pratsiakh ukraiins’kykh radians’kykh istorykiv 1956–1987 rr,’ Istoriia v suchasnii shkoli: naukovo-metodychnyi 
zhurnal, no. 10 (146) (2013), pp. 29–31; Janusz Radziejowski, ‘Collectivization in Ukraine in light of Soviet 
historiography,’ Journal of Ukrainian Studies, 5, no. 2 (1980), pp. 3–17.
major causes of what were ‘food shortagesʼ: unfavourable weather conditions; poor management of 
the collective farms and organization of grain procurement on the ground; ‘excessesʼ by the Soviet 
and party officials; and anti-Soviet activities by the enemies of the regime.27 While some Soviet 
researchers placed responsibility for this ‘situationʼ on Stalin, Kaganovich and Molotov – adding 
that Stalin ‘encouraged arbitrariness towards the peasantryʼ28 – others laid the blame entirely on the 
rank-and-file officials in a manner similar to Stalin’s article ‘Dizziness with Success.ʼ29 
At the same time, a number of Soviet scholars revealed the involvement of various groups 
in the grain procurement of unrealistic targets that led to the famine: MTS, KNS (Committees for 
Non-Weathy Peasants), thousands of village commissions that consisted of local officials and 
activists, collective farmers, trade union workers, members of the Komsomol, various 
plenipotentiaries, workers, and Communists from the cities.30 According to these sources, these 
perpetrators worked in precarious conditions: they were verbally and physically assaulted and, 
according to Slynʼko, faced purges of up to 25-30% in some districts in Ukraine.31 Another Soviet 
scholar, Suslo, even claimed that district and village officials deliberately exaggerated the amount 
of grain that could have been procured to their superiors in order to advance their career. As a 
result, they drove their constituency into destitution. He also implied that the officials at the 
republican level were complicit in this behaviour, hence removing agency from the Kremlin.32 
Between the Thaw and the 1980s, there is little Soviet scholarship on the events of 1932-
33. In the face of the Soviet denial of the famine, and given that the archives were largely closed to 
western scholars, an article on the role of KNS in facilitating the famine by Mace in 1983 appears to
us today as a remarkable study indeed. Mace posits that KNS members played a key role in 
enforcing the policies that led to famine on the village level.33 He claims that KNS consisted of 
village outcasts empowered by the regime but not representative of the rural society. Recent 
research by Levandovska reveals that the state did not rely on KNS alone when it deployed tens of 
27 See, for instance, V. Bondarenko, Razvitie obshchestvennogo khoziaistva kolkhozov Ukraiiny v gody dovoennikh 
piatiletok (Kyiv: AN URSR, 1957), p. 35; O. Kasymenko, Istoriia Ukraiinsʼkoi RSR: populiarnyi narys (Kyiv: AN 
URSR, 1960),p.  292; S. Iudachev, Borʼba KPSS za organizatsionno-khoziaistvennoe ukreplenie kolkhozov (1933-
1934) (Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 1962), pp. 19-34.
28 V. Danilov, N. Ivnitskii, ‘Leninskii kooperativnyi plan i ego osushchestvlenie v SSSR’ and I. Ganzha, I. Slinʼko, P. 
Shostak, ‘Ukrainskoe selo na puti k sotsialismu,’ Ocherki istorii kolektivizatsii selʼskogo khoziaistva v Soiuznykh 
respublikakh, ed. V. Danilov (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1962), pp. 54-55.
29 S. Iudachev, Borʼba KPSS, 73; M. Kutz, Pytannia kolhospnoho budivnytstva na Ukraiini, 1929-1941 rr. (Lviv: 
Vydavnytstvo Lvivsʼkoho universytetu, 1965); J. Stalin, ‘Golovokruzhenie ot uspekhov’, Pravda, 10th March 1930.
30 See, for instance, Sotsialistychna perebudova i rozvytok silʼsʼkoho hospodarstva Ukraiinsʼkoii RSR, vol. 1 (Kyiv: 
Vyd-vo Kyivsʼkoho un-tu, 1967), 460-461; I. Slynʼko, Sotsialistychna perebudova i tekhnichna rekonstruktsiia 
sil’s’koho hospodarstva Ukraiiny (1927-1932 rr) (Kyiv, 1961), pp. 285-289.
31 I. Ganzha, I. Slinʼko, P. Shostak, ‘Ukrainskoe selo,’ p. 199.
32 Mace, ‘Radians’ka istoriographiia Holodu’, 2008, p. 87.
33 James E. Mace, ‘The Komitety Nezamozhnykh Selian and the Structure of Soviet Rule in the Ukrainian 
Countryside, 1920-1933,’ Soviet Studies, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Oct., 1983).
thousands of Communists and workers from the cities. Moreover, during NEP, KNS as an 
organization was considerably weak, and many of its members were purged.34 
The first academic monograph on the 1932-1933 famine, Conquest’s The Harvest of 
Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine (1986), opened up scholarly discussion of 
the famine among academics in the West. Without assigning a separate chapter to the perpetrators, 
Conquest identifies them as the same people who were involved in dekulakization and 
collectivization: local officials, KNS, Komsomol, Communists and workers from the cities, teachers
and activists. Using oral memory and memoirs as sources while critically assessing Soviet 
scholarship on the subject and newspapers of that period, Conquest demonstrates that the men and 
women facilitating the Holodomor on the ground did have agency: many local officials defied the 
orders, while others duly followed them, sometimes with enthusiasm. Conquest acknowledges that 
they faced resistance and repressions and that they were often accused of sabotage as well as 
excesses. Their motivation varied from fanaticism to the settling of personal scores. Due to the 
sweeping scope of the book, however, Conquest offers no typology of the perpetrators, nor does he 
reflect on the long-term implications of their participation. Overall, in his view, the rank-and-file 
activists who searched the houses and confiscated food from the starving families were not much 
different from ʻthugs and idealists.’35 To prove this point, he lists a large number of examples of 
violent searches, beatings and murders and cites from the memoirs of those who claimed they 
participated out of their belief in the Soviet project. 
The pioneering works by Mace and Conquest received an almost immediate response from 
Soviet scholars. In 1987, first secretary of the TsK KPU Shcherbytsʼkyi officially acknowledged the
famine, which sparked vivid public discussion. Journalistic media were flooded with memoirs and 
letters from survivors, documentaries produced and works by the Soviet and diaspora Ukrainian 
authors were published.36 In 1988 Kul’chyts’kyi, then a Soviet historian, explained the famine along
the lines of the academic discussion of the Thaw. He also stressed the importance of the III All-
Ukrainian Party conference in July 1932, when some of the district and republican officials 
criticised the grain procurement plan and pointed to the disastrous state of the countryside.37 In this 
way Kul’chyts’kyi demonstrated that the decisions about the policies that led to the famine were 
made in Moscow. From this point on, Kul’chyts’kyi’s research would evolve continuously, proving 
34 Levandovsʼka E., ‘The Role of Committees of Poor Peasants in Realization of the Soviet Policy in Ukrainian 
village,’ Naukovi pratsi istorychnnoho fakultetu Zaporiz’koho natsional’noho universytetu, 2013, no XXXVII, 122.
35 Conquest, Znyva skorboty, p. 192.
36 Liudmyla, Hrynevych, ‘Vid zaperechuvannia do vymushenoho vyznannia: pro mekhanizmy vkhodzhennia temy 
holodu 1932-1933 rr. v ofitsiinyi publichnyi prostir v SRSR ta URSR naprykintsi 1980-kh rr.’ Problemy istorii 
Ukraiiny: fakty, sudzhennia, poshuky: Mizhvidomchyi dovidnyk naukovykh prats’ 18, 2008, pp. 232-44.
37 Stanislav Kul’chyts’kyi, ‘Historical Experience: Vital Today’, News From Ukraine (1988), No. 2, p. 7.
a subject for research in and of itself. While he has never published any dedicated work on the 
question of the perpetrator, he advanced the claim in 1992 that profiteering was a major motivation 
for the mass participation in dekulakization, while his co-author Shatalina pointed to the gratuitous 
violence that most peasants feared.38
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening of the archives, an impressive body 
of research and documentation on the political decisions that led to the famine39 has accumulated 
both in Ukraine and abroad. As Andriewsky points out, most historians approach the mechanism of 
the famine from the position of the state and its leadership, confronting their intentions, methods 
and decisions.40 In their study of the top perpetrators, Vasylʼiev and Shapoval detail how decisions 
made by Stalin were put into action by his envoys Kaganovich and Molotov.41 Perhaps the best 
illustration of such implementation of Stalin’s policies on the ground to date is a collection of 
documents edited by Vasylʼiev, Werth and Kokin.42 Vasylʼiev has also published widely on the 
power relationship between the Ukrainian Communist leadership and the Kremlin, pointing out that 
the former lost its position of sub-centre during the famine.43
Scholars have also examined distinct groups of perpetrators on the ground. Fitzpatrick 
considers the participation in and support of the state policies by younger generations in the 1930s;44
Viola focusses on the role of the Twenty-Five Thousanders – workers sent to organize collective 
farms. In fact, together with Vasylyev, Viola has delved deeply into the subject of the trained 
perpetrators of the Great Terror in Ukraine, the DPU, elucidating their role during the famine. In 
their work on collectivisation and the peasant resistance to it, Vasylʼiev and Viola note that among 
the millions of state employees involved in collectivisation and the famine, there were many hard-
working and responsible individuals who ‘with sympathetic reluctance … applied their training and 
expertise to uproot and divide families.ʼ45 Viola’s latest work on the lower- and middle-level NKVD
38 Stanislav Kul’chyts’kyi, and Ie. Shatalina, ‘Protses rozkurkulennia 1929 – 1932 rr. ochyma selian’, Problemy istorii
Ukraiiny: Fakty. Sudzhennia. Poshuky. Respublikans’kyi mizhvidomchyi zbirnyk naukovykh prats’ (Kyiv, 1992), No 
2, 41-45; Ie. Shatalina, ‘Ekspropriatsiia selians’kykh gospodarstv v Ukraiini u 1929-1932 rr.’, Ukraiins’kyi 
istorychnyi zhurnal, 1992 (No 3).
39 Nicolas, Werth, ‘Keynote Address for the Holodomor Conference, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 17-18 
November 2008’, Harvard Ukrainian Studies 30, no. 1/4 (2008), pp. xxix-xxviii.
40 Olga Andriewsky, ‘Towards a Decentred History: The Study of the Holodomor and Ukrainian Historiography’, 
Contextualizing the Holodomor. The Impact of the Thirty Years of Ukrainian Famine Studies, ed. by Andrij Makuch
and Frank E. Sysyn (Edmonton-Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2015), p. 34.
41 Iurii Shapoval and Valerii Vasyl’iev, eds. Komandyry velykoho holodu: Poiizdky V. Molotova i L. Kaganovycha v 
Ukraiinu ta na Pivnichnyi Kavkaz, 1932-1933 rr. (Kyiv, 2001).
42 Valerii Vasyl’iev, Nickolas Werth and Serhii Kokin eds. Partiino-radians’ke kerivnytstvo Ukraiins’koii SSR pid 
chas Holodomoru 1932–1933: Vozhdi. Pratsivnyky. Actyvisty. Zbirnyk dokumentiv ta materialiv (Kyiv: Instytut 
istorii Ukraiiny, 2013), p. 10.
43 Valerii Vasylʼiev and Lynne Viola, Kolektyvizatsiia i selians’kyi opir na Ukraiini (lystopad 1929 – berezenʼ 1930) 
(Vinnitsa: Logos, 1997).
44 Sheila Fitzpatrick, Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union, 1921–1934 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979).
45 L. Viola and V. Vasilʼev eds., Kollektivizatsia i krestʼianskoe soprotivlenie na Ukraine (Vinnytsia, 1997), p. 229.
cadres who carried out the purges in 1937-1938 shows the impact of situational and individual 
factors on the execution of the orders.46 In Ukraine, Ievseieva has touched upon the participation of 
‘military atheists’ in grain procurement; Kis’ has noted the absence of research on female 
perpetrators of the famine; Kas’ianov has commented on the role of teachers in the dekulakization 
campaign; and Riabchenko has researched the everyday life of students sent to the villages during 
the collectivization drive.47 
Other researchers have approached mass violence during collectivization in Ukraine from a 
completely different perspective. In his comparative analysis of mass violence in the twentieth 
century, Gerlach places Ukraine among a group of extremely violent societies that, in certain 
circumstances, explode in paroxysms of violence.48 Indeed, disdain for the rule of law in the 
practice of lynching was widespread before the famine. Further research into widespread lynching 
during and after the famine reveals that village officials often joined, if not led, the lynching mobs. 
The scale of lynching was so extreme that the first secretary of TsK KP(b)U ordered provincial 
party committees to punish the culprits.49 At the time prominent writer and political activist 
Vynnychenko regarded this endemic of violence as stemming from the psychological state of the 
peasantry, habituated to violence during the First World War and ensuing revolution.50 
Though the study of the perpetrators of the famine is in its initial stages, several Ukrainian 
historians have started writing ‘history from below.’ For instance, Drovoziuk has sought to establish
behavioural patterns of the village activists during the famine. In his research, he argues that the 
policy of Sovietization of the Ukrainian rural population defined the qualities that the new regime 
was looking for in potential perpetrators.51 Drovoziuk also explores various ‘practical’ capacities in 
which local peasants could have been involved in collectivization: compiling lists for 
dekulakization, confiscating property, evicting and persecuting the dekulakized. He splits the 
perpetrators into two groups: those who defied the orders and those who implemented them with 
sadism and terror.
Drovoziuk explains participation by way of personal traits and speculates that a 
46 Lynne Viola, Stalinist Perpetrators on Trial. Scenes from the Great Terror in Soviet Ukraine (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2017). 
47 T. Ievsieieva, ‘Bezbozhna p’iatyrichka. Dial’nistʼ voiovnychykh bezvirnykiv,’ Holod 1932-1933 rokiv v Ukraiini: 
prychyny ta naslidky (Kyiv: Naukova Dumka, 2003), pp. 656-675; Oksana Kis’, ‘Defying Death: Womenʼs 
Experience of the Holodomor, 1932–1933’, Aspasia 7, pp. 42-67; Heorgii Kas’ianov, ‘Ukraiins’ka intelihentsia v 
1933 r.’, Problemy istorii Ukraiiny (Kyiv, 1992), No. 2, pp. 93-94; O. Riabchenko, Studenty radians’koii Ukraiiny 
1920–1930-kh rokiv: praktyky povsiakdennosti ta konflikty identyfikatsii (Kharkiv: KhNAMG, 2012).
48 Christian Gerlach, Extremely Violent Societies: Mass Violence in the Twentieth-Century World (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010).
49 N. Romanets’, ‘Borot’ba z samosudamy v Ukraiins’komu seli, 1933–1935 rr’, Naukovi pratsi istorychnoho 
fakul’tetu Zaporis’koho Natsional’noho Universytetu XXIX (2010), p. 186. 
50 Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Vidrodzhennia natsii (Kyiv, 1990), p. 51.
51 Stepan Drovoziuk, ‘Povedinka sil’s’kykh aktyvistiv pid chas sutsil’noii kolektyvizatsii ta Holodomoru 
Ukraiins’koho narodu (1932-1933 rr)’, Istoriia Ukraiiny. Malovidomi imena, podii, fakty, vol. 34 (2007), pp. 67-79.
microhistorical approach might help substantiate his claims. He advocates a study of the 
perpetrators as involving analysis of their biographies and their ‘reputation within the local 
community’ in a given historical context. First, he notes, historians should establish identities at the 
village level and examine how people were selected as well as their social background, education, 
work, political views, age and reactions in various life situations. The latter is important, he argues, 
as it demonstrates whether society ‘was able to put aside cruel types of perpetrators to enforce the 
policies of totalitarian regimes.’52 Though he acknowledges the importance of the ‘silent majority’ 
by referencing Kapustian,53 Drovoziuk concludes that village activists represent a separate 
psychotype essential for the maintenance of totalitarian power. 
Another historian who explores behavioural patterns of the activists, Lysenko, argues that 
collectivisation actorss on the ground can be split into three categories: marginalised elements of the
village; sadists; and sympathetic officials who left or hid grain in the villages, opposed directives 
and encouraged the peasants to resist.54 Veselova, meanwhile, argues that individual behavior 
during the famine also depended on the stage of starvation: desperate to survive, she claims, some 
peasants became aggressive and defied all social constraints.55 Finally, perpetrators at the district 
level are mentioned in the work of Doroshko on party officials or nomenklatura in the 1930s and 
during the famine in particular. He focuses mainly on their remuneration, repressions in case of 
disobedience, and ‘blind’ and thorough completion of tasks.56 
Interdisciplinary Approaches to the Study of the Perpetrators of the Holodomor
 According to Mamdani, both academic and popular accounts of crimes against humanity 
suffer from three silences.57 One of the silences is an evacuation of agency from the men and 
women who perpetrate mass violence on the ground in discourse that prefers to concentrate on top-
down dynamics or advance a monocausal motivation of perpetration. I argue that this silence is 
largely present in the case of the Holodomor. Taking Mamdani’s argument further, I posit that when
political discourse presents the famine as an exclusively state project and ignores its subaltern and 
52 Stepan Drovoziuk, Natsional’no-kul’turne ta dukhovne zhyttia ukraiins’koho selianstva u 20-30-kh rr. XX stolittia. 
Istoriographichnyi narys (Vinnytsia: O. Vlasiuk, 2005), p. 224. 
53 G. Kapustian, Dvi ‘pravdy,’ abo ukraiins’ke selo v dvadtsiati roky dvadtsiatoho stolittia (Kremenchuk, 2003).
54 Olena Lysenko, ‘Typolohiia povedinky sil’s’kykh aktyvistiv u konteksti zdiisnennia sutsil’noii kolektyvizatsii 
sil’s’koho hospodarstva v Ukraiini (pochatok 1930-kh rr.)’, Istoriia Ukraiiny. Malovidomi imena, podii, fakty: 
Zbirnyk statei. Vol. 36 (Kyiv: Instytut istorii Ukraiiny NAN Ukraiiny, 2010); ‘Informatsiino-analitychni dokumenty 
organiv DPU USRR iak dzherelo vyvchennia dial’nosti sil’s’kykh aktyvistiv v umovakh sutsil’noii kolektyvizatsii 
(kinets’ 1920-kh – pochatok 1930-kh rr.)’, Z arkhiviv VUChK-GPU-NKVD-KGB. 2010, No. 1 (34); pp. 336-358.
55 O. Veselova, ‘Uvikopomnennia zahyblykh vid holodnoho moru’, O. Veselova, Holod-genotsyd 1933 roku v 
Ukraiini (Kyiv: Libra, 2000), pp. 432-457.
56 Doroshko, Nomenklatura: kerivna verkhivka, pp. 299-223.
57 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers. Nationalism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
‘popular’, rank-and-file character, it tends to reduce the violence to a set of meaningless outbursts, 
ritualistic and bizarre, in which ‘idle, drunk and good-for-nothing’ elements of the pre-modern 
Ukrainian village come to the fore. 
To confront this silence, I incorporate into the theoretical framework of this dissertation 
approaches from history, social psychology, memory studies and criminology – approaches that are 
widely employed in the analyses of the rank-and-file perpetrators of other historical events of mass 
violence. In particular, I borrow the typology of perpetrators of mass violence presented by 
Smeulers.58 This typology, I contend, presents new opportunities for the study of the Holodomor. I 
also employ a critical reading of the perpetrator testimonies that is suggested by Browning who, 
unlike Westermann, does not find it possible to ‘infer’ motivation from testimony, party 
membership, or a belonging to a certain generation, indoctrination and brutalization. According to 
Westermann, most perpetrators of the crimes of totalitarian regimes are ideological perpetrators – 
despite recent research on the subject that reveals that only around 5% of perpetrators can be 
characterised as such.59 
A comparative analysis of the testimonies of the perpetrators of other events of mass 
violence, such as the in-depth interviews of Eugene de Kock or the accounts of Adolf Eichmann, 
can provide directions for further inquiries into how the perpetrators reflected upon their 
experience. In fact, a typology of the subsequent responses of the perpetrators, suggested by 
Anderson, explains how they made sense of collectivization and the famine: e.g. by excusing their 
agency; by denying participation or remaining silent; by showing remorse or regret; by defending 
the use of violence (sometimes in Bolshevik language). 
I also employ a microhistorical approach developed by Carlo Ginzburg, which has been 
successfully adopted by other researchers of the mass violence and genocide including Browning, 
Oppenheimer and Gross.60 
From a social psychology perspective, I am influenced by the towering work on the 
compliance to authority of ordinary people and their conditioning by Milgram and Zimbardo, which
has proven formative for the field of criminology. As Milgram demonstrated in his work, 
58 Alette Smeulers ‘Perpetrators of International Crimes: Towards a Typology,ʼ in Supranational Criminology: 
Towards a Typology of International Crimes, ed. Alette Smeulers and Roelof Haveman (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 
2008), pp. 233-265.
59 See Jonathan L. Maynard, Rethinking the Role of Ideology in Mass Atrocities, Terrorism and Political Violence 
26/5 (2014); Jennifer Welsh & Serena Sharma (eds.); The Responsibility to Prevent: Overcoming the Challenges to 
Atrocity Prevention (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Alex Alvarez, ‘Destructive Beliefs: Genocide and the 
Role of Ideology,’ Supranational Criminology, ed. A. Smeulers and R. Haveman.
60 C. Ginzburg, The Cheese and the Worms. The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller (London: Penguin Books, 
1992); Browning, The Ordinary Men; T. Brink, J. Oppenheimer, Killer images : Documentary Film, Memory and 
the Performance of Violence (London: Wallflower Press, 2012); Jan T. Gross, Neighbours. The Destruction of the 
Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland, 1941 (London: Arrow Books, 2003). 
conformity is crucial for the perpetration of mass violence. It is present in all societies as some 
amount of it is ʻnecessary to the functioning of any social system.ʼ61 I also consider the question of 
perpetration from a gender studies perspective, relying on the work of Sjoberg and Gentry, who 
show how the representation of female perpetrators in media usually reduces them to cliché types of
promiscuous, fanatics or sadists – i.e. ‘abnormal’ females, which is largely how they are depicted in
cultural memory of the Holodomor.62 
Cultural memory in this dissertation is understood as texts, rites, and images that preserve 
memory of the famine and help determine the officially sanctioned reflection on a fateful event.63 In
the second part of this dissertation, which explores the representation of the perpetrators in 
Ukrainian literature and film, I draw from the work of such Ukrainian literary critics as Dibrova, 
Slaboshpyts’kyi and Stepula and such interdisciplinary historians as Clark, Shkandrij and 
Yekelchyk. I analyse the current representation of the perpetrators in the Holodomor Victims 
Memorial Museum in the context of other memorial sites of mass violence and other museums of 
totalitarian regime in post-Soviet republics. Finally, I conceptualize the discrepancy between 
identifiable and memorial traces with the theoretical scaffolding on the memory of traumatic events 
developed by Adorno and Todorov.
Sources
Of all the sources I have consulted, the TsDAHOU and HDA SBU archives in Kyiv, 
Poltava and Zhytomyr provided me with an abundance of material. Central were also the provincial 
and district archives in Ukraine and the collections of testimonies at the Holodomor Research and 
Education Center in Toronto and Bakhmeteff Archive at Columbia University. Given that most 
perpetrators of the Holodomor died before the scholarship began to confront the famine freely and 
directly, I have also relied on the ‘post-memoryʼ of the famine at the prompting of Hirsch, who 
agrees that the concept – of the transfer of the memory of the deeply traumatic events, experiences 
or people between the generations – can be applied in the Holodomor studies.64 
I have been less successful in accessing archival sources on the 1932-1933 years on the 
village level, though the district archives in Myrhorod and Khoroshiv revealed identifiable traces of 
the perpetrators in 1960-1970s. The village museums made the presence of the perpetrators almost 
61 Stanley Milgram, ‘Nationality and Conformity,’ Scientific American, vol. 205, no. 6, 1961, p. 51.
62 See, for instance, Leonid Kononovych, Tema dlia medytatsii (Lviv: Kalʼvaria, 2004); Talan, Rozkolote Nebo; 
Vorozhbit, The Grain Store.
63 Jan Assmann and John Czaplicka, ‘Collective Memory and Cultural Identity,’ New German Critique 65 (1995), p.  
129.
64 This has been confirmed to the author by Marianne Hirsch at the Mnemonics Summer School at University of 
Stockholm on 23rd August 2014.
palpable as many of them were its founders. Overall, I have found substantial new information on 
the tumultous lives of the perpetrators in the years preceding the famine and afterwards. As I 
collected these materials, I saw lost lives, villainy, cowardice and complicity as well as the 
prolonged suffering of the survivors who often had to live along with (and sometimes marry into) 
the families of perpetrators. It has been difficult to remain unmoved. 
Various published collections of archival documents also helped facilitate research of the 
perpetrators. The prominent edited collections that include resolutions passed by the Politburo or 
the TsK KP(b)U on grain procurement, Stalin’s correspondence with Kaganovich and Molotov and 
ODPU reports on the situation on the ground including the letters from the perpetrators themselves, 
are the voluminous Tragediia sovetskoi derevni: Dokumenty i materialy, Holodomor 1932-1933 
rokiv v Ukraiini: dokumenty i materialy and Sovetskaia derevnia glazami VchK-OGPU-NKVD. One
ODPU report to Stalin in 1932, which was published in these collections, was identified by Martin 
as the key document in understanding the resistance of the village officials in Ukraine against 
unrealistic grain procurement quotas. This resistance within the party intensified following the III 
KP(b)U Conference when the quotas were approved and accepted to immediate implementation by 
republican, provincial and some district officials.65
Another valuable source are the corpora of eyewitness testimonies by survivors, bystanders,
and perpetrators. While some scholars reflect on the impossibilities of bearing witness to a 
traumatic event,66 the amount of research using eyewitness testimonies of mass violence is 
consistently growing,67 along with a host of fiction and non-fiction works that rely on these 
accounts for content. The first survivor testimonies of the Holodomor were collected in the 
aftermath of the Second World War from Ukrainian displaced persons in the West and later in 
diaspora such as The Black Deeds of the Kremlin and by the U.S. Commission on the Ukrainian 
Famine in Washington. No less valuable are major collections published in Ukraine: ‘33-i Holod’: 
Narodna knyha-Memorial, Transformatsiia hromadians’koho suspil’stva, Ukraiins’kyi holokost, 
Pam’iat narodu, Natsional’na knyha pam’iati zhertv Holodomoru, and Svicha pam’iati. The 
testimonies in the latter two works were collected with a standard questionnaire addressing the 
question about the perpetrators. Using such a unified questionnaire in assessing oral memory is 
65 Terry Martin, ‘Famine Initiators and Directors: Personal Papers: The 1932-33 Ukrainian Terror: New 
Documentation and Surveillance and the Thought Process of Stalin’, Isajiw W. Wsevolod, ed., Famine-Genocide in 
Ukraine, 1932-33 (Toronto: UCRDC, 2003), pp. 107-8.
66 S. Felman, D. Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis and History (New York: 
Routledge, 1992). 
67 Major oral history corpora of testimonies include, among others: publications of the reports by US Congressional-
Presidential Commission on the Ukraine Famine; Lidiia Kovalenko and Volodymyr Maniak, eds. Holod-33. 
Narodna knyha-memorial (Kyiv: Radiansʼkyi pysʼmennyk, 1991); voluminous Natsional’na knyha pamiati zhertv 
Holodomoru (2008); Oral History Program at Prairie Centre for the Study of Ukrainian Heritage (1992-1993); 
online collection Share the Story by Ukrainian Canadian Congress and Ukrainian World Congress (2008).
essential for a critical analysis of survivor testimonies.
The other obvious source on the perpetrators are their very own accounts – memoirs, 
diaries, interviews, testimonies during trials and interrogations. Researching perpetrator accounts 
presents a series of hermeneutic and ethical problems, and using such sources raises the question of 
how these forms of life writing should be approached. Indeed, we have to consider the intrinsic 
problem of memoirs as creative acts and deliberate questions of self-censorship and external 
censorship, factual errors, distortions, omissions, falsifications. Memoirs are political acts too: they 
are aimed at a specific audience within a specific political context. As such, they can be divided into
two groups: recollections written by Soviet citizens published in the West during the Cold War, 
critical of the Soviet system, and memoirs by upwardly mobile individuals published in the Soviet 
Union who sought to legitimize the state-sanctioned violence and often presented their accounts as 
part of a collective experience. 
Indeed the life stories of Stakhanovites deal more with public matters than private ones. 
Fitzpatrick compares these memoirs to testimonios – accounts of members of revolutionary 
movements in Latin America in which individuals are only representatives of a collective 
experience recording a change in society.68 In such testimonies the authors often compare their 
disadvantaged position in the past with a happy present, thus justifying their violence against the 
victims as a fair struggle or retribution: ‘[we] helped the Communists arrest them [the peasants] and
confiscate their property, which had been acquired dishonestly through the efforts of others.ʼ69 
In an article on the historiography of Soviet memoirs, Kuromiya demonstrates that there is 
‘little compelling reason to believe that the memoirs published in the West are more “objective” 
than Soviet memoirs.ʼ70 Moreover, official criticism of Stalinʼs rule during the Thaw encouraged 
some perpetrators to critically assess their own involvement. In 1962 Nadia Zahlada wrote about the
mistakes of the early thirties in Ogoniok (Kuromiya calls such Stakhanovites ‘repentantʼ), although 
many others remained silent or defended the necessity of violence (‘die-hardsʼ).71 Confiscated 
diaries, letters and suicide notes of the perpetrators, re-discovered in the archives after 1991, 
confirm most of the published memoirs. For instance, a diary by Zavoloka, a repressed party official
from Kyiv involved in grain procurement in 1932-1933, reveals the atmosphere of fear and 
compliance that is strikingly similar to the memoir by Kravchenko (1947) published in the West 
during the Cold War.72 Likewise, the ‘interchangeableʼ justification of violence by a collective or 
68 S. Fitzpatrick, ʻLives and Times,ʼ S. Fitzpatrick and Y. Slezkine, eds. In the Shadow of Revolution: Life Stories of 
Russian Women From 1917 to the The Second World War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 6.
69 A. Solovieva, ʻSent by the Komsomol,ʼ Fitzpatrick Slezkine, eds. In the Shadow of Revolution, p. 238. 
70 Hiroaki Kuromiya, ‘Soviet Memoirs as a Historical Source’, Russian History 12, 2/4 (1985), p. 294.
71 Ibid, p. 322.
72 Victor Kravchenko, I Chose Freedom: the Personal and Political Life of a Soviet Official (London: Robert Hale, 
shared mentality in the memoirs by Stakhanovites can also be found in the recollection of grain 
procurement by Lev Kopelev. 
Nonetheless, such memoirs have key limitations as historical sources. To address them, I 
conduct four tests as suggested by Browning: the self-interest test, the vividness test, the possibility 
test and the probability test.73 In other words, of prime interest are the statements in the testimony 
made against the self-interest of the perpetrator, the events described in greater detail, and the 
claims that can be confirmed in other sources. According to Gerlach, a scholar should use such 
testimonies as supportive evidence together with many other sources.74 Should the source pass the 
four tests, a degree of trust is established which reduces the risk of a symbolic re-enactment of 
violence by accepting the authority of the perpetrators ‘to convey or to establish common 
knowledge.ʼ75 Accepting the epistemic authority of the perpetrators in their account of the events 
poses another risk. Schmidt points out that such acceptance entails empowering the account of the 
perpetrator or recognising their rational agency; therefore, she counsels, researchers should beware 
of adopting the perpetrators’ points of reference.76 
Engaging with a variety of sources on the perpetrators more often than not includes 
assessing their testimonies in one or another format: an interview, a diary, a memoir, letters or court
testimony. When approaching perpetrator testimony as a discursive practice, Schmidt distinguishes 
between external and internal truth – i.e. reconstruction of external events and personal account of 
experience. ‘The interruptions, the silence, and even the flaws within Holocaust survivor 
testimonies are symptomatic expressions of the internal truth’77 of the events they witnessed. 
Perpetrator testimony might lack that perspective. Schmidt notes that their non-witnessing, lack of 
internal truth and silence in the testimony represents a ‘constitutive element of genocide.ʼ78
Plan of Dissertation
In the first chapter I will place the lower rank perpetrators within the mechanism of the 
famine from district to village level and explain what acts can be regarded as perpetration. I will 
further explore, by using typology of perpetrators of mass violence, their motivation for 
participation. The mechanism will be explained further by looking into the composition and 
1947); V. Borysenko et al, eds. Rozsekrechena Pam’iat’: Holodomor 1932-1933 rokiv v Ukraiini v dokumentakh 
GPU-NKVD (Kyiv: Vydnychyi Dim Stylis, 2007), pp. 552-572.
73 Christopher Browning, ‘Perpetrator Testimony. Another Look on Adolph Eichmann,’ Collected Memories: 
Holocaust History and Postwar Testimony (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 2004), pp. 11-12.
74 Christian Gerlach, ‘The Eichmann Interrogations in Holocaust Historiography,’ Holocaust and Genocide Studies 15,
no. 3 (winter 2001), pp. 429, 434, 442.
75 Schmidt, ‘Perpetrators’ Knowledge,’ p. 85.
76 Ibid, pp. 99, 101.
77 Ibid, p. 97. 
78 Ibid, p. 98. 
activities of the local search brigades, institutional affiliation of its members and buksyrni bryhady 
(tugboat brigades), as the prime agents in removing provisions from the victims. The variety of 
roles of participation such as providing intelligence (informers and village correspondents), support 
(spouses) and preventing victims from accessing food (field guards) will be addressed too. 
Throughout this chapter, the important issue of their life after the famine will be touched upon: how
participation affected their later life, what possible choices they did or did not have and how they 
reflected on past experience. 
The second chapter provides two detailed case studies of the perpetrators in villages. 
Firstly, the perpetrators are identified – their numbers and roles. Their testimonies, where available, 
are read by using Browning’s methodology. Their participation is explored chronologically to 
demonstrate how they became involved and whether or not they influenced the life of their 
communities after the famine. One village is Popivka in Poltava oblast’ – the very village in which 
Soviet dissident Lev Kopelev procured grain as a young reporter. The second village, Toporyshche 
in Zhytomyr oblast’, in theory presents a different case – a multiethnic community in a district that 
suffered considerably fewer casulties during the famine (30% or 2,200 in Popivka; 8% or 
approximately 100 in Toporyshche). Further analysis, however, reveals that enforcement of the 
famine and the perpetratorsʼ experience are essentially the same.
The second part of the dissertation on the representation of the rank-and-file perpetrators in 
Ukrainian cultural memory, consists of five chapters: prose (Chapter III), poetry (Chapter IV), 
drama (Chapter V), film (Chapter VI) and museum (Chapter VII). All the works subject to analysis 
were chosen based on their reach to a mass audience – i.e. their presence in cultural memory of the 
famine. I explore the representation of the famine in prose, poetry and drama according to three 
distinct modalities based on the location of the agency of the perpetrator: 1) officially approved 
Soviet works in which the perpetrators embrace their agency; 2) those produced by dissidents and 
circulated through samvydav and tamvydav, with a more nuanced or dispersed agency; 3) Ukrainian
diaspora and by post-Soviet Ukrainian authors who represent the perpetrators with displaced agency
– as the alien Other or deviant local types that are influenced by the Other. While the chapter on 
film is split into an analysis of the fictive and the documentary, it follows a similar approach of 
differentiating between the aforementioned modalities of Soviet, dissident and diaspora/post-Soviet 
narratives. The final chapter on the museum investigates how the rank-and file perpetrators are 
represented in the current exhibition of the Holodomor Memorial museum in Kyiv. Based on 
analysis conducted, possible options for inclusion of the rank-and-file perpetrators in its narrative 
are suggested. 
These chapters are united by a common subject – the rank-and-file perpetrators of the 1932-
1933 famine in history and memory. I argue that the perpetrators of the famine on the ground were 
more often than not ordinary people and ordinary Ukrainians. In approaching the perpetrators of the
famine, it is crucial to differentiate between the actors and their deeds. Indeed, reducing them to an 
impersonal and anonymous ‘theyʼ does not bring us closer to understanding how people born in the 
same thatched huts came to kill or facilitate the deaths of their neighbours.
PART I
Chapter I 
The Mechanism of the Holodomor on the Ground
One intelligent writer on state matters argued fairly that 
if you have to commit an atrocity in order to achieve a political aim, 
then you have to do it most eagerly and fast, 
because people would not tolerate cruelties for long.
Lenin, in a letter to Viacheslav Molotov, 192279
This chapter focuses on the place of the rank-and-file perpetrators in the mechanism of the 
famine; it asks how the famine was possible on the ground level and who were the people involved. 
The analysis will be developed by outlining the acts of perpetration; identifying the actors and 
suggesting a typology through which to understand them; and exploring the role of the district 
officials through their initiation into the mechanism of the famine in the second half of 1932. Their 
demographics will be addressed, and a relevant case study provided. The analysis will then proceed 
with an examination of search brigades and their institutional composition: village officials and 
collective farmers, KNS, Komsomol, party plenipotentiaries and teachers. It will focus on tugboat 
brigades that had a devastating effect on peasants, as many survivors testify. Finally, the importance
of auxiliary roles in the mechanism will be discussed, including informers like village 
correspondents, field guards and spouses. 
1. The Acts of Perpetration
Both Ukrainian and Western historians of the 1932-1933 famine argue that the following 
legislative provisions led to the famine80 and made the men and women who were engaged in their 
enforcement complicit in mass violence: 
1. Collective and individual farmers had to surrender grain and renounce the right to retain any
for their own consumption, including the seeds. The state still collected meat, milk, eggs and
other produce from collective and individual farmers.
79 ‘Letter to Molotov,’ 19 March 1922, in Richard Pipes, ed., The Unknown Lenin: From the Secret Archive (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), pp. 152-3.
80 Sergei Maksudov, ‘Victory over the Peasantry’, Harvard Ukrainian Studies, vol. 25, no. 3/4, 2001, pp. 188-189; 
Shapoval and Vasyl’iev, eds. Komandyry velykoho holodu.
2. The homes of all peasants could be searched arbitrarily; in the case that grain was found, 
peasants could be persecuted for theft. 
3. Collective farms, villages and entire districts could be ‘blacklisted’ and, in actuality, turned 
into ghettos. The supply of any goods including salt, gas and matches would be stopped, all 
available foodstuffs confiscated and removed, commerce and communications banned.
4. From 20th November 1932 meat procurements were demanded fifteen months in advance 
from the collective farms and from individual farmers who failed to meet grain procurement 
targets, leaving almost half the rural population without any livestock.81 All the grain 
previously distributed to collective farmers for their work was ordered to be returned; all 
grain in the villages was confiscated and credited toward procurement.82
5. The peasants, when found in the fields, were prosecuted under the Law from 7th August 
1932 for ‘pilfering.’ 
6. Commerce in food was banned until the procurement quotas met. (They were never met.)83
7. Train travel for peasants was restricted.
The mechanism of the famine entailed the cooperation of many institutions of the state to remove 
all foodstuffs from the peasants and to ensure that the starving did not have access to the 
storehouses or the fields or a means of escape from the villages. The people involved in the 
implementation of these legislative provisions on the ground, I argue, should be regarded as 
perpetrators of the Holodomor. A detailed study of all perpetrators in reference to the 
aforementioned provisions would be beyond the scope of this work. I focus my attention on the 
people involved in enforcing the first five points above: those who conducted searches, removed 
foodstuffs and valuables, denied available resources to the starving, and engaged in other activities 
such as denouncing, instigating or perpetrating violence. 
The house searches that loom large in the oral memory of the famine were conducted by 
81 In 1931, 88% of peasants in Ukraine had livestock; in 1932-1933 around 50% peasants did. See Narodne 
hospodarstvo USRR (Kyiv, 1935), p. 252.
82 Feliks Rudych, Ruslan Pyrih, eds. Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraiini: Ochyma istorykiv, movoiu dokumentiv 
(Kyiv: Vyd-vo politychnoï literatury Ukraiiny, 1990), pp. 250-4, 278-9, 296-9.
83 Iurii A. Moshkov, Zernovaia problema v gody sploshnoi kollektivizatsii selʼskogo khoziaistva SSSR 1929-1932 gg. 
(Moscow, 1966).
search brigades. Soviet historians characterise the members of the brigades in the following way: 
‘the best, leading collective farmers … who revealed acts of theft and hidden bread and helped to 
maintain grain procurement.84 Eighty percent of survivors in the Poltava oblast’ commented that the
search brigades consisted of local or svoi (our own) people, who included collective farmers and 
village officials – usually the heads of the village councils or the chairmen of collective farms.85 For
most of them, participating in collectivization and dekulakization served as a precursor to 
participation in the famine. In other words, they were already habituated to violence. Local officials,
in their turn, received their orders from district officials and liaised with security services who 
helped to enforce policies in cases of insurgency or the failure of local officials.
2. Identifying the Perpetrators
The timeframe of the famine should not be limited to the late 1932 – early 1933. The 
Holodomor would not have been possible in a vacuum. Its perpetrators had previous experience of 
collective violence: for some, prodrazverstka in 1921 was formative, while for most, grain 
procurement in 1928-1929 and the event of collectivization were decisive. Collectivization saw 
Soviet officials and activists in every village ordered to dekulakize a specified number of peasants. 
This number was dictated by the district, that in 1932-1933 ordered to procure a specified amount 
of grain or other produce in lieu of grain. That is, these numbers based not on previous quantitative 
assessments of how many peasants were indeed ʻkulaksʼ, whatever that meant, on how much grain 
was actually harvested.86 What mattered was simply what was expected.
Removing land and other property from private ownership, displacement or deportation, 
and conducting various repressions and executions were referred to as ‘the third frontʼ in public 
discourse and were described in militaristic language: ‘mobilization,ʼ ‘soldiers,ʼ offensive,ʼ 
‘enemiesʼ etc.87 This war was fought not in a distant trench, but in the villages of a largely agrarian 
country. This state-sanctioned violence, which led to what we would today characterize as gross 
criminal violations of human rights, unfolded gradually and progressively. Once engaged in these 
activities for years, it became more difficult for perpetrators to recede from ‘the front.ʼ Like the 
subjects in Milgram’s experiment on obedience, they subjected the victims with the highest shock 
only after a progressive series of smaller shocks88.
84 Ivan Trifonov, Ocherki istorii klassovoi borʼby v SSSR, 1921-1937 (Moscow, 1960), p. 255.
85 O. Bilousʼko et al., eds. Natsional’na knyha pam’iati zhertv Holodomoru 1932–1933 rokiv v Ukraiini: Poltavs’ka 
oblast’ (Poltava: Oriiana, 2008), pp. 916-1188. 
86 First Secretary of the TsK KP(b)U Stanislav Kosior in his speech at the TsK plenum in February 1933 confirmed 
that data on the 1932 harvest could not be disclosed. See TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 1, spr. 400, ark. 8. 
87 Applebaum, Red Famine, p. 85. 
88 S. Milgram, ʻThe Dilemma of Obedience,ʼ The Phi Delta Kappan 55, no. 9 (1974), p. 604. 
Their roles were not limited to the forceful removal of foodstuffs during the grain 
procurement in 1932-1933; they also included preventing peasants from leaving villages or 
obtaining food elsewhere, instigating violence, reporting and providing intelligence on the starving 
peasants and concealing the truth of events as they unfolded. Many perpetrators in the famine did 
not see themselves as perpetrators due to the fact that the mechanism of the famine was a composite
of non-lethal and lethal functions that together contributed to mass murder. In most cases, a 
perpetrator had a specific purpose to fulfil based on their job. Serving as a watchman at a granary in
a village is typically a mundane job; during the famine, it involved actively denying emaciated 
villagers grain, which led to organised starvation. Given that many perpetrators acted in the 
positions assigned to them by the state, I will explore their roles based on their institutional 
affiliation. 
Empowered or instructed to carry out a task, officials or village activists did not necessarily
have an intention to cause harm or death. Their work was sanctioned behind the screen of 
collectivization, grain procurement and so called ‘class warʼ in the village. They were activists, 
officials, conductors, guards, plenipotentiaries, teachers, field watchers. They may have felt that 
their function in the mechanism of the famine did not change anything or that there was little point 
in objecting. Or that their involvement was part of a great transformation of the country. Or perhaps
they could not feel anything at all. Although some of their supporting roles may fall short of 
criminal responsibility, their importance in contributing to the deaths of millions of men, women, 
and children cannot be underestimated. Even the role of bystanders needs to confronted as well. 
Perpetrators observe the reaction of others. If bystanders remain passive, perpetrators may consider 
their actions are justified.
Female perpetrators often had similar tasks to their male counterparts, but their gender also 
determined distinctive roles. War is a traditionally a male-dominated domain, and the ‘bread frontʼ 
was no exception. The perpetrators were accordingly expected to possess qualities usually 
perceived as masculine: ‘courageousʼ, ‘strongʼ, ‘braveʼ etc. At the same time, women who opposed 
the state during collectivization and the famine were called ‘backwardʼ, ‘darkʼ and ‘ignorant.ʼ In an 
attempt to prove themselves as capable and trustworthy ‘soldiersʼ, female perpetrators were 
reportedly crueller than their male colleagues. They often dealt with the most vulnerable. Some 
female members in search brigades sought to discover hidden foodstuffs by talking to children, who
would be more likely to disclose this information to them. As one survivor recalls: ‘A woman and 
two men came to us. [While the men searched the house,] she used to ask us, the little ones, so 
many questions.ʼ89 
89 P. I. Haman et al., eds. Natsional’na knyha pam’iati zhertv Holodomoru 1932–1933 rokiv v Ukraiini: Cherkas’ka 
In a conservative village, many young women likely encountered significant pressure to 
obey orders from their superiors whom few could defy, even if many initially had a difficult time 
when ordered to confiscate foodstuffs for the first time. One female teacher, sent to the countryside 
in 1930 and ordered to dekulakize the peasants, was violently sick on the first day of her 
participation. Yet she eventually got used to the system. Her partner, a teacher in a similar position, 
grew increasingly concerned about whether she became brutalised like him.90 According to Staub, 
perpetrators thus join the ‘continuum of destructionʼ and accept their new behaviour as normal: 
‘Institutions are changed or created to serve violence. The society is transformed. In the end, there 
may be a reversal of morality.ʼ91
While there were 112,000 Communists in the countryside and half a million Komsomol, we
cannot assume that they all participated in the requisition of food as part of a tugboat brigade, as 
some historians of the famine tend to suggest.92 In 1932 many Communists in rural areas indeed 
held positions of power – 7,500 chaired collective farms, 5,300 were brigade leaders, 15,000 in 
state-owned cooperation network – but 36,000 were ordinary collective farmers with a further 6,000
not having any relation to collective farms.93 Moreover, in October 1932 senior Soviet official 
Gapeev noted at the TsK KP(b)U plenum that out of 51,789 Komsomol sent to the village, almost 
40% left the countryside within one month.94 Hence not all members of organizations or institutions
that were expected to enforce grain procurement, apart from trained perpetrators, obeyed the orders.
While most people are naturally influenced by orders from figures of authority or the 
expectations and behaviour of collectives, some choose not to progress on a continuum of 
destructiveness, as Milgram makes clear and demonstrated in the report discovered by Martin.95 
Indeed, during the Holodomor some collective farmers refused to search the houses of their 
neighbours. As a 19-year-old collective farmer, Olena Dunʼ, from Kamʼiani Potoky in Kremenchuk 
district recalled: ‘Once the village council sent me to an old woman. There I found a hungry woman
crying. I was like her myself; why would I look for whatever she had? You can put me on trial 
tomorrow, but I wonʼt go and I didnʼt go.ʼ96 
It is the agency of the perpetrators that most scholars of collective violence and 
oblast’ (Cherkasy: Vyd. Chabanenko Iu., 2008), p. 918.
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92 S. Maksudov, ‘Victory Over the Peasantry,’ 190; Conquest, Harvest of Sorrow; the documentary film Harvest of 
Despair (1984), discussed later in this work. The number is first mentioned in Sotsialistychna perebudova i rozvytok
sil’s’koho hospodarstva Ukraiins’koi RSR, vol. 1, 1917-1937 rr. (Kyiv, 1967), pp. 462-3.
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1965, p. 72.
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international crimes base their typology on.97 Perhaps the most detailed, inclusive and overarching 
typology based on the motivational factor is one developed by Smeulers.98 Her typology can be 
applied to the Holodomor, as I illustrate in the table below. Depending on the context, individuals 
can have multiple motivations: 
Group Definition As applied to the Holodomor
Professional Trained to enforce 
policies (sometimes with
violence)






Rural and urban Communists, village and district level 
officials, Komsomol, collective farmers, teachers and 
others who use their position of power to benefit 
financially, settle scores with neighbours or advance their 
Party career through deployment in the village. 
Fanatic Driven by ideology; 
Believes victims are 
necessary ‘for the greater
goodʼ
Local and urban Communists, Komsomols and collective 
farmers. Kopelev calls them ‘true believersʼ who 
maintained that violence was justified; the starving were 




Uses situation for 
fulfilment of their 
sadistic deviation 
Officials, plenipotentiaries and activists that tortured, 
raped and murdered the victims.
Follower Majority of perpetrators 
who follow orders or 
comply
Most collective farmers, officials and plenipotentiaries.
When confronted during the search about his actions 
leading to the deaths of children, one perpetrator replied: 
‘Well, and what else … thatʼs it, we are sent and we are 
doing it.ʼ99
Compromised Vulnerable people, 
including children, who 
participate because of 
explicit or implicit 
coercion, threats or 
aggressive indoctrination
(particularly in the case 
of children or teenagers)
Men and women who feared for their lives or the lives of 
their families, young Komsomols and pioneers.
As the survivor, Prokip Lukʼianetsʼ, explained: ‘They 
faced a choice to collect a certain amount … or to be 
thrown out. Everybody wanted to live. … The ones who 
searched were ordinary people like us.ʼ100
3. District Officials or ʻThe Fate of Agriculture Is Decided Thereʼ101
The mechanism of the Holodomor on the ground included district officials – namely the 
RPKs and plenipotentiaries who leveraged the orders from the top to the village level. Though the 
97 See, for instance, Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders, ix-x; M. Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy: 
Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 27.
98 Smeulers, ‘Perpetrators of international crimes …ʼ p. 237.
99 Bilousʼko et al., eds. Natsional’na knyha pam’iati, p. 980.
100 Ibid, p. 918.
101 From the speech of Yalov, the secretary of the Rubezhany RPK at III Conference of KP(b)U on 8th July 1932. 
TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 1, spr. 377, ark. 222. 
directives on grain procurement usually came from the republican leadership, district officials were 
the ones who would inform and instruct the village councils, collective farms and Communists in 
the country. At times the orders came from the elite leadership of the Soviet state: in late December 
1932, for instance, Kaganovich met the leaders of the Voznesensʼk and Zinovʼiev districts in Odesa 
oblast’ in his train car after receiving telegrams from Stalin approving harsh methods.102 To explore 
the actions of district officials in more detail, I proceed with a discussion of the party conference 
and purges that initiated participation in the Holodomor; demographics; and the case of Andrii 
Richytsʼkyi. 
3.1 A Watershed: III KP(b)U Conference and the Purges
While district officials were not new to enforcing unpopular policies, their involvement in 
the Holodomor started with the adoption of quotas for the 1932-1933 grain procurement campaign. 
These targets were introduced at the III KP(b)U conference on 6-9th July 1932 in the Kharkiv Opera
house. The importance of this event in the Holodomorʼs chronology has been emphasised by many 
scholars, including Kulʼchytsʼkyi and Shapoval.103 Yet it is subject to only two specialised 
studies.104 Molotov and Kaganovich attended the conference to ensure that grain procurement quotas
were accepted by the republican and the district officials. During the conference, however, several 
of the eighteen RPK secretaries who gave presentations – there were thirty-three speakers altogether
– voiced their opposition to the quotas. Moreover, they warned of the famine and listed the policies 
causing it, despite deprecation and chastising from colleagues and superiors. All such unwarranted 
remarks were also removed from the plenumʼs stenogramme before it was published, so officially 
there was no resistance to grain procurement within the party, nor was there starvation in the 
countryside.105 The significance of this event is even more striking when one compares the 
uncensored script with the uncensored script of the IV party conference eight months later. After all
the policies responsible for the famine had been implemented, in February 1933 district officials 
voiced no objections. 
The conference in July 1932 reveals a number of key details about district officials. It was 
attended by 252 delegates, of which 158 or 62.7% were RPK secretaries.106 In his opening words, 
the first secretary of the TsK KP(b)U Kosior admitted that there was starvation in many districts, 
102 V. Vasylʼiev, ‘Tsina holodnoho khliba. Polityka kerivnytsva SRSR i USRR v 1932-1933 rr.’ in Shapoval and 
Vasyl’iev, eds. Komandyry velykoho holodu, p. 57.
103 Kul’chyts’kyi, ‘Historical Experience: Vital Today’, 7; Yu. Shapoval, ʻIII konferentsia KP(b)U: Proloh trahedii 
holoduʼ in in Shapoval and Vasyl’iev, eds. Komandyry velykoho holodu.
104 Iu. Babko, M. Bortnichuk, Tretia Vseukraiinska konferentsiia KP(b)U (Kyiv: PolitVydav Ukraiiny, 1968); Yu. 
Shapoval, ʻIII konferentsia KP(b)U ... ʼ.
105 Tretia konferentsiia KP(b)U, 6-9 lypnia 1932 r. Stenografichnyi zvit (Kharkiv, 1932).
106 TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 1, spr. 385, ark. 6.
but stressed that the priority was to procure grain and that peasants had to give up all supplies to the 
state. He complained that district secretaries who allowed torture and searches of the homes of 
collective farmers only damaged the Partyʼs reputation: ʻthey conducted terror and violations only 
abnormal people or staunch counter-revolutionaries are capable of.ʼ107 He deemed incorrect and 
counter-revolutionary ʻthe theory of the unrealistic procurement planʼ and emphasised that the 
ʻkulakʼ should be ʻburnt out.ʼ108 He also noted that he and his colleagues could not have been aware 
of the situation in all individual districts (indeed, there were over six hundred of them). Thus they 
re-distributed quotas in such a way that some districts had six times the original quota to 
compensate for the absence of grain elsewhere, which in turn devastated them. In other words, 
Kosiorʼs described a situation on the ground ʻin the whole of Ukraineʼ marked by widespread 
violence, with the famine already underway and with defiance among district secretaries, whom he 
blamed for the dire situation in the republic.109 
Despite rather discouraging remarks by the first secretary of KP(b)U, some RPK secretaries
spoke out. For instance, Amcheslavsʼkyi from the Skvira RPK reminded Kosior that district 
officials informed the TsK KP(b)U of ʻexcesses’ on the ground. In Amcheslavsʼkyi’s district, three 
district party plenipotentiaries had ʻworked’ (Richytsʼkyi, Kulishev and Kryvenko) prior to his 
arrival. They dekulakized over 5,000 poor peasants and drove many others into destitution.110 The 
Smila RPK secretary, Fomin, noted that some government officials made matters worse with their 
visits. So did many party plenipotentiaries who contributed nothing to grain procurement because 
they did not know the district. Drabiv district secretary Sherstov was more direct: one tugboat 
brigade in his district organised a mass beating of the collective farmers, removed all seed funds 
and forced farmers into buying state loans they could not afford. He also informed the audience that
starving farmers could not work in the fields and that there was no food left in the district. Sherstov 
illustrated the absurdity of the orders from the top when he recounted how he had been instructed to
procure cabbages and carrots for dispatch to Leningrad in the Olevsʼk district, which was ʻcovered 
in woods and stones, where vegetables are not cultivated.’ When Sherstov had failed to comply, he 
was interrogated by the DPU.111
Alhough Molotov and Kaganovich dismissed all criticisms at the time as ʻwhining’ and 
ʻopportunism,’ they later discussed them with Stalin and commented that party leaders in Ukraine 
were more obedient than expected.112 Indeed, feeling the firm approach of Molotov and 
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Kaganovich, republican leaders proceeded to blame raionshchiki (district secretaries) for the 
devastation in the countryside. Some district secretaries themselves, like Kulish from Konotop, 
accused Sherstov and others of ʻattempting to hide one’s incapability.’ Such wording is reminiscent 
of the pressure put on Browning’s ʻordinary men’ when ordered to participate in a massacre.113 
Ultimately the delegates passed the resolution that bound them to the ʻunconditional fulfilment’ of 
the grain procurement plan.
Passing the resolution, however, did not equal enforcing it. Many district secretaries in fact 
evaded grain procurement. According to a report by Veger, for example, the Dnipropetrovs’k 
provincial committee turned a blind eye to the Novo-Troits’k RPK, which did not adopt grain 
procurement targets in August 1932. When the party cells in the district voted against the imposed 
grain quotas, the RPK informed the provincial committee, which did not respond.114 More 
generally, the ODPU report that Stalin received about the reluctance of the rank-and-file officials to 
adopt the plan revealed widespread defiance. It prompted Stalin to write to Kaganovich on the 
ʻterrible’ state of affairs in Ukraine:
… They say that in some parts of Ukraine (it seems, Kyiv and
Dnipropetrovsʼk) around 50 district committees have spoken out against
the grain requisition plan, considering it unrealistic. In other district
committees, it appears that the situation is no better. What is this? This
is not the Party, not a parliament; this is a caricature of a parliament...115 
The report addressed expressions of doubt or outright defiance to grain procurement in 199 
or 33% of districts in the Ukrainian republic from August to November 1932, following the 
meetings of district secretaries with officials and collective farm managers from the villages in their
respective districts. But over 60% of RPKs proceeded with grain procurement. One secretary 
explained in detail how obedience to authority worked: ʻWe could not say a word at the [oblast’ 
Party committee] meeting. Despite our explanations that the quota is high and the average yield is 
exaggerrated, Comrade Cherniavsʼkyi [the secretary’s superior at the time] asked only one question:
ʻSo do you think the oblast’ plan is possible or not?ʼ – I had to reply that it was possible and to 
agree to fulfillment.ʼ Some questioned party policies altogether: ʻThey could make mistakes in 10 
or 20 districts, but to make mistakes in all districts in Ukriane – this means that something is 
wrong.ʼ116 Other secretaries argued that acceptance does not mean enforcement, and warned of 
leaving their positions and the Party altogether. What was undoubtedly disturbing for the Soviet 
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leadership was that the key people in the vertical of the executive branch of the state and the Party 
could no longer be trusted to carry out the policies in the countryside.117 
This dissent among the rank-and-file was swiftly crushed. In October 1932, the Ukrainian 
Party underwent a purge aimed at both the district and village levels. At the plenum of the TsK 
KP(b)U a senior party official, Manuil’s’kyi, spoke of the necessity of Party purges in the 
countryside and claimed that the districts lagging behind in grain procurement were led by ʻclass 
enemies.’ At the same time he acknowledged that many good district secretaries were disheartened: 
ʻtheir arms dropped,’ he said, comparing them to soldiers discouraged with defeat. He therefore 
argued that, as in the army, they ʻshould be temporarily taken to the rear, given a cigarette, and 
[allowed] to pull themselves together and then brought back to the battle.’ The republican 
leadership had to issue a clear directive to the district commissions on purges to ʻtake into 
consideration the difficult situation, the cases of malnutrition in a number of districts, the endemics 
in whole villages.’ The purges had to be conducted without specific targets, unlike dekulakization:
… we should not despair if some rural districts… would have only 10%
Party members left. There will be at least 20% wreckers among them ...
The purges should reveal a new activ, which was raised during spring
sowing campaign this year and proved to be better than a year ago. That
is the aim of the purge.118 
At the time, local purging commissions were to be staffed with Communists who joined the
party before 1929. Manuil’sʼkyi noted that during collectivization many ʻunreliable typesʼ were 
admitted into the Party, whereas those who served in the Red Army were considered even more 
reliable than the DPU. Molotov, who returned to Ukraine in October 1932 as the head of the 
extraordinary commission to help grain procurement, oversaw the purges.119 The head of the DPU in
Ukraine, Balytsʼkyi, reported that 11,000 were arrested in relation to procurement within the first 
four months of grain requisition campaign. Over the course of the following month (between 15th 
November and 15th December 1932), a further 16,000 were arrested. This figure included 2,260 
from collective farm management, including 409 collective farm heads. 108 or 0.6% of 16,000 were
sentenced to death.120 The total number of arrests in connection to grain procurement in 1932 was 
27,000.121 Those who retained their positions received regular telegrams from oblast’ committees 
demanding the fulfilment of quotas within 5 or 10 days. In some oblast’s the DPU servicemen in 
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their full uniform would visit collective farms and insist that management to fulfil the quotas.122
Was everyone who failed to fulfil procurement quotas purged or put on trial? While there is
no quantitative analysis on the subject, the highly publicised show trials of district officials offer 
insight into what one could potentially expect for not reaching grain procurement quotas set for a 
district. In the case of Orikhiv, for instance, 16 district officials were tried in late 1932 for failing to 
meet the grain procurement target, which they argued was unrealistic. Some of them reportedly 
pressured the management of local communes and collective farms to leave some grain behind for 
forage, seeds and other funds. None of them pleaded guilty, despite the pressure put on them by 
Skrypnyk, the Commissioner of Education at the time, who demanded them all to be sentenced to 
execution by firing squad.123 Despite his efforts, only one official was sentenced to death; two were 
pardoned, and the rest received various terms in camps. Shortly after the sentences were announced 
publicly, the death sentence was changed to imprisonment, and all of them were released by 
1935.124 Most continued to work for the government and later retired. 
When the case was re-examined in 1964, all the witnesses who were also involved in grain 
procurement at the time confirmed that the 1932 plan was impossible to fulfill.125 They described 
how accused officials deployed trusted plenipotentiaries to oversee the removal of all grain from the
storehouses, organised house searches to confiscate ʻprivate suppliesʼ and organised additional 
threshing of straw. As this re-examination took place during the Thaw, some witnesses noted that 
these efforts led to the death of many peasants in the district – a fact later confirmed by the 
testimonies of the survivors, archival records and demographers.126 The witnesses, who were 
themselves perpetrators at the district and village levels, had no convictions; they were otherwise 
ordinary citizens with families and mostly local or from other parts of Ukraine. Many were not even
Communists. One witness, Gavriil Masliuk, who testified against the accused in 1932, openly 
reflected on the risk of repression in 1932 thirty years later: ʻFor falling negligibly short of this or 
that requirement, [they] could expel any district employee from the Party or remove them from 
work.ʼ127 
In other words, this show trial served its purpose. Held at a cinema theatre similar to the 
infamous SVU show trial in 1930, the trial intimidated district officials and caused some to fear for 
their lives. But were they compromised perpetrators, as some historians suggest?128 Indeed: if the 
122 RGASPI, f. 81, op. 3, spr. 215, ark. 11.
123 HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 25 (1951), spr. 3, ark. 198. 
124 HDA SBU, f. 16, op. 25 (1951), spr. 3, ark. 200. 
125 Vasyl’iev, Werth and Kokin, eds. Partiino-Radians’ke kerivnytstvo, pp. 176-205.
126 O. Starukh et al, eds. Natsional’na knyha pam’iati zhertv Holodomoru 1932-1933 rokiv v Ukraiini. Zaporiz’ka 
Oblast’ (Zaporizzhia: Dyke pole, 2008), pp. 958-961.
127 Vasyl’iev, Werth and Kokin, eds. Partiino-Radians’ke kerivnytstvo, p. 203.
128 Borysenko, ed. Svicha pam’iati: Usna istoria …, 30; Conquest, Znyva skorboty, pp. 188, 192, 199.
officials arraigned at the show trial received milder sentences than initially expected – ultimately, 
they all survived after spending 1.5 years in Siberia constructing a railway – and if the chances of 
facing a firing squad were 0.6% provided one was persecuted, then how accurate is it to 
characterize district officials as compromised into perpetration, especially when the risk of such 
punishment paled in comparison to certain death by starvation?
One of the convicted, the secretary of the Orikhiv RPK, Golovin, provides an answer to this
question. Upon receiving a ʻdifficult’ quota, he went to the oblast’ committee with the RVK 
secretary in a bid to reduce it. They were ordered to return ʻto execute the grain procurement plan 
under all circumstances. As disciplined and devoted Communists, we did everything we could to 
fulfill it.’ Acknowledging that the procurement of grain had left the district without any supplies in 
the summer of 1932, Golovin mentions that repressions for district officials like him only started in 
November 1932, upon the arrival of Molotov and Kaganovich to Ukraine: ʻAn assault on the 
Communist cadre started at once. In a mere week, they put the Party and Soviet leadership of 
several rural districts on trial.’ Indeed, by that time Golovin was in charge of a construction of a 
plant in Nikopol. In other words, his obedience preceeded the purges and his removal from work in 
grain procurement did not prevent him from working elsewhere. In 1935 he was released under the 
VTsIK directive on amnesty for those ʻwho committed crimes in the countryside’ and under Article 
58-14 in particular.129
Obedience to orders out of fear of severe punishment cannot explain the perpetration of 
Holodomor in places like Orikhiv, as those who ended up implementing the policy on the ground 
accepted the unrealistic quotas before the trial took place. It is conceivable that the relentless 
execution of orders by Orikhiv district officials and many others stemmed from obedience to 
authority, in accordance with Milgramʼs theory. Approaching this notion as a by-product of 
evolution, Milgram explains obedience to authority as a ʻdeeply ingrained behavioral tendency’ to 
comply with the directives of superiors, despite the fact that their actions violate moral norms and 
other people’s right to life.130 As Milgram demonstrated in his experiments, two thirds of any group 
obey the orders of ʻauthorityʼ to inflict extreme pain on the victims even without external coercive 
force. In the case of the Holodomor, many district officials, and village officials alongside them, 
accepted the unrealistic grain procurement plans and proceeded to execute it not out of fear. Rather, 
they demonstrated the notions that Milgram calls ʻloyalty, duty, disclipline’ – something Golovin 
and many other witnesses stressed in their testimonies. In his words, they were ʻdisciplined and 
devoted Communists.ʼ131 
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Insights drawn from Milgram’s work might offer an even more sophisticated explanation of
the behaviour of the district and village officials. His repeated experiments demonstrate that 
compliance is greater when the subject who is instructed to give the actor/victim an electric shock 
does not see and hear them. Yet compliance is as low as 30% when the subject has to touch the 
victim. If the subjects have auxillary roles that do not directly involve inflicting pain, obedience is 
almost total. Likewise, when the subjects are part of the group instructed to deny the orders to 
inflict pain, disobedience is nearly total. In the case of the Holodomor, most district officials were 
shielded from the starving peasantry by both time and space. Ordering the removal of food from 
homes or cordoning off villages was temporally removed from the effects of such orders – from the 
actual deaths of the victims. But some understood their role clearly – it is not for nothing that most 
district officials demonstrated a reluctance to work on the ground, as we shall see in Chapter Two.
3.2 Demographics
District officials that retained their positions were remunerated for their service during the 
famine. Each RPK consisted of over a dozen secretaries for each area of work – from district 
planning to healthcare and propaganda. Along with the district prosecutor, the district judge, the 
editor of the district newspaper, the police and the DPU – there were over 34 categories of ʻtop 
district officials’ with dependants that were put in ʻthe first category’ of distribution in 1933.132 This
position meant that their rations included a daily 800 grams of baked bread (400g for dependants) as
well as monthly amounts of cereal, pasta, herring, sugar, preserves, oil, confectionary, cigars ʻof 
high quality’, soap, etc.133 The districts were also organised according to their economic and 
strategic importance, i.e. whether they were the site of heavy industry, sugar production etc. The 
total number of officials with dependants in the districts of the top category in 1933 was 30,834.134
The personal files of 125 Communists at the RPKs in 12 okruhy (administrative units) in 
1930 reveal the following demographics: 96.5% male, most with only primary education, from the 
working class, with an average of 9 years of party membership. Some were Red Army veterans. 
Women were exclusively secretaries of women affairs departments, and their wages were lower 
compared to their male colleagues, an average of 100 rubles against 149.5 rubles respectively.135 
With a few notable exceptions, women do not play crucial roles as elite political leaders at times of 
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mass violence.136 During the Holodomor, they did not dominate among district officials either. At 
the Orikhiv trial, the only woman out of the 12 officials put on trial, Maria Skypian-Bazilevich, held
a variety of posts during her career at the district and oblast’ levels, but she never chaired a Party 
committee. She was among the two pardoned officials in the trial.
3.3 The Richytsʼkyi Case
In early 1934 seven men were put on trial on charges of counter-revolution during grain 
procurement in the Arbuzynka district of the Odesa oblast’. They were accused of deliberately 
using excessive violence ʻto foster disaffection’ with the Soviet state in late 1932 – early 1933. The 
incriminated activities included illegal demolishing of peasant huts, various types of public 
shaming, arrests, beatings and sexual violence. While the exact number of the victims in Arbuzynka
district remains unknown, the names of 138 victims in the town of Arbuzynka alone were recovered
by way of survivor recollections, which suggests that the total number of people starved to death in 
the district was high.137 The accused perpetrators included the secretary of the Arbuzynka RPK, 
Ivan Kobzar, and a TsK KP(b)U plenipotentiary, Anatolii Richytsʼkyi. As the ten volumes of 
records from the trial demonstrate, these individuals – along with a number of their colleagues from
the DPU, police, the RVK, the district newspaper and the party cells in the district – were 
instrumental in organising the famine on the ground, and their methods even drove some peasants to
commiting suicide.138 A close reading of the trial records elucidates the role of district officials in 
the events of the famine. 
The excesses decribed in the trial were not new to the peasants in that district. In fact, 
several district officials had been removed from their positions for the same excesses earlier that 
year. The 1932-1933 procurement started in August 1932 when the RPK secretary, Kobzar, 
accepted new quotas and instructed the chairmen of the collective farms and the Communists to 
execute it, and even ordered dozens of individual farmers in each village to join the searches. At the
same time, Kobzar had been known to be disliked by his colleagues at the RVK and the district 
newspaper. They ʻsabotagedʼ procurement by leaving grain in the villages. In fact, during the six 
years of Kobzarʼs tenure as the RPK secretary, Arbuzynka had never fulfilled its grain procurement 
quotas. The RPK was said to be ʻan empty spaceʼ where few records were kept of what was 
procured or sown.139 
The situation changed drastically with the arrival of the TsK CP(b) U plenipotentiary, 
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Richytsʼkyi, in December 1932. Firstly, he called for a RPK meeting during which he introduced 
new approaches to make recalcintrant peasants reveal hidden grain. These methods were 
immediately approved by Kobzar and leveraged down through the attendees to the villages. Within 
days peasants were detained in small rooms without being permitted to sit or lie down for several 
days; they were then interrogated by several officials in a ʻconveyer beltʼ manner. On one occasion, 
a kerosene-soaked cat was set alight and thrown into the cellar with the detained women and 
children. On another occasion, a few men swollen from starvation were beaten and left to die in 
their own faeces. The peasants were stripped, placed in barrels and driven from village to village or 
made to dance and sing as a form of public shaming. Others had all their possessions and dwellings 
confiscated or destroyed.140
Secondly, Richytsʼkyi and Kobzar organized meetings in key villages to instruct activists 
(up to 100 attendees per meeting) – collective farm chairmen, village council heads, party cells 
secretaries, plenipotentiaries etc. – on how to find grain. Each collective farm had several search 
brigades. Oral instructions were followed by 5-pages-long directives from Richytsʼkyi and Kobzar 
to the village council heads and the party cells. Richytsʼkyi attempted, in his words, to ʻbreak the 
activists [perpetrators] away [from other peasants] and make them join the active fight for breadʼ. 
At a meeting in the village of Novo-Krasne, brigade leader Gekov confirmed the efficiency of the 
new methods in making peasants reveal hidden provisions. His brigade took evicted peasant 
families with infants and elderly to the remote fields and left them in the snow without adequate 
clothing. Attendees at the meeting were said to be ʻcompletely terrorisedʼ and ʻdisorientatedʼ: one 
official sobbed and hid in a bookcase. Kobzar threatened to send anyone who questioned the new 
orders ʻto the polar bearsʼ and visited villages every other day to see how the new methods were 
being applied. In one village Richytsʼkyi put all collective farmers under arrest until they reported 
on each other for hiding provisions.
But there were local officials who questioned the new methods. One district 
plenipotentiary, Polunin, told Richytsʼkyi that fulfilling the grain quota was impossible. He was 
immediately arrested. When another village official, Romanovsʼky, returned from a resort and 
called the new methods unlawful, Richytsʼkyi verbally attacked him. Romanovsʼky complained to 
the RVK to no avail. Witness after witness, most of whom were perpetrators themselves, explained 
that they followed orders because of bullying by Kobzar or Richytsʼkyi, who represented the higher 
authority at the time. Some felt terrorized by Poluninʼs arrest. 
Likewise, Kobzar blamed his adoption of the harsh methods on the authority of 
Richytsʼkyi, who was introduced to him by a secretary of the TsK KP(b)U, Panas Liubchenko. 
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Moreover, on 24th December 1932, Richytsʼkyi and Kobzar attended a meeting with Kaganovich in 
Voznesensʼk, which Kaganovich mentions in his diary. The senior Soviet figure told the men that 
they were not harsh enough and had to put peasants under such pressure ʻthat [they] themselves 
show where the grain is hidden.ʼ141 On 20th January they had a meeting with another senior 
Communist, Zatonsʼky in Arbuzynka, who also approved ‘concentrated strikes’ on peasants. 
Richytsʼkyi admitted that Kaganovichʼs speech encouraged him to proceed with harsher techniques 
ʻfor a greater effectʼ. Richytsʼkyi was known to the head of the DPU, Balytsʼkyi, and even 
Kaganovich ʻshowed trustʼ by sending him a personal telegramme in late December 1932. 
Richytsʼkyi stressed his devotion to the party, and the DPU in particular, both of which he claimed 
he had always kept informed by keeping a grain procurement diary and sending regular reports.142 
Moreover, Kobzar pointed out that other officials – district DPU head, Lashko; the RVK 
head, Krzhevitsʼkyi; and the district newpaper editor, Rytov – also participated in excesses, so he 
too felt peer pressure to comply. Seeing them adopt harsh methods proved convincing; as Kobzar 
remarks, ‘[They were] also silent; it felt awkward for me to speak upʼ.143 This assertion was 
questioned by Richytsʼkyi who noted that he had ʻno disagreementsʼ with Kobzar, but that 
Krzhevitsʼkyi and Rytov insisted on leaving 60% of grain for collective farmersʼ consumption. 
Perhaps more striking is Richytsʼkyi’s own testimony. ʻAll facts and all actions under 
certain circumstances have a certain political meaning and a completely different meaning under 
other circumstances,ʼ he said. ʻFrom the position of today, those actions were wrong, but at the time
I considered them right, and they were taken according to the instruction of Sovnarkom [in 
November 1932].ʼ Richytsʼkyi argued that the TsK Politburo directive on the application of harsh 
methods in grain procurement included the confiscation of houses, fines and taxes. In fact, these 
were exactly the same methods he had earlier applied in the Makhnov district in Vinnytsia oblast’, 
with wide approval and success. Yet his actions were mentioned in the aforementioned 
stenogramme at the III Party conference by another district official as having a devastating effect on
the peasants. At the time, republican leaders chose to award him with a medal for his ʻfirmʼ 
approach to grain procurement.144 
Equally important are testimonies by witnesses who admitted destroying houses, 
conducting searches and confiscating food. They mentioned these activities as a matter of a fact, as 
something rather mundane and ordinary. In other words, the rank-and-file perpetrators blamed their 
participation on the district authority and did not see their actions as crimes at all. They shied away 
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by downplaying their role. For example, the secretary of a large party cell, Tkach, stated that he did 
not initiate excesses or take part in searches but only ʻdiscovered pitsʼ with grain. Another accused 
perpetrator, Dymchak, complained about the pressure to join the search brigade and admitted to 
evicting one family: ʻI had to go there on order of the collective farm chairman and only because 
there was a directive to send 8-20 people, and it happened to be me. … they needed people to 
destroy the huts.ʼ145 
Such witnesses presented themselves as ordinary Soviet citizens who acted on orders. After
the famine, they did not face any retribution for their participation. Richytsʼkyi worked as an 
associate chief editor of Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia and as a research assistant of the All-
Ukrainian Association of Marx-Lenin Institutes in Kharkiv; Kobzar was an associate head of the 
agricultural department at the Odesa oblast’ consumer union; Gekov, who was personally involved 
in searches and torture, worked in the management of the Toms’kyi plant in Makiivka in Donbas; 
another perpetrator, Oleksandr Ivanchenko, enjoyed a career as an employee at a power station in 
Nova Odesa.146 
While this trial was seemingly part of the campaign against national Communists like 
Richytsʼkyi – who was, among other things, a former member of a non-Bolshevik party, a 
biographer of Ukrainian national poet Taras Shevchenko, and the first translator of Karl Marx into 
Ukrainian – his participation in grain procurement was used as evidence that he was plotting to 
discredit Soviet rule. Blaming the rank-and-file perpetrators for excesses was not new; in 1930, 
after all, Stalin did just that when collectivization was provoking a powerful peasant uprising. But 
Richytsʼkyi’s activities were not regarded as crimes either by himself, his colleagues, or his 
superiors. On the contrary: when he protested against his arrest to the TsK KP(b)U Politburo, 
Richytsʼky listed his ʻachievementsʼ in grain procurement as a proof of his absolute devotion to the 
Party.147 Ultimately, Richytsʼkyi, Kobzar and others behaved no differently from the other district 
officials in Ukraine during the famine. Nevertheless, Richytsʼkyi was sentenced to death and 
executed, while Kobzar and the others, branded as ʻhonest big mouthsʼ, were sentenced to 3 years 
in prison.148
4. Search Brigades
On the village level, the mechanism of man-made famine starts with the elimination of food
from the peasants’ possession. In the case of the Holodomor, this task was performed by search 
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brigades. Such brigades were groups of local men and women supervised by local officials to 
conduct house searches in order to confiscate grain. The local officials involved were most often the
heads of the village council or the chairmen of the local collective farm that received orders from 
district officials. Search brigades could also include teachers, district officials, police or the DPU 
servicemen. From November 1932 search brigades could requisition other agricultural produce in 
lieu of grain and seize personal possessions towards the procurement campaign. From 19th January 
1933 they could also keep 15% of the foodstuffs or grain found in these searches,149 which 
undoubtedly motivated more peasants to participate in searches. These actions devastated peasant 
households. In survivor testimonies, the brigades are often mentioned by the descriptive names: 
aktyv/isty (activists), buksyry (tugboats), vlada (authorities), bryhady (brigades), shtyrkhachi 
(poachers), krasna mitla (red broomstick), komizany (from Komnezam), komsomol’tsi (Komsomol) 
etc.150 
While there is no dedicated research or known archival documentation with statistical data 
on all search brigades, some details can be gleaned from reports by the DPU servicemen and local 
officials, complaints from the peasants, or the perpetrators’ own personal files. These documents, 
however, cover the brigade members who either refused to follow orders (e.g. those who questioned
procurement plans and distributed foodstuffs before being replaced by the more obedient members) 
or were accused of excesses on the ground (e.g. profiteers, drunks, sadists and murderers). The 
requisition of foodstuffs and possessions was indeed often accompanied by violence, debauchery, 
and profiteering. At the III KP(b)U conference in 1932, for example, Kosior criticised village 
officials for profiting and using up to 35% of the income from collective farms for their personal 
benefit instead of the expected 3%. He accused them of managing village activists ʻwith 
administrative measures,’ while Petrovsʼkyi stressed the widening divide between village leadership
and the rest of farmers.151 
To reconstruct a fuller picture of search brigades, oral memory can be used. While one oral 
memory of a traumatic experience is deeply personal and individual, 200 survivor testimonies can 
be more reflective of collective traumatic experience, offering insights for quantitative analysis. 
Most notable corpora of oral memory of the Holodomor naturally focus on the victims and the 
survivors. A questionnaire by Borysenko in the voluminous Natsional’na knyha pam’iati, however, 
concentrates on these brigades specifically. Here I offer one of the first analyses of this data. 
Borysenko’s questions on the perpetrators are the following:
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1) Who confiscated the foodstuffs grown in the fields and kitchen gardens?
2) Were there any rewards for reporting your neighbour for hiding bread?
3) Did the searchers present any papers before proceeding with confiscation?
4) Did they punish people, attack, deport or arrest?
5) Were they armed?
6) How did people defend themselves?
7) Who was involved in the searches? What were their names?
8) How many of them came inside the house? Who were they?
9) Did they take only food or other belongings – clothes, lifestock, etc.?
10) Who was watching the fields?
11) At what time did they conduct the searches?
12) How many times did they search?
13) Who did not starve in the village and why?
14) Who do you consider responsible for the famine?
All 210 testimonies from the Poltava oblast’ provide consistency in data.152 While explicit 
sampling quotas cannot be used, the pool of subjects was fairly balanced by geography within the 
oblast’ and by age at the time of the famine. The answers elaborate on the identities and 
demographics of the perpetrators; the brigade size; the actual perpetration; and institutional 
composition. Depending on its size, one village could have had several brigades. Usually one 
brigade operated in an allocated part of the village known as kutok or sotnia (corner or hundred). In 
some cases, however, the brigades were relocated to work in the neighbouring villages or other 
districts so that the perpetrators would not be known to local peasants personally. Thus they could 
be more effective. 
When survivors were asked to name the members of the brigades, only 54% did. In a 
handful of testimonies, they named the district officials but never any police or the DPU 
servicemen. Almost all the identified men and women were residents of the villages in which they 
operated or residents of a village nearby. In fact, 80% of survivors commented that brigades 
consisted of entirely local people. 17% of survivors recalled teams that included plenipotentiaries 
from the cities, with only 3% describing searches or trusy (quakes) being conducted by people from
outside the village.153 
Why did 46% of the survivors fail to provide any names? Here they offered various 
reasons: they forgot; they were too young to remember; or they had reservations, especially if the 
perpetrators’ families still lived in the village at the time of the interview. Some survivors did not 
regard the members of the brigades as perpetrators. A rather telling instance is of the survivor who 
did not consider her father a perpetrator, even though he was in a brigade: ʻI remember an incident, 
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my father was [in the search brigade] there, so they got inside the house and found a big barrel with 
muddy water. My father looked inside and went away, but the other [perpetrator] put his arm in the 
barrel. At once, the owner sprung on the man and stabbed him from behind. The owner was 
murdered [for that] of course; such incidents took place.ʼ154 Eventually her family house was 
searched ten times a month, and her father eventually died at the end of the famine. 
In fact, a number of survivors explained that collective farmers searching or watching the 
fields were doing their job. One day they were told to work in the field, the following day they were
told to search the houses. In this way, participation in the searches became mundane: ʻThe brigade 
was put together; whoever wanted could sign up. They used to collect all food. They said: 
“According to the law”. And what can you do about it? Our village folk used to collect everything. I
did not like them.ʼ155 
While the brigades were predominantly male, there were all-female teams too. Some 
members of them were poor; others, better off, joined the collective farm to protect themselves from
dekulakization. A small number of survivors comment on the perpetrators being ʻkulakʼ offspring 
taking revenge on the poor. Almost all the survivors knew the perpetrators before and after the 
famine through a variety of roles – as neighbours, distant relations or relations-to-be, co-workers 
etc. The common ground the members of the brigade shared was their belonging to the collective 
farm in various capacities. The size of the group varied with an average brigade consisting of 4-5 
members. Larger groups were rare – being only 12% of the cases. Though perpetrators felt more 
comfortable in numbers, brigades consisting of between one to three persons were not rare – 31%.
While the brigades were supposed to procure grain, only one out of 210 survivors said 
perpetrators confiscated only bread. 52% of survivors said the perpetrators confiscated everything: 
foodstuffs, life-stock, personal items, valuables, clothes etc. Later some of the confiscated goods 
were sold off by the village council, whereas other items were appropriated by the perpetrators or 
their relatives: ʻI remember one wearing my father’s suede jacket for a long time.ʼ156 During the 
searches every possible hiding place was checked manually or with steel rods to pierce the soil, the 
walls or the floor. The beds, cots, chests, ovens and even chimneys were often damaged. The 
searches mostly took place during the day, although the perpetrators could also come at night to 
catch the starving peasants by surprise. A quarter of survivors felt the brigade would only stop once 
there was nothing left. According to 70% of the witnesses, perpetrators returned again and again. 
Only 22% of the survivors commented on searches taking place just once or twice.
Upon arrival, the brigade would usually demand the grain or other foodstuffs. According to 
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98% of testimonies, they did not present any papers authorising them to conduct the searches, nor 
were they expected by those whose homes were searched. Most survivors commented more often 
than not, they were not armed: only 29% of survivors remember a member of the brigade having a 
gun or a shotgun. Survivors rejected the plausibility of resistance, given that the perpetrators ʻcould 
do anything’ or that they were ʻtoo scared even to say a word.’ Many survivors described babies 
being thrown out of their cradles in search of food. There were instances of perpetrators locking 
children inside the houses and closing the chimney while blackmailing the parents.157 Evidence of 
violence during these searches is ubiquitous in all corpora of oral memory. Indeed, 83% of 
survivors in Poltava oblast’ remembered their family or people they knew as being either deported, 
dekulakized, imprisoned, or physically and verbally abused during the searches. 
As the amount of resources differed from oblast’ to oblast’, and with local officials 
approaching the management of supplies differently, no one was spared from hunger in some 
villages. 21% of survivors asserted that everyone in their village, including the perpetrators, starved.
In fact, 2% recalled local brigade members and their families dying from starvation.158 But more 
than half of all survivors (54%) remembered that perpetrators and leaders and their families did not 
starve during the famine. Almost unanimously (95%), survivors considered ʻauthorities’ responsible
for organising the famine. The ʻauthorities’ include the whole vertical chain of government, from 
Stalin to the village officials. Only 2% suggested that it was ʻpeople like us’ who made the famine 
possible.
Finding ʻrighteous ones’ amongst the searchers beyond the anecdotal evidence is 
challenging. The existing collection of testimonies on the 140 ʻrighteous officials’ includes a 
number of unverified accounts. For example, a son of a chairman of a collective farm describes his 
father as the saviour of the village of Uzdytsia in Hlukhiv district, Sumy oblast’. According to the 
official’s son, not a single person died in Uzdytsia during the Holodomor.159 A list of the victims 
from the same village, however, contains 65 names, over 60% of whom were children.160 While 
there is no quantitative data on the numbers of those who left the brigades, it is clear that some 
perpetrators helped the starving peasants hide food in their allotments as they were not subjected to 
searches.161 There are many instances where some brigade members did not search as meticulously 
as others. In other words, perpetration, as survival, was an individual experience and depended on 
many circumstances. As in Browning’s case study, in which two different officers had opposite 
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reactions to the policemen asking to be relieved from their duty to shoot the victims, various 
officials on the ground had different approaches to the evasion techniques of their subordinates.162 
5. Institutional Composition of Brigades
The vast majority of the Holodomor survivors name the heads of the village council as the 
chief organisers of house searches. In fact, in many cases, the heads of the village council actually 
took part in the searches themselves. The lists of the perpetrators include the chairmen and board 
members of the collective farm. 30% of survivors in the Poltava oblast’ also mention that the 
district officials who decided how to organise searches and what to confiscate played a role too. 
Survivors also mention peredovyky (shock workers), teachers, Komsomol and Communists and – to
a lesser extent – outsiders, KNS, Twenty-Five Thousanders, police and the DPU. Membership in 
these groups can overlap: the head of the village council could be a KNS member, a plenipotentiary 
could be a teacher, a Komsomol can belong to the KNS. The key position of the village council 
head and the chairman (rarely chairwoman) of the collective farm was acknowledged by their 
rations. Together with the party cells, they received bread and cereals from the district milling tax 
(5%).163 While we cannot assume that all these people facilitated the famine, it is safe to say that 
they were expected to participate in the grain procurement campaign. 
Female officials and activists could head, albeit rarely, the brigades that searched peasant 
houses and confiscated grain. Though outnumbered by men, they loom large in over 20% of the 
accounts by the survivors who accentuated women participation.164 As one survivor, a child at the 
time, succinctly puts it: ʻMost poignantly was that there were women among them, who took the 
last piece of bread from children.ʼ165 These women defied the gender stereotypes of nurturing 
maternal actors and instead participated in violence that led to the death of children. While they 
tend not to try to explain the motivation of such women, survivors sometimes refer to their 
institutional affiliation: as officials, members of the village KNS, collective farmers, shock farmers, 
and teachers.
According to Stalin himself, women were grossly underrepresented on the village councils: 
they constituted only 1% of membership in 1923 and 2.9% in 1924.166 During the upheaval of 
collectivization, however, the representation of women in local government increased. In 1930 
women headed 4.2% of village councils, while 3.7% of village council secretaries and 19.1% 
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village council members were females in the Kyiv oblast’. During the famine, this female 
participation grew further. By the end of 1933, in only 16 districts of the Kyiv oblast’, there were 
22,000 female team leaders, and in 44 districts of Dnipropetrovsk oblast’, 307 female tractor drivers
and 215 female brigade leaders.167 Women at those positions were expected to participate in all 
campaigns in the village, including grain procurement, which – coupled with gender expectations – 
helps explain the presence of women in oral memory.
5.1 KNS 
KNS, also known as Komnezamy, were state-sponsored organizations in the Ukrainian 
countryside between 1920-1933 that supported and enforced state policies on the ground. Some 
historians, including James Mace, argue that the famine of 1933 is a measure of their ʻsuccessʼ in 
grain procurement, given that they controlled the village councils. Indeed, 80% of the heads of the 
village council were KNS members in 1931.168 Other researchers, on the other hand, point out that 
KNS failed as an effective force during collectivization due to its poor management and neglect by 
the state in the preceding years. In particular, Levandovsʼka highlights a large number of reports on 
the inactivity of KNS organizations: ʻKNS works so poorly that if there had been no lists of 
members, one would think that KNS does not existʼ or ʻthe village KNS does not exist in real life, 
only on paperʼ.169 She concludes that the involvement of tens of thousands of plenipotentiaries from 
the cities proves that Kremlin leaders did not trust KNS to facilitate the famine. As oral memory 
and archival evidence demonstrate, the key role was reserved for the village council, party cell and 
collective farm leadership. Yet some of these key village perpetrators were also KNS members, 
which warrants an exploration of its role in the Holodomor. 
Introduced in Ukraine in 1919 by the Bolsheviks, kombidy (komitety bednoty, committees 
of the village poor) were supposed to exercise political authority in the villages. Later they were 
reformed into KNS, which sought to control village councils that were established in 1922 and 
assumed power in the countryside. The name of the new committees underlines the intention to 
encourage non-wealthy peasants – or seredniaky (middle peasants) – to support Soviet policies in 
agriculture. Its members were granted favourable conditions for loans and industrial distribution of 
consumer goods in the village in the 1920s. In return they were expected to redistribute the land of 
the gentry and ʻkulaksʼ among the landless and smallholding peasants; to requisition agricultural 
produce (while keeping 25% of it);170 to fight the ʻenemiesʼ of Soviet power; to denounce the 
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village council to higher authorities etc.171 KNS thus controlled or at least had leverage in every 
aspect of the village life. Such leverage attracted, on the one hand, marginal elements in the village 
who embraced violence and theft and gave KNS its infamous reputation and, on the other, the 
industrious poor peasants who became self-sufficient by the end of the decade thanks to the benefits
of KNS membership.172 KNS was subject to recurrent purges, resulting in 840,316173 of its members
being expelled.
When the state took a break from radical policies during NEP, subordinated KNS to village 
councils and deprived it of some of its privileges, 54% of its members left the organisation.174 
During collectivization, however, the government again fostered the return of KNS, allowing the 
arbitrariness and illegality for which they were granted immunity in the past. KNS members ʻthrew 
themselves into a decisive offensive against the kulaks, showing heroic initiative during important 
economic and political campaigns in the villageʼ.175 Upon arrival in the village, party 
plenipotentiaries could count first and foremost on KNS, which often dominated on the 
collectivization committees, helped to compile lists for dekulakization, and provided intelligence. 
For their activity in collectivization, dekulakization and grain procurement, they were also (once 
again) threatened and killed by peasants. At the same time, a number of KNS members refused to 
search houses in 1928 when allowed by law to confiscate property other than land.176 Moreover, 
only 20% of KNS members joined collective farms by the end of 1929.177 
Indeed, only 3% of 212 survivors in the Poltava oblast’ name KNS members among those 
who searched their houses and confiscated food. These accounts do not differ substantively from 
the others, as KNS members involved in house searches showed as much mercy as anybody else in 
their position. Some profiteered and made a career to provide for their own families; only in one 
case did a KNS member share his rations with the starving. One survivor describes them as idle 
people, whereas the rest characterise them as simple peasants or profiteers who joined collective 
farms with virtually nothing.178 
Several accounts mention women or komnezamivky. While the Soviet historians often cited 
female members of KNS as evidence of female political participation,179 the number of women in 
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KNS increased only in the winter 1922-1923 and during the collectivization, i.e. when membership 
gave access to the distribution of resources for the poor. Indeed, the women who joined the KNS 
were usually among the most socially vulnerable: widows and unmarried women. Like men, other 
women joined because of the opportunities KNS could potentially provide them: education, training
and employment. Female participation in KNS, however, was never higher than 25%.180 The report 
on KNS in Volyn’ okruha, for example, notes 5136 women in KNS (or 14.2% of all members) in 
1925. 
But KNS did not always represent the poor. The report on KNS in Volyn okruha, for 
instance, reveals that only 13% of all poor peasants (or 36,123 people) joined the organization, 
which included only 6.5% of the rural population. Many (38,6%) were illiterate, while less than 1% 
were Communists and 2% were in Komsomol. According to Voloshenko and Bilokon’, however, 
KNS members were by definition poor peasants with little experience of successful farming. With 
many dependants to feed, they received loans that were often used for food, luxury items and 
alcohol instead of investment into farming equipment and land acquisition.
At the same time, the report also relates that many peasants called KNS members ʻdrunks, 
good-for-nothings and bastards.’181 In fact, some Communist leaders questioned the motivation and 
morale of some KNS activists at the time: Petrovs’kyi and Kviring described them as a corrupt part 
of the poor peasantry, interested only in the benefits and prone to alcohol abuse. This 
characterisation is echoed by researchers Mel’nychuk and Hryhorchuk.182 This stereotype was 
exacerbated by the failure of KNS members to make their farming sustainable during the years of 
the NEP. By contrast, Soviet historiography of the 1960s that offered a partial re-assessment of 
collectivization, depicted the KNS members as the fighters against alcoholism, corruption, brutality 
and bureaucracy.183 During the famine, however, argues Smirnov, most of them were confused by 
the ʻextreme violence’ that accompanied state policies and simply obeyed orders.184 
5.2 Shock-Collective Farmers
In most survivor testimonies, collective farmers are mentioned as ordinary people from the 
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village: neighbours, acquaintances, distant relatives, classmates. While ordinary collective farmers 
rarely published their accounts of collectivization and the famine, the memoirs of shock-collective 
farmers are widely available. A careful analysis of over thirty biographies of Stakhanovite 
collective farmers reveals that in 1932-1933 they were complicit in facilitating the famine. Maria 
Demchenko, Nadiia Zahlada, Olesia Kulyk, Maria Martsun, Marta Khudolii, Pasha Angelina and 
many other Stakhanovite farmers may have achieved remarkable results in growing sugar beets, 
wheat and flax, but they also participated in collectivization, dekulakization and grain procurement 
in the early thirties. Most of them were among the founders of the collective farms in their villages, 
or were Komsomol members. Since the Komsomol and the first members of the collective farms 
were usually the primary actors in dekulakization, their participation in the grain procurement in 
1932-1933, including in the searches, was likely widespread. Many participated voluntarily; some 
were forced; others followed suit. Naturally, their consistent support of the various state policies 
and willingness to work hard made them trustworthy candidates for the Stakhanovite movement. To
illustrate their participation I will review three examples: Maria Demchenko, Nadia Zahlada and 
Olesia Kulyk.
Maria Demchenko (1912-1995) was a celebrated sugar beet grower from Starosillia in 
Cherkasy oblast’ who built a personal rapport with Stalin. Having left the village in search of work 
during NEP, she worked at the Magnitogorsk plant in a cement workshop but then returned home. 
Her family was one of the first to join the collective farm where she was a team leader in 1930-
1936. In March 1933, when many peasants in her village were starving to death, she joined the 
Komsomol for her hard work. At the ceremony, Demchenko and her brigade leader David Burda 
pledged not to discard a single sugar beet in the fields or by the road.185 
In 1934 Demchenko’s team achieved high results, for which she went to a Komsomol 
conference in Moscow and met Stalin. At the conference Demchenko met fellow sugar beets 
growers Khrystyna Baidych and Kateryna Androshchuk from the village of Kuz’myn in Vinnytsia 
oblast’. Like her, they promised Stalin they would achieve even higher results in the following 
years and kept in touch with Hryhorii Petrovs’kyi.186 This enthusiasm inadvertedly cost lives, as the 
survivors from Kuz’myn recalled that the starving peasantsʼ only hope for survival was the sugar 
beets discarded in the fields or by the road.187 While in Kuzʼmyn there were over 20 established 
identities of the Holodomor victims,188 the list of identified victims of the famine in Demchenko’s 
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village reached 94, which suggests that the total number was considerably higher.189 
In her efforts to achieve a higher yield of sugar beets, Demchenko was assisted by many 
local officials, in particular Ivan Tyshchenko, a Komsomol secretary at the collective farm, and 
Mykhailo Lial’chenko, the RPK secretary appointed in 1932. According to Demchenko, seeing 
insects flying to the lights of a district committee member’s Ford car one night gave her an idea of 
how to get rid of beets moths – by making fires in the fields at night.190 Also supportive of 
Demchenko was her friend and fellow Stakhanovite, Marina Hnatenko, one of the prominent 
Komsomols in the village. Unlike Demchenko, who, according to contemporaries, resembled a 
factory worker with her short hair and clothes, Hnatenko still had her hair plaited and wore a home-
spun embroidered shirt. While the journalists commented that a military uniform would suit 
Hnatenko better, her embroidered shirt offers us an important detail. During the Holodomor, the 
starving peasants often sold their embroidered shirts in the cities or to their neighbours for food or 
money. Having an embroidered shirt in the immediate aftermath of the Holodomor may indicate 
that she had access to foodstuffs or kept the shirt from the items she confiscated during 
dekulakization, or both. As Demchenko stated at the time: ʻWe destroyed the kulaks and took 
everything into our hands. Now we have power over everything, and they are going crazy from 
jealousy.ʼ191 
Having secured support from the officials, Demchenko noted hostility in the village, even 
at the peak of the Stakhanovite movement. Like male perpetrators, these young women faced the 
vengeance of survivors after the famine. In Skrahlivka (Berdychiv district, Zhytomyr oblast’), 
where over 26 people died in the first three months of 1933, a group of farmers murdered two 
female shock workers upon their return from Moscow. During the trial, the two suspects said the 
women were ʻdogs that served Moscowʼ.192 Neither Demchenko nor Hnatenko stayed in the village. 
After burying her parents in the 1960s, Demchenko moved to central Kyiv where she lived alone 
until her death in 1995.193 Hnatenko also died in Kyiv in 2006.
Nadiia Zahlada (1894-1977), who was older than Demchenko during collectivization, was 
one of the founders of a collective farm in her village of Vysoke in the Zhytomyr oblast’. She was 
on the collective farm board in 1929 and briefly chaired it after the Second World War. An illiterate
widow with six children, she also nursed and adopted an infant girl of her neighbours who starved 
to death. She also worked in the local orphanage during the famine. The registrar records show only
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thirteen deaths of starvation in Vysoke in 1932-1933, most of them infants, but it is safe to assume 
that the death toll there was considerably higher.194 
Reflecting on the 1930s almost thirty years later, Zahlada commented on the past carefully: 
ʻWe all remember how badly collective farms were managed under Stalin. It was all about numbers,
not sorting things out, but empty words. Many collective farms were damaged; some are still 
recovering today. Many people were forced to go against their own conscience!ʼ195 It is possible, 
that she implies that her own conscience was compromised, contributing to events that claimed 
lives in Vysoke. Despite her activism and commitment, Zahlada was expelled from the party during
the purge in 1933. Her expulsion was something she could not comprehend, although she re-joined 
the party in 1940: ʻWhat else do they want? I work [as hard] as I can, I threw the icons away …ʼ196 
In 1962, in her widely publicised article about consciencious collective farmers, she criticized the 
lack of enthusiasm among collective farmers and chairmen in the 1960s.197 Zahlada received a lot of
responses to her article, many people calling her a ʻgenuine Communist’ and a ʻtrue builder of 
Communism.’198
In 1930 a sixteen-year-old Olesia Kulyk (1914-198?) from the village of Popivka in 
Myrhorod district in the Poltava oblast’ enrolled into tractor driver classes with other Komsomol 
members despite her mother objections. Olesiaʼs story became an inspiration for the poem Pisnia 
Tractorystky (A Song of a Female Tractor Operator, 1933) by renowned poet Pavlo Tychyna. The 
poem was included in school curricula for decades, making Olesia, while not a Stakhanovite, a well 
known female tractor operator. Like other collective farm employees, she received a ration during 
the famine and was required to follow orders from the village management, – from driving tractors 
to conducting house searches. Popivka saw over 2,000 people or 1/3 of its inhabitants die in 1932-
1933.199 
In 1932 Olesia was already a driver at the collective farm. One winter day in 1933, she
drove Pavlo Tychyna into the village and told him about her life. Olesia left the village in 1938,
moved on to work at a steel factory in Dnipropetrovs’k. She later settled in southern Ukraine,
married, and had four children. She visited the village in 1982 and had an emotional reunion with
close friends like Omelʼchenko, one of the village perpetrators and a KNS member since 1920.200
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Her career path is similar to the one of another native of Poltava oblast’, Maria Kalashnik. A a
Komsomol in 1932-1933, she also left the village after the famine and eventually became the
chairwoman of a bread factory in Poltava. Historian, Voronina, identifies such a career pattern as a
familiar one for the female activists of the 1930s.201 
5.3 ʻLeave the Schools to the Womenʼ
During the Rwandan genocide, women in various occupational fields facilitated the mass 
murder of Tutsis. Teachers at schools betrayed their pupils and handed them over to killers; so did 
nuns.202 During Holodomor, teachers in Ukraine were also instrumental in mass violence. As one 
high-ranking Communist official commented: ʻThere is not a single village where teachers would 
not have been in the commission or brigades of grain procurement and collectivization.ʼ203 That is, 
74,046 teachers – almost 2/3 (or 41,317) of whom worked in villages204 – were there not only to 
educate the villagers, but to help bring about their ʻsocial transformation.ʼ In practice they 
dekulakized, created collective farms and enforced propaganda campaigns. During the famine, they 
organised chervoni valky (red trains – carts with procured grain); acted as informers; perused 
private post; instigated violence; and searched peasant huts. With the percentage of women in the 
teaching profession at 55.8% in 1928,205 more than 20,000 women would have had the opportunity 
to oversee or engage in the aforementioned activities.
The importance of teachers in enforcing political campaigns was understood well by the top
leaders in Soviet Ukraine at the time.206 They regarded the teachers as ʻa third frontʼ (after military 
and economy) and a key agent of the influence of Soviet power in the countryside. In fact, the 
official position was that ʻchildren were to be schooled into fighters for communism or not to be 
schooled at all.ʼ207 As the teachers in Ukraine did not support the Bolsheviks during the 
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revolutionary years,208 the Soviet state reduced funding for the schools and anyone wishing to enter 
the profession was required to pass a ʻreliabilityʼ exam.209 At the conferences of teachers in 1924-
1925 over a quarter of them ʻaccepted the Communist party as their only leader,ʼ 50% were 
politically passive (ʻa political marshlandʼ) and the rest resisted Soviet rule. During collectivization,
however, passivity could have been interpreted as siding with enemies and ʻthe political marshlandʼ
shrunk to a quarter in 1928,210 though only 3.3% of all teachers were Communists (and 4.1% 
Komsomol).211 In 1930, however, 35% out of 11,000 new teachers were Komsomol and this 
percentage was projected to grow.212
Khvylia, a member of the TsK KP(b)U who submitted a detailed study of the situation of 
the teachers in the countryside in 1930, pointed to female teachers as being more vulnerable to 
abuse in the village.213 Women had less authority or confidence than their male colleagues who also 
could have been ordered to watch the possessions of the dekulakized, the granary or the stables or to
watch and then convoy the arrested ʻkulaksʼ or to collect eggs from the peasants. Based on ROBOS 
statistics, Khvylia concluded that if the teacher was a young and attractive woman, she was likely to
be sexually harassed. Moreover, the attackers, often village officials themselves, used their position 
of power to discipline a teacher that refused their advances. The teachers in the countryside often 
faced insufficient food provision, delays in pay, poorly heated school premises that required 
renovation, inadequate accommodation. 
In some districts the local officials were made teachersʼ superiors (Pervomaisʼk, Tulʼchyn) 
by the district Inspection of Education. The teachers were required to join the collective farms, their
salary then belonged to the collective, they could get food and other products only through the farm 
and were required to work at the farm as well as to teach. Moreover, according to one district 
inspector of education, it was up to the collective farm chairman to issue a reference for the teacher 
should they want to pursue further education or transfer.214 Naturally, the teachers under such 
circumstances could be interpreted as compromised perpetrators.
Enforcing violent state policies made them enemies with their studentsʼ parents that 
sometimes demanded teachers reveal the lists of peasants to be dekulakized. For example, in the 
village of Tarasivka, Kytaihorod district, Kamʼianetsʼ okruha, a teacher was the only one who 
ʻcategoricallyʼ objected to an agreement between the village council and the local KNS that there 
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were no ʻkulaksʼ in the village.215 These conflicts often resulted in violent clashes. In fact, in 
Annopil district there was only one village in which the teacher has not been beaten by the peasants.
They were threatened, assaulted and their huts set alight. But sometimes teachers would show 
remorse, especially if the starving peasants were their own students. One survivor recalls how her 
teacher Savinsʼka in the village of Velyka Obukhivka (Myrhorod district, Poltava oblast’) returned 
the cloths she had confiscated earlier that day to the children.216 All these circumstances prompted 
some teachers to flee, while others starved and even committed suicide.217 
 Ukrainian Soviet writer Anatolii Dimarov recalled how his mother participated in 
dekulakization as a teacher. He also remembered her crying when a peasant her team dekulakized 
committed suicide. That man was a father of Dimarovʼs school friend.218 His mother left his father 
when they learnt they were to be dekulakized, changed her name and relocated to another village 
with the children. Dimarov later described her experience through the character Tetiana in the novel
The Hungry Thirties (1989). Compromised by her repressed family Tetiana follows the orders so 
that her sons survive. Despite her work at school she still has to work at the farm to earn meagre 
portions of food which she shares with her children. One day she is thankful she does not have to 
dekulakize the family she has been lodging with. Clearly a compromised perpetrator, she is only 
one teacher of thousands. While the teacherʼs family was likely to suffer from malnutrition or poor 
diet, the teachers were rarely subject to house searches and in most cases received a ration – a 
lifeline many victims did not have.
Indeed, some teachers understood all too well the processes they were part of. Following 
Stalinʼs article in 1930 in which he criticised violence on the ground, many perpetrators wrote to 
him to express their dismay. One teacher from Uzyn in Kyiv oblast’, where more than 1,563 out of 
6,000 inhabitants died during the famine,219 wrote to the paper Radiansʼke Selo. She was concerned 
about the articleʼs repercussions for the perpetrators and wondered if Stalin was aware of the 
situation on the ground: ʻDidnʼt he know that the churches were closed down with force, that people
were pulled into the collectives, thrown out of trade unions and KNS? That every single agency 
pushed for collectivization, sued its underlings and issued warnings?ʼ220 She was afraid that Stalin's 
article could negate the results of the perpetratorsʼ arduous work and undermine their authority. Her
description of the work of teachers is telling of their later involvement in the procurement in 1932-
215 Ibid, ark. 2-3.
216 Bilousʼko et al., eds. Natsional’na knyha pam’iati, p. 1081.
217 TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 20, spr. 3099, ark. 18.
218 А. Dimarov, Prozhyty i rozpovisty: Povist   pro simdesiat lit (Kyiv: Dnipro, 1997), Part I, p. 37.
219 V. Ul’ianchenko et al, eds. Natsional’na knyha pam’ iati zhertv Holodomoru 1932–1933 rr. v Ukraiini. Kyivs’ka 
oblast’ (Kyiv: Bukva, 2008), p. 115.
220 TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 20, spr. 3107, ark. 27.
1933:
How many times during my work in the brigade when collecting seeds and collectivizing 
did I see tears, hear curses and pleas. A dirty wet hut, a bunch of pale, filthy rag-clad 
people. You come, check for grain and take everything they have, and then inform them 
that their cows, pigs, chickens and vegetable patch are collectivized; then demand donation 
for the tractor, 15% cash for the shares and 30% for the joining fee and all their savings 
(because some people are put on trial for being too slow in selling state loans). There was a 
case when a poor peasant nearly slashed the brigade and threatened to kill the Communists 
in the near future. At one meeting peasants demanded that all civil servants would pay to 
the collective for the eggs, hens and butter they consume.221
5.4 Komsomol
Komsomol members often appear in oral memory as young people acting on the orders of 
village officials. The actions of Komsomol members facilitating collectivization is indicative of 
their later role in the Holodomor. While Komsomol members can be interpreted as compromised 
perpetrators – most of them were teenagers, susceptible to propaganda – their motivations varied. 
Some of them were local, while others, mostly students, were sent to the countryside from the 
towns by oblastʼ Komsomol committees. Both urban and village Komsomol members maintained 
close contact with the local officials, the DPU and police and sometimes acted on their direct 
orders. Upon completing their assignments, Komsomol members reported on their work caucus 
meetings at the district centres.222
Urban Komsomol members would first register at the district Komsomol committee and 
then proceed to the villages where they would report to the village council, which would give them 
specific tasks. According to many memoirs, the instructions from the district committees to fight 
ʻkulaks,’ engage in mass agitational work among the peasant youth, and determine ʻwhere the 
kulaks are hiding the grainʼ left young people confused: ʻThis was a huge task; were we up to it? 
We really knew nothing about these things; we did not know where to begin.ʼ223 Guided by senior 
comrades from the Party, however, many of these young people soon adapted. Usually they 
introduced themselves to the village youth and informed them of the opportunities that membership 
in the collective farm offered. Komsomol members attended youth gatherings in the village and the 
local reading huts. From the village youth they would retrieve information about hidden grain and 
village affairs. Often, the personal details revealed by these exchanges were used in dekulakization. 
In one village, a peasant whom the activists intended to dekulakize shot at them from a rifle and 
locked himself in the house. One urban Komsomol member demonstrated resourcefulness and acted
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as a Trojan horse. Having learnt from the village youth that the peasant was very religious, she 
disguised herself as a nun and asked him to let her in for the night. In the morning she opened the 
gates to the brigade.224 
There is no statistical data on how many urban Komsomol members deserted their posts or 
committed suicide, but based on oral memory, it is clear that many persisted in the work fulfilling 
their instructions. When one such Komsomol member in Kuban, Maksim, was questioned by his 
friend on the necessity of violence – and on the practice of starving children to death in particular – 
he justified such methods by explaining that all citizens had a collective responsibility to cooperate 
with authorities. Moreover, Maksim argued that saving the children would prolong the struggle 
between the state and the peasantry:
It is a necessary measure. Cossacks must be terrorised, or collectivization will fail. When we
collected grain and revealed the saboteurs hiding it, we received virtually no support from 
the population. Here’s an example: we discovered that one kulak buried a lot of grain in a 
pit, about 5 tonnes. Obviously it took him a long time to dig such a large pit, but when we 
asked his neighbours, everyone assured us that they knew nothing. … We must finish off the
kulaks at all costs; if we donʼt finish them, they will finish us.225 
Local Komsomol members were naturally well acquinted with the situation in the village. 
While they were supervised by the senior Party members, they were often supported by their 
relations, except for cases when Komsomol members disowned their peasant parents. A celebrated 
Stakhanovite tractor driver from Donbas oblast’, Pasha Angelina, was a Komsomol member in 
1930. According to her autobiography, she took part in collectivization along with her family. Her 
brother Vasily was the chairman of the village KNS and the head of agitation and propaganda at the
RPK, while another brother, Ivan, was the secretary of the village Party cell. Another, Nikolai, was 
in the Party, and another two siblings were in the Komsomol. The Angelin family also had long-
term grievances against the local farmers who had employed them in the past. When Angelins failed
to win the majority of votes for the creation of the collective farm, they simply dekulakized their 
enemies and took their land. Though their actions were interpreted in the village as profiteering, 
Angelina regarded dekulakization as part of the inevitable struggle in which ʻwe, the ordinary 
peopleʼ won. More importantly, she claims that their actions were similar to those of activists in 
many other villages around the country and that the younger generation, which she represented, 
could not ʻwait for [better] future with folded arms.ʼ226 
Like other perpetrators, they were attacked: Angelinaʼs mother was beaten, and the siblings 
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were threatened and shot. Angelina herself was deliberately run over by a cart. She recalls how 
fellow female collective farmers objected to her organising an all-female brigade of tractor drivers 
and how older women rejoiced at lightning hitting her, which was seen as a punishment for her 
actions. Angelina explains that the Komsomol members like her moved on to administrative work 
in mid 1930s: they headed various district level organizations and institutions or became chairmen 
of the collective farms and secretaries of different level Party committees.227
In an in-depth interview I conducted with Oleksandr O., which was based on the 
questionnaire by Borysenko, we can gain yet another view into the role of Komsomol members in 
the perpetration of the Holodomor. Oleksandr O. was only fifteen years old in 1932. While denying 
participation in the events for immediate profit, Oleksandr O. admitted that his village blacksmith 
family profited from their loyalty to the regime over the long term. His two uncles secured high-
ranking Party jobs at oblast’ and republican levels. His family was one of the first to join the 
collective, exercising what Noll calls a ritual myth to prove the loyalty and enthusiasm of the 
family.228 One uncle became the headmaster of a village school and ʻof course organised the 
teachers and students into search brigades.ʼ Like many other perpetrators of mass violence, 
Oleksandr O. denied the very event of the famine in interview. He claimed that not many people 
died and that it was a temporary difficulty and not man-made. Later, however, he added that it was 
avoidable, recalling several dead people dumped on a cart in the village of Velyki Krynky every 
day.229 When he admitted to seeing hundreds of the starving peasants at the train station in Khorol – 
where they were late shot en masse for attempting to break into grain storehouses – Oleksandr O. 
expressed regret that the authorities made no attempt to help the starving peasants.230 
  The Komsomol offered young people like him many opportunities, claimed Oleksandr O..
Coming from a family of the church elder, he excelled in chemistry at school and used his 
chemistry set to debunk ʻreligious miracles’ in front of a 100-strong audience in the village club. 
Later he joined the prestigious Kyiv Polytechnic, fought at the front during the Second World War. 
After many years of service, he retired in Kyiv where he recently died at the age of 99. During the 
famine, he said, ʻI was young but could not understand why they [the victims] gave up so easily. 
They put up their arms and died. We, students, were asked to search too, so that no one could hide 
anything. There was a house we came to, with a little roof above the entrance, where a man hid a 
sack of grain. But we found it. We were so happy when we got it! The man told us that it was for 
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the seeds and to survive... But we said “no”, enough said and took the sack to Zagotzerno.’231 None 
of his comrades died from hunger; most stayed in Khorol but continued their studies elsewhere. The
chairman of the collective was later fired for using wood from the local church as fuel for the 
school.
His Komsomol brigade of five teenage boys was one of many acting on the orders of the 
RPK, which were passed down through the school in Khorol. They and other perpetrators, all of 
them local, searched all houses. No one searched the searchers, however: ʻThe officials trusted us. 
When we were tasked with upturning the grain in storage – the grain store was full – we filled our 
special pockets too.’ When asked about the starving peasant whose grain he found, Oleksandr O. 
sounded indifferent: ʻwe did not know him... Maybe he ate beets after that or had a little more 
hidden somewhere.’ He admitted that participation in these searches was voluntary and that no one 
was punished for refusing to search. According to him, no one refused: ʻWe were keen to do it!’232
At the same time, however, his family had to sell the gold and silver they had and even take
embroidered towels to exchange for grain in Belarus, where ʻthey did not know that we were 
dying.’ One of his aunts and her many children survived only thanks to her more influential 
brothers. They also employed her father-in-law to collect corpses. During the Second World War 
his family was targeted by the survivors; his house was put on the list to be burnt as the Germans 
retreated. But the individuals whom the family of Oleksandr O. had helped during the famine 
ensured his family house was saved. His first cousin in Khorol confirmed that Komsomol activists 
served in the search brigades but did not name anyone. She also omitted mentioning the part her 
father played in the famine as the headmaster of the school who organised brigades himself. She 
justified the participation of teachers by their dependance on rations. Like her cousin, she recalled 
helping the extended family to survive and blamed the famine on state policies.233
5.5 Plenipotentiaries
The Party plenipotentiaries (upovnovazheni) were drawn from various institutions and sent 
to the countryside with special powers to organise or oversee grain procurement. In 1929 the all-
Ukrainian Council of Trade Unions sent 120 brigades to assist in collectivization.234 Some came as 
teachers or the Twenty-Five Thousanders. Throughout 1932, thousands of men and women – many 
with a ʻreliable’ record of work in the village during collectivization – were deployed to procure 
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grain and had to stay in the countryside for at least two years.235 According to archival materials and
oral memory, college students worked alongside the Party members and university staff: ʻIn 
Adriiivka in the Sanzhary district, there was a college, and the boys from the college, armed with 
guns, came in [groups of] fifteen. They split into smaller groups, and with several members from 
the village council, went to Svatunivka, Bazarivka, Nekhvoroshcha.’236 One such student, sent as a 
plenipotentiary from Komsomol to help grain procurement in late 1932, claimed that 
collectivization, the incompetence of people like him, and the local corrupt officials caused the 
famine.237 
The students were also joined by the army. According to the political office of the RSChA 
in spring 1933, 186 brigades of soldiers and officers worked in the countryside searching for grain 
hidden by the peasants. They apparently discovered 374 pits with grain.238
Others embraced the opportunity to procure grain in order to advance their career. One 
Soviet engineer recalled one such careerist type in his memoirs: Borys Lisnychevs’kyi, the 
chairman of Shepetivka construction trust: ʻan ethnic Jew, a roofer by training, and, of course, an 
ardent Communist.’239 Lisnichevs’kyi was responsible for Party work in the office: there were 
frequent two-hour-long meetings after work, which were mandatory to attend, where he read the 
latest Party resolutions and news of Soviet successes far away that nobody could verify. In the 
autumn of 1932 Lisnichevs’ky was sent by the Party to the countryside ʻto pump bread from the 
peasants. Here Lisnichevs’kyi demonstrated such enthusiasm that in the district where he worked, 
peasants literally had not a pound of grain left. He worked so hard that he was sent to do the same 
job to another district. He ʻpumped outʼ bread there too. Afterward he was promoted to a higher 
position and given a flat in the house that was being constructed.’240 According to his file at the 
SBU archive, Lisnichevs’kyi’s career was cut short in 1937. He was arrested on charges of 
sabotage, terrorism and participation in a counter-revolutionary organization. At the time of his 
arrest Lisnyshevs’kyi was the director of the construction trust of Vinnytsia oblast’.241 His property 
was confiscated. Within a few months he was executed; his wife received five years in the labour 
camps.242
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Despite the previous experience of collectivisation, some plenipotentiaries appeared to be 
unprepared for the famine that was to unfold. Party leadership in Kharkiv received many reports on 
the plenipotentiaries ‘deserting’ their positions in droves, getting drunk with the local activists, or 
criticizing the very policies that they were expected to enforce.243 Poor provisions by the state did 
not help their situation either. Some plenipotentiaries committed suicide ʻridden with guilt and full 
of sympathy for the starving’ and feeling powerless to change anything.244 According to a report by 
Khataievich on the situation in Odesa oblast’, there were almost 30 plenipotentiaries in the 
Arbuzynka district between September and October 1932. Eleven of them left the district without 
prior warning. Only one of them was expelled from the Party after commenting on the plan being 
unrealistic.245 
Despairing plenipotentiaries coined a name for grain procurement as ʻextermination with 
death’ or the ʻtugboat of death.’246 They faced the pressure from above, as seen in a directive letter 
from Kosior on 22nd November 1932. It stipulates that plenipotentiaries were required to report 
every ten days on 1) the actions taken [to reach procurement quotas] and to fight defeatist moods in 
grain procurement and 2) the results in procurement, with examples of excellent work and of 
repressions applied to individual farmers in accordance with an earlier directive from 18th 
November 1932 to those hoarding grain.247 In other words, the letter outlines what was expected 
from them: to procure, to repress and to report. When they failed to meet these expectations, 
however, they were not necessarily punished. Protocols of the RPKs across the republic reveal 
many instances of plenipotentiaries failing to procure, to repress, or to report. Often they received 
warnings or moved from one place to another. Some were expelled from the Party, while in other 
cases they kept their jobs.
Yet there were also cases of some plenipotentiaries trying to help the starving peasants. One
30-year-old district plenipotentiary, Honcharenko, in Zhashkiv worked as a chairman of the 
collective farm in Skibin during the famine. He states that 201 people in Skibin starved to death in 
the winter of 1933 alone: 
Despite these difficulties [I] organised a sowing campaign and helped a 
neighbouring collective farm. During the 1933 harvest, after much discussion 
with other people on the collective farm board and with the secretary of the 
Party cell, I milled some grain to feed the farmers... By August I spent 1,500 
[kilograms] and procured 800. I was reported by the the RPK and the MTS 
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polit[ical department] ... and sentenced to 10 years of camps.248
Honcharenko justifies his own actions by explaining that he successfully completed the harvest, and
claimed that he had not profitted, and also notes that his pregnant wife and three little children had 
already been evicted from their house. 
        In January 1933, at a meeting of the Kharkiv oblast’ Party committee, its first secretary, 
Roman Terekhov, provided the following typology of plenipotentiaries: 1) those scared of the 
excesses; 2) defeatists; 3) saboteurs; 4) and the incapable. He acknowledged that most 
plenipotentiaries changed after encountering ʻdifficult circumstances’ on the ground; they quickly 
shifted ʻfrom the right positions to the neutral ones.’249 These euphemisms point to a large number 
of perpetrators, most of whom were not trained to enforce violence, questioning their orders and, if 
not immediately defying them, then simply not proceeding to fulfil them quickly, though many of 
them, like the aforementioned Richyts’kyi and Lisnichevs’kyi, chose to proceed.
6. Tugboat Brigades
There were other outsiders that burrowed themselves deep in oral memory. These are the 
so-called buksyry (tugboat) brigades. The name ʻtugboat’ characterized their role – to speed up 
procurement within any given collective farm, village or district. While in oral memory, they are 
often conflated with the village brigades, the tugboat brigades consisted of Party members, civil 
servants, and collective farmers from outside the village. According to a resolution by the Politburo 
of the TsK KP(b)U on 18th January 1932, 600 Communists from industrial centres (140 
Communists to be sent from Kharkiv) were to assist 40-50 ʻkey’ RPKs in grain procurement 
campaign. Several brigades with 3-4 persons in each, in turn, were to organize by the beginning of 
December 1,100 local activist collective farmers to procure grain from individual farmers or in 
neighbouring villages.250 Other tugboat brigades were organised by decisions of district, oblast’ 
party committees or the TsK KP(b)U. The composition of a brigade depended on the organization it
was set up within. Tugboat brigades were generally larger than local brigades and sometimes 
reached 800 members. The appearance of such a large number of strangers reportedly intimidated 
the peasants, meanwhile the members of the tugboat brigades, not bound by any ties to the starving 
peasants, were more likely to obey the orders and requisition the last foodstuffs.251
One such tugboat brigade worked in Zinov’iev okruha in October 1930 and left a detailed 
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report on its assignment.252 It consisted of 203 members from various organizations: 15 Komsomol, 
3 pioneers, 102 members from RSChA, 173 who participated in the 1928-29 grain procurement 
campaign, and 87 non-Communists. The 12 women in the brigade came from the conference of 
female collective workers of Zinov’ievs’k okruha, where 312 women delegates gathered to discuss 
progress in grain procurement. This tugboat brigade visited villages where local brigades failed to 
fulfil grain procurement targets or where individual farming prevailed and the local officials were 
either ʻfeeling confused and betrayed’ or had left the villages altogether.253 The report acknowledges
difficulties in the district which pushed masses of the poor peasants into a ʻconsumerist’ practices. 
When the tugboat brigade arrived in the villages, the peasants refused to accommodate or 
feed the chuzhozemtsi (foreigners) or chervona mitla (red broomstick) who, according to the 
peasants, ʻcame for their bread’ and thus were openly hostile to them. The brigade was met with 
hostility by village officials who were supposed to assist them. In particular, one local official told 
the arrivals that there was no work in the village for them, for which he was promptly expelled from
the Party by the RPK.254 The head of the village council in Kovalivka commented that local officials
like him were ʻbought’ to let the tugboat brigade take their remaining bread whereas the secretary of
the Party cell in Malynivka ʻsabotaged’ the work of the brigade, accusing its members of ʻexcessive
eagerness.’
Eventually the brigade set to work. They split the villages into smaller parts of 20 houses, 
where they sought to procure grain and organise separate meetings for collective farmers and their 
children. A group of 57 members of the brigade worked in 14 villages where they organised 32 
village meetings in five days. They dekulakized 37 families and collectivized over 1,454 
farmsteads. Female members of the brigade worked with the peasant women and children. As the 
RPK applauded the tugboat brigade in the media, one plenipotentiary rushed to the RPK with a plea
to reduce the quotas: ʻIf you don’t cut the target now, I will not see the village council head and the 
chairman of the collective farm alive again. I’m afraid they will take their lives.’255 He was moved 
to another position, and the quota was unchanged.
Within five days of its work, the tugboat brigade procured more grain than the regular 
search brigades had done in the past. In two districts, Voznesens’k and Nova Odesa, regular search 
brigades had procured 390,259 puds in 67 village councils, whereas the tugboat brigade procured 
449,000 puds in 25 village councils.256 Upon the tugboat brigade’s return from the village, the RPK 
organised a rally in Voznesens’k, where the attendees decided to build a plane and name it after the 
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brigade. 
7. Variety of Roles
There were many other groups that contributed to the mechanism of the famine, including 
railway workers, who were ordered not to sell tickets to peasants without permits to leave their 
village – that is, to escape the famine – or train conductors who did not allow often emaciated 
stowaways with children on the train. Naturally, they also faced checks, purges and repressions. 
Some obeyed the orders; others did not. One train conductor in Osnova near Kharkiv, named only 
as S.K., let peasants with children in his train car, which was in contravention of instructions. His 
colleagues reported him to their supervisor, O. Onopko, and the DPU. He was promptly fired.257 
While it is impossible to explore all such roles in this dissertation, I will highlight a select 
number: informers, field guards and wives.
7.1 The Informers: Sil’kory and Neighbours
Village correspondents or sil’kory (short for sil’s’ki korrespondenty) also facilitated the 
famine on the ground. Sometimes the role of village correspondent was combined with that of the 
head of the village council, or the head of the village Party cell. In most cases it involved providing 
intelligence to the security service. In 1926 Zatons’kyi commented on peasant correspondents as a 
minority working in difficult conditions: ʻWe are well aware of the attitude toward you that is 
expressed by the kulaks and even by some disgraceful representatives of Soviet power.’258 
The number of sil’kory grew steadily during collectivisation. If in 1925 there were only 300
correspondents in Soviet Volyn, which is part of today’s Zhytomyr oblast’, by 1929 there were 500.
Their reporting to the district papers was oblique, yet telling. At the peak of the famine, a sil’kor 
called Leninets in the village of Toporyshche in Zhytomyr oblast’ reported 3 collective farmers for 
not qualifying for daily rations at the farm. He accused them of being idle and sleeping in the field 
instead of working. According to oral testimonies from the village, however, these men were 
swollen from hunger and unable to work.259 
From January 1933 someone reporting hiding grain would yield 15% of the find. It tore 
families apart. Kateryna Hrebelnyk, from Korovaii in Hrebinky district, Poltava oblast’, recalls a 
case of a woman boasting to her sister that her husband hid grain. Her sister in turn told her own 
husband, who reported his brother-in-law. The grain was found, the man imprisoned and 
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vanished.260 Very often it set neighbour on neighbour. Indeed, some informers became so good at 
the practice that they used their new skill to profit further, offering starving peasants the chance to 
keep their foodstuffs in exchange for intelligence on their neighbours.261 During the Holocaust, a 
similar dynamic was observed. While the Dutch could earn money by betraying Jews, the captured 
Jews could save their lives – if only temporarily – by reporting other Jews. The infamous Ans Van 
Dijk was first denounced as a Jew; instead of being sent to the death camp immediately, she chose 
to stay by betraying others. She allegedly betrayed over a hundred Jews.
7.2 The Field Guards
As the 1933 harvest approached, many starving peasants turned their hopes to the fields. So
did the Party leaders in Kharkiv, but for a different reason. They did not want the starving peasants 
to ʻpilfer’ the fields. A year earlier, at the III Party conference, Kosior stated to district secretaries: 
ʻAbsolutely nothing can justify pilfering: not a lack of bread or dire need.’ He suggested using 
collective farmers as guards.262 At the TsK KP(b)U plenum in June 1933, Kisis argued that 
ʻpilferers’ will try ʻto simulate the hunger ... in order to get some moral justification for stealing the 
harvest.’263 Almost every speaker expressed concerns about the ʻprotection’ of the new harvest and 
admitted that the famine – some used the word holod openly – exceeded that of 1922 and was ʻnot 
like any other famine in the past.’264 The protection of the harvest was therefore to be organized in 
accordance with decree by the TsK VKP(b) and SNK from 24th May 1933: ʻbread’ had to be 
protected both in the fields and during transportation, and ʻthe thieves’ were to be prosecuted under 
the law of 7th August 1932. The field guards were to be recruited locally and watchtowers erected. 
In Odesa oblast’, for instance, more than seven hundred watchtowers were constructed.265
At the same plenum, Odintsov and Khataievich argued that the collective farmers, and the 
shock-collective farmers in particular, should guard the fields under supervision by police and the 
DPU, whereas Cherniavs’kyi suggested making field brigades at the collective farms responsible 
for protecting the harvest through mounted patrols.266 Kosior, on the other hand, argued that the 
most effective way to stimulate collective farmers to protect the harvest was to give them bread. He 
added that there was not enough grain for everyone, so the guards would have to be promised bread 
from the new harvest that they would protect.267 Kosior reasoned that establishing mounted patrols 
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would yield little, especially in the light of a ʻcolossal quanitity of parasite and stray elements.’
Kosior’s suggestion worked. Many non-Party farmers volunteered to become guards in the 
fields; they were usually armed with a rifle or a whip, moving on horseback or observing from the 
newly erected wooden towers. Many field guards were village activists (members of search 
brigades), while others joined to receive a ration that could save lives. Others still simply followed 
orders, like Pavlo Ivashko from Kobeliaky in the Poltava oblast’: ʻLocal people, collective 
farmers ... You got a job allocated to you and you do it ... They were at work, these people did their 
work.’268 Very often children helped to watch the fields. During the summer of 1933, for instance, 
over 540,000 school age children guarded the fields and helped to collect ears of wheat after the 
harvest.269 
Apart from physical punishment, the guards could also bring the ʻoffenders’ to the village 
council, where they will be dealt with by police. The security services also reported numerous cases
of ʻoffenders’ being lynched by collective farmers and local officials. Some guards were strict or 
sadistic, punishing anyone who dared to cut ears of wheat. Others turned a blind eye to the children 
swollen with hunger. Indeed, the role of the guards in the famine should not be underestimated: by 
the beginning of 1933, tens of thousands of people were caught in the fields or caught breaking into 
storehouses or granaries; 54,645 of them were convicted under the Law of 7th August, 1932; 2,000 
peasants were executed; and the number of peasants lynched still remains unknown.270 
In a report on the involvement of the Komsomol in protecting the harvest, Muskin notes 
that 40,471 Komsomol members in the Kharkiv oblast’ and 38,000 in the Dnipropetrovs’k oblast’ 
participated in the spring 1933 campaign on the ground.271 Apart from all other duties, they 
organised ʻagro-guard’ (or mounted patrols), and thousands of guarding teams, who were not 
supposed to compete with the collective farm brigades but rather ʻto motivate the brigades to 
protect the harvest on its field.’ Ten thousand Komsomol men and women worked like shock-
workers, and thousands received bonuses for ʻthe exceptional heroic deeds.’272 
Some survivors remember outsiders guarding their fields. Indeed, at times the responsibility
of watching the fields was delegated to members of the TSOAviaKhim or RSChA. Despite its 
military inclination, many members of TSOAviaKhim were young women like shock-workers 
Demchenko and Hnatenko, who joined the organization to gain training or to fulfil their dreams.
 In 1933 thousands of the activists from the city cells of TSOAviaKhim were deployed in 
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the countryside ʻto guard the new harvest.ʼ In the first days of August 1933 the chairman of the 
central council of Ukrainian TSOAviaKhim, Bohdanov, reported to the Politburo of the TsK 
KP(b)U with reference to an earlier request that 2,200 TSOAviaKhim volunteers watch the fields in
sovkhozy (state collective farms). He stated that 2,420 men and women were deployed at 141 farms 
as ʻpart of a great effortʼ by TSOAviaKhim in the village. Meanwhile, the Kharkiv oblast’ council 
sent 700 ʻmilitary educatedʼ activists from the city to the collective farms. According to incomplete 
data that Bohdanov had at the time, there were over 21,000 TSOAviaKhim members protecting the 
1933 harvest in Ukraine.273
5.3 The Spouses
There is another role that has escaped the focus of researchers of the Holodomor: those who
supported the Holodomor in the private sphere as the spouses of the perpetrators. While there are no
known cases of influential wives of the Party leaders in Soviet Ukraine at the time – the equivalents 
of Mira Markovic, Jiang Qing, Elena Ceausescu, Simone Gbagbo or Eva Perron – some women 
indeed gained political or economic power through their partners on the village level. Others simply
preferred not to interfere with their spousesʼ jobs. 
The wives and husbands of Party plenipotentiaries rarely lived with their spouses during 
their deployment in the countryside, and some could have been unaware of the activities in which 
their partners were involved. Yet when they followed their spouses, they could not avoid witnessing
or even participating in the famine. Their reaction to the events varied. One Twenty-Five 
Thousander wrote to the paper Radiansʼke Selo in 1930 about his comrade bringing his wife to the 
village: ʻ... the secretary of the RPK said he would not help in such silly matters [arranging for the 
accommodation]... That night they had to pay 50 rubles for the flat... in three days they saw their 
landlord being dekulakized. The wife started crying for the loss of 50 rubles... that they stayed with 
kulaks... all of whom were evicted except for one old disabled man who I had to throw out 
myself.ʼ274
The family members of the village activists, on the other hand, were likely to be fully aware
of the spouses’ actions. Very often they played an important role by encouraging the men either to 
profit or to help the starving. They contributed to crimes by way of silent approval and by providing
emotional comfort as well as active support. As in Nazi Germany almost a decade later, they 
passively supported the regime by actively supporting their spouses. Some survivors even note the 
wives of the perpetrators participating in the searches, or refusing to help victims when in a position
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to do so. One peasant woman asked the wife of the collective farmʼs chairman, Natalka, for a 
handful of flour. Natalka refused saying she had none. When Natalka died from typhoid some time 
later, her husband hired the woman to cook for him; she then discovered a trunk full of flour in the 
kitchen.275
Some women disapproved of their husbandsʼ actions but were unable to change anything. 
Tetiana Tur, whose father was a perpetrator in Luhove (Velykа Bahachka district, Poltava oblast’), 
recalls how her mother cried in desperation when her husband ʻpumped outʼ all the grain from other
families and then procured their own supplies with the words ʻThe state needs it!ʼ One of their 
daughters later died from starvation.276 At times the wives of village officials could halt 
collectivization in their village, at least for a time. Party plenipotentiary Nekliaev reported on the 
anti-collectivization rally in the village of Shliakhove near Umanʼ, which was headed by the wives 
of local officials. When one husband was arrested, the women cooperated with the district 
officials.277 Others tried to help the starving peasants: while keeping her activist husband in the 
dark, Nastia Tkachenko used to give potatoes and lard to the very family that her husband had 
dekulakized. The girls in that family, out of gratitude, embroidered shirts for Nastia.278
Conclusion
By identifying the rank-and-file perpetrators by their institutional affiliation, I have shown 
that these local and urban activists included members of various parts of society. They were men 
and women, rich and poor, young and old, Communists and non-Party members alike. Their 
previous participation in collectivization tended to serve as a precursor to their involvement in the 
famine, though it was not always indicative. Only a minority refused to obey or handed in their 
Party tickets, as revealed in the ODPU report discovered by Martin.279 There is a variety of 
explanations for this lack of refusal: fear, deference to authority, obedience to orders, careerism, 
brutalisation during the post-revolutionary years and collectivization, ideological indoctrination, 
segmentation and the increasingly routine nature of the tasks, special selection of the perpetrators. 
The fact that ordinary people participated in mass violence was reflected in their experience
later in life. Some felt compelled to either deny their participation, minimize its significance or 
present themselves as compromised or ideological participants. Although Soviet propaganda indeed
played an important role in motivating particularly young people to participate, most perpetrators 
were often involved for mundane reasons. They did not regard their perpetration as such, as we see 
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from both perpetrator and survivor testimonies. Regardless of their motivation, the rank-and-file 
perpetrators’ role was decisive in the mechanism of the famine and led to the death of millions.
While my typology of the Holodomor perpetrators on the ground can be developed further, 
even its initial application reveals how significant an inclusive approach is for understanding the 
Holodomor and its execution on the ground. With the availability of archival material and existing 
corpora of oral memory, more analysis of the rank-and-file perpetrators has become possible. I now 
turn to two case studies to develop this analysis further.
Chapter II
The Case Studies: Toporyshche and Popivka
In this chapter, I analyse memoirs and testimonies of the perpetrators in two villages in 
detail and juxtapose them with archival evidence, oral memory and post-memory. These two 
villages, Toporyshche and Popivka, are located in two distinct historical and geographical regions 
of Ukraine – the oblast’s of Zhytomyr and Poltava. Zhytomyr oblast’ has boasted a multiethnic 
demographic composition, while its natural complexion is very wooded, with relatively less fertile 
soil than elsewhere. Poltava oblast’, by contrast, with its rich black soil, has featured prominently as
the land of plenty in the novels of Nikolai Gogol, the famous ethnic Ukrainian writer of the 
nineteenth century Russian Empire. It also produced one of the ‘father of modern Ukrainian 
literature,’ Ivan Kotliarevs’kyi, and one of the leaders of the early twentieth-century Ukrainian 
national movement, Symon Petliura. While the famine claimed more lives in Poltava oblast’, both 
in proportion and numbers, the mechanism of the famine on the ground and the experience of its 
rank-and-file perpetrators in both Toporyshche and Popivka are sadly similar. 
As a starting point, I establish what constitutes perpetrator testimonies and clarify the other 
sources used in this chapter, most of which are unpublished. They include personal files at the DPU;
minutes from the RPK meetings, the village council, and the collective farm meetings; documents 
from the republican, provincial, district and private archives, the village museums and the village 
councils; memoirs, autobiographies, and letters; interviews with the people who knew the 
perpetrators; newspaper reports and oral memory. While there are no ʻsmoking gunʼ documents 
mapping the entirety of the mechanism of the Holodomor, the evidence is sufficient enough to 
ascertain the activities of perpetrators in the searches, acts of repressions and other activities. Their 
own words are used in tandem with other texts.
The Case of Toporyshche
On the eve of collectivization, the village of Toporyshche in the Khoroshiv district, 
Zhytomyr oblast’, was home to 1,640 inhabitants, many of whom lived in hamlets nearby. Like 
most villages in Volyn’, it was multi-ethnic, largely consisting of four groups: Ukrainians, 
Germans, Poles and Jews.280 Toporyshche had three churches (Orthodox, Lutheran and Roman 
Catholic), two schools and hosted monthly fairs. Perhaps what differentiates Toporyshche from 
other similar villages were its relatively high literacy rates – only 35% of residents were completely 
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illiterate in 1922.281 In 1929 two Ukrainian collective farms were created there – Peremoha 
(Victory) and Lenina (hamlets-based) – in addition to one German collective farm. Regardless of 
their fulfillment of grain quotas in 1932-1933 (both Ukrainian farms reached only 60%, while the 
German one overfulfilled), most residents of Toporyshche endured starvation.
According to oral memory, about 100 residents died from starvation. Though only 22 
identities of the victims have been established, demographers at the MAPA project at Harvard 
University estimate the average direct population loss in this district to be 179 people per 1,000.282 
If this ratio is applied to Toporyshche, the number of victims could have been around 286, though 
average loss in the district could be explained by the other villages being included on the ʻblack 
lists.’ The German part of the village faired better thanks to the aid from their contacts abroad. 
While we are unlikely to establish the exact number of victims, the very fact that at least a hundred 
peasants died from starvation in the village indicates the clear presence of perpetrators whose 
actions led to their death. 
The identities of the perpetrators can be recovered from several sources: personal files of 
the repressed peasants, protocols of the collective farm and the village council meetings, minutes 
from the RPK meetings, the village museum, perpetratorsʼ memoirs, private archives, oral memory 
and postmemory. For example, the list of 163 Communists and 137 candidates for Communists in 
Khoroshiv district includes the names of party cell members in Toporyshche and mentions their role
in grain procurement.283 In fact, the total number of the confirmed perpetrators is over a hundred, 
suggesting that a considerable part of the adult population was involved in starving their 
neighbours. The key role in all sources is reserved for the Havryliuk brothers – and most notably, 
Matvii Havryliuk, who was in charge of grain procurement commission in the village in 1932-1933 
and appointed to this position by the RVK. He also chaired the local party cell, KNS and held other 
positions of power. The majority of other activists, however, were responsible for routine tasks like 
house searches and field protection.
In order to understand how Havryliuk and other Toporyshchans facilitated the destruction 
of scores of their neighbours, we have to review, once again, the events preceding the famine. In her
recent work, Applebaum argues that peasants were effectively divided into two groups in the 
immediate aftermath of the revolution, when one group was empowered to exploit their neighbours 
on behalf of the state and was assisted by fervent believers from the cities.284 The case of 
Toporyshche, however, demonstrates that these groups were not clearly defined. The motivation of 
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the perpetrators was multicausal, although a closer inspection of the post-revolutionary period helps
elucidate their motives.
In a local government survey conducted in 1924, Toporyshche was predominantly 
characterised as a ʻmiddle peasant’ village with a ʻhostile’ attitude towards KNS.285 While few 
villagers participated in the military conflicts following the revolution, many did not support the 
Bolsheviks and took part in the reikova viina (ʻtrain track war’) in 1919. The war manifested itself 
in the partial destruction of train tracks during the Great Peasant Uprising in 1919. This tactic 
impeded the Red Army’s advance into rural Ukraine beyond major towns. The train track 
connecting Zhytomyr and Korosten was built in 1916 and ran not far from the village centre. On 7 
July 1919, several dozens of men from Toporyshche destroyed a stretch of the track, attacked an 
armoured train and killed several Red Army soldiers. During the repressions in the late 1930s, when
over 80 Toporyshchans were tried and executed as ʻenemies of the people,’ the former perpetrators 
of the famine – now witnesses in the trial – accused the victims, correctly or not, of the attack on the
armoured train in 1919.286
Those few Toporyshchans who sided with the Bolsheviks cultivated experience in enforcing
violent policies. Hailing from a prosperous peasant family with horses, four cows, a cart and a 
sleigh among other possessions, the Havryliuk brothers were both respected and feared in the 
village.287 In 1920 the family housed a requisitioning campaign instructor from Russia Vasilii P. 
Timakov who, according to Ivan Havryliuk, convinced them ʻto adhere to Bolshevism.’288 Matvii, a 
bell-ringer at the local Orthodox church, worked in the food procurement squad on behalf of the 
Soviet authorities in 1920-1921. Participation in the newly reinforced requisitioning committees 
brought peasants like him security and privileges amidst the post-revolutionary devastation. In his 
own words, he found a lot of grain and helped CheKa and the police detain ‘dangerous kulaksʼ in 
the neighbouring district. The cruelty involved in the work of these committees was not a secret 
neither to the population, nor to Bolshevik leaders289, and Matvii admitted it did not win him many 
friends:
I beat the grain out of the kulaks in five villages, helped to detain them 
when they fled ... the kulaks hid their grain and even threatened to kill me 
and my family... From that time on, I learnt how to work in the village, 
how to organise the poor peasant masses, how to motivate them to 
participate in various campaigns. Siding with Soviet power right from the 
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beginning made me an enemy of the kulaks in the village too.290
Until the late 1920s the presence of the Soviet state in the village had been minimal. There 
were no recorded tensions between supporters of the new state and those opposing it. The situation 
changed dramatically with the beginning of collectivization, which was not, pace Stalin, brought on
by a great upswell of peasant enthusiasm.291 Toporyshche was no exception. As elsewhere, most 
Toporyshchans resisted giving up their private property, while only some of them organised ʻthe red
trains’ of carts with grain collected on behalf of the state. Support of collectivization split families. 
One RPK report described how a man in Toporyshche berated and beat his wife in public after she 
had been elected onto the village council.292 Activists were attacked and feared walking alone at 
night.293 Following a brawl with activists in May 1929, Ivan Havryliuk’s barn was burnt down in 
December, while the house of Semen Chervatiuk, Matviiʼs father-in-law, was burnt down the 
following month. The village council head, Kindratsʼkyi, was assasinated in 1930.
Yet collectivization also divided supporters of the Soviet state in the village. Members of 
the local party cell spoke openly of it as a temporary policy not worth the effort.294 A group of 
Toporyshchans decided to send to Zhytomyr G. Zubrytsʼkyi, a founder and the head of the village 
KNS until 1924 (when Matvii Havryliuk replaced him), in order to complain about the illegal 
seizure of land by the collective farmers under the guidance of Havryliuk. Zubrytsʼkyiʼs attempt 
failed, and most of the group was put on trial for anti-Soviet agitation.295 Neither was there unity on 
a collectivization drive among the district officials in Volodarsʼke (now Khoroshiv). Protocols of 
the RPK plenums mention one RPK member, Svidersʼkyi, criticising the fast pace of the campaign 
and threatening to kill the RPK secretary, Nikitenko. In 1931 Svidersʼkyi was removed from his 
position and expelled from the party.296 
Apart from collectivization, it was the grain procurement campaign in 1931 that put 
potential perpetrators to the test. Two out of thirty six members of the Volodarsʼke RPK (or 6%) 
refused to take part in grain procurement: Rynda handed his party ticket (twice) back to the 
secretary, Kontsevich simply refused.297 When procurement rates kept falling, the RPK instructed 
village officials ʻto order Komsomol and students into the brigades to help the procurement 
brigades.’ The district newspaper described the behaviour of Toporyshchan activists in detail. In 
July 1929 they nailed black boards to the gates of farmsteads where the owners ʻhad sworn that they
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had no grain.’ The peasants who refused to cooperate were boycotted, and their children expelled 
from school.298 Matvii Havryliuk detained those who tried to flee dekulakization and deportation. 
He also claimed to have been exceptionally good at finding hidden gold and reported other 
collective farmers for leaving the collectives or hiding in order not to assist with searches or 
dekulakization. 
One of the house searches he organised in 1932 is described by Andrii Chervatiukʼs 
daughters, Marta and Kateryna:
Our father hid three buckets of barley in the attic, our mother put clay on 
top of barley and stealthily made porridge in the evening to keep us alive. 
Then somebody must have reported us, they took everything and brutally 
beat the father in front of us for trying to hide that barley. There were three 
of them: Matvii Havryliuk, Stepan Shakhray and Vasylʼ Zubrytsʼkyi. They 
broke his fingers by slamming the door, kicked him on the floor till blood 
gushed out of his mouth, swore at him. It left us numb to see father beaten 
and sworn at, we were a proper family, always spoke quietly in our fatherʼs 
presence...299
After the search was over, Andrii Chervatiuk was arrested and spent months in prison. He was 
released in spring 1933 and died of starvation shortly thereafter.
But not all perpetrators were as enthusiastic as the Havryliuks. In 1931, the secretary of the 
Party cell Shakhray openly called procurement quotas ʻunrealisticʼ even though they were accepted 
by a general meeting in the village. The RVK member Holovach and the DPU informer Rudenko 
reported on Shakhray. They accused him of not meeting various procurement quotas and of having 
a defeatist attitude within the leadership of the village.300 In particular, they claimed that he failed to
procure enough grain for the trains of carts. He was reported to have said the following: ʻLet [them]
come here from the centre and the district and procure bread. Let them fight the kulaks. What do 
they want from us!ʼ Moreover, his colleagues at all three collective farms were reported to be 
corrupt, ʻlack[ing] enthusiasm in destroying capitalist elements in the village, and establish[ing] a 
distance between themselves and the masses.ʼ Despite the fact that Shakhray apologised for the 
ʻmistakeʼ that he made due to ʻdifficult conditions he works in,ʼ the RPK took no chances and 
replaced him with a district cadre – Savelii Balakov. Meanwhile, Vasylʼ Zubrytsʼkyi, the head of 
the village council, received a verbal warning.301 
The power struggle between Zubrytsʼkyi and Matvii Havryliuk was central to problems in 
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the village, according to a 33-year-old Balakov, a Communist since 1920. According to Balakov, 
Havryliuk ʻwas tsar and God whom everyone fearedʼ who teamed up with his former enemy 
Dmytro Chovniuk in order to take all the key village positions. In the early winter 1932 Holovach 
from the RVK once again sought out a candidate to be in charge of the party cell in Toporyshche. 
Matvii Havryliuk agitated the local peasants at a KNS meeting against the decisions on grain 
procurement by the village council, calling them ʻprivileged people from the city.ʼ More 
importantly, he accused the district officials present of forcing them to conduct the house searches, 
to confiscate food and possessions from others, and to enforce other unpopular policies. They 
promised not to follow such people in future and reportedly received overwhelming support from 
the audience of 250 peasants, although at the end of the meeting Havryliuk advised everyone to 
support the grain procurement quotas nevertheless.
Balakov called the DPU, and Havryliuk was arrested. Almost immediately Havryliuk sent 
lengthy letters to the oblastʼ office of the DPU, the TsK KP(b)U and Pravda. He claimed that 
village officials were corrupt and involved in underground trade and described his experience in 
grain requisition and other campaigns in the past. He also made mention of his connections in the 
DPU and, most importantly, of his outstanding ability ʻto organise masses of the poor peasantsʼ and
to increase the percentage of grain procurement. It is not known which of his arguments convinced 
the prosecution to acquit Havryliukʼs case in January 1932. The DPU was aware of his activities 
long before the arrest, positive and negative. In 1930 the provincial union of collective farms 
(Oblkolgospilka) received a letter from a Toporyshchan woman, Fedora Dubyna, who complained 
about Matvii abusing his power in the village and acting through the ʻgang of thugs.ʼ Her family, 
along with the Havryliuks, were the founding members of the Peremoha farm. She argued that he 
settled scores with her husband and also repeatedly raped her 14-year-old daughter. Yet the district 
authorities, the DPU and the prosecution seemingly turned a blind eye to Havryliuk’s alleged 
crimes. In 1932 he was once again allowed to control all the key positions in the village and to work
on grain procurement with his former competitors.
In local oral memory, most collective farmers who acted on the orders of Havryliuk and 
Zubrytsʼkyi are excused as simply dutiful. Their watching of the fields, for instance, is remembered 
by neighbours or their descendants as a mere ‘task at the collective farmʼ and not interpreted as a 
facilitation of the famine, at least not openly. For activists to carve themselves into oral memory, 
they had to act in an extraordinary way. One brigade member, Chervatiuk, was known for his 
gambling addiction and lost a cow over a game of cards. Though his children survived, his wife 
starved to death.302 Another perpetrator, Arsen Dubyna, was remembered for extreme thoroughness 
302 Interview with Antonina Hryshyna, 21st November, 2014. 
during searches, whereby he palpated hens in the morning to predict how many eggs they would lay
that day so that the starving peasants would not eat any.303 
Establishing a circle of trusted men and women during the famine proved useful for the 
perpetration of repressions in Toporyshche in 1938. For instance, in the voluminous case against 
over eighty ʻGerman spies’ – mostly semi-illiterate German peasant fathers of large families in the 
village – the Havryliuk brothers and their associates assisted the DPU with the arrests and the 
searches.304 Leonard, the son of the arrested Adolf Kremring, recalled how the same Havryliuk 
brothers and other perpetrators of the famine arrested these German peasants who, coincidentally, 
sought contact with relations in Germany and received aid during the famine. In 1933 twelve-year-
old Leonard helped these German men to write the request for aid. Only in 1989 did their families 
learn that these so-called ‘spies’ were executed shortly after their arrest.305
While there were no Twenty-Five Thousanders in Toporyshche, urban activists arrived to 
assist the collectivization in various capacities: from village officials to teachers. The lists of key 
officials in the village museum mention only the last names of chairmen of the collective farms, the 
heads of the village council, and the school headmasters between 1930-1933: Holovach, Fesenko, 
Hrybanʼ, Stashkevych, Korolenko. They were appointed from the district and did not stay in the 
village after 1933. Nor did they remain in local memory. Only one newcomer, a young teacher, 
Stepan Sh., stayed in Toporyshche for the rest of his life. Sent to the countryside in 1930 as a 
teacher at the age of eighteen,306 he came from a Ukrainian working class family in a town in 
southern Ukraine. Stepan received secondary education in Novo-Myrhorod, joined the Komsomol, 
and worked as a teacher when he was sent to assist collectivization in Toporyshche. In the village 
he helped to close down a local church and taught at the school.307 
After the famine, Stepan married a local girl whose father died in the Holodomor.308 He 
continued to teach and became the headmaster in 1938-1939. During the Second World War, 
Stepan enlisted in the infantry, where he served as a political instructor from 1941 to 1945. His 
comrades in arms commented on his bravery at the frontline, which brought him three decorations. 
According to the published memoir of a war veteran from Uzbekistan, who was also a 
collectivization activist in the early 1930s, Stepan was a brave, enthusiastic and supportive leader 
whom everyone respected.309 In late 1944 he was wounded and transferred to a hospital in 
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Leningrad, where he fathered a child with a surgeon who had operated on him. At this time Stepan 
informed his wife in Toporyshche that he was leaving her. But his wifeʼs sister was married to Ivan 
Havryliuk, who allegedly made Stepan return home with the threats of possible repercussions. 
Ostensibly his loyalty to the Havryliuks was rewarded, as he spent the next year taking a course for 
political instructors in Moscow and two years in East Germany. According to local sources who 
remember him, Stepan developed an alcohol addiction after war and fathered several children 
outside his marriage. 
 The lives and careers of the other perpetrators varied after the famine. The Havryliuk 
brothers retained their positions of power. While Ivan became headmaster of the village school, 
Matvii chaired the party cell. Vasylʼ Zubrytsʼkyi became the headmaster of a school in a 
neighbouring village. After the death of his wife, Matvii moved in with Todos’ka, the widow of 
Prokhor Zubrytsʼkyi – a man he reportedly put on the list for repressions in the 1930s. Arsen 
Dubyna stayed on as a brigade leader at the collective farm, while Anton Chervatiuk continued to 
build houses for other people. Half of them fought at the front during the Second World War and 
were decorated for bravery, while the other half, including the Havryliuks, stayed in the village. The
Havryliuks later claimed to have been Red partisans, contrary to local oral memories. The 
granddaughter of Andrii Chervatiuk, Nina, fell in love with Leonid, the son of Matvii Havryliuk, 
but both families opposed their relationship. In particular, Ninaʼs aunts, Kateryna and Marta, 
insisted that she could not date someone whose father killed her close relatives.310 Leonid never 
married, while Nina married in her sixties to Vasylʼ Zubrytsʼkyiʼs widowed son-in-law. The 
relationships are deeply entangled as the memory of the famine.
Crucially, these perpetrators shaped local memory and its manifestations as ʻmemory 
makersʼ after the fact. The mass grave of the Holodomor victims remains unmarked until today: in 
mixed victim-perpetrator families, the descendants of the victims asked me to interview them 
individually or remained silent altogether. Even the entry on Toporyshche in the aforementioned 
Istoria Mist ta Sel was written by Ivan Havryliuk, who taught history at the village school. In his 
manuscript, he follows what Katerina Clark described as the Heroic Ages of Soviet chronology: 
revolution, collectivization and the Second World War.311 Considering his active participation in 
collectivization, Ivan focusses mainly on village activists, mentioning the primitive conditions of 
the pre-revolutionary village and ʻtrain track warʼ participants. The lists of activists in his 
manuscript, however, confirm that most of the perpetrators survived the famine and the purges. In 
1945 they were back in their positions of power in the village. Most of them lived ordinary lives 
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well until old age.312
2. The Case of Popivka 
ʻAll of us here are the soldiers of the grain front.ʼ
Lev Kopelev313
Arriving in Popivka after the harvest, I noticed that both sides of the road leading to the 
village were covered in grain. How was it possible for more than 2,000 people to die here during the
famine? A 22-year-old peasant, Feodosii Kulish, asked the perpetrators the very same question 
when they took his grain and threw his young family in the snow in the early spring in 1932.314 With
a population of over 7,000 on the eve of collectivization, Popivka boasted three schools, two 
churches, a hospital, a veterinarian surgery, a telephone station, numerous workshops and regular 
markets.315 Kulish called the grain quotas unrealistic and the famine in the spring of 1932 ʻthe 
harbinger of a greater starvation in spring 1933 that will take thousands of lives of many innocent 
peasants, poor children and leave many orphaned. The leaders want to enslave us in the collective 
farms once and for all; the spring will be decisive.ʼ Kulish also correctly predicted that he would be 
tried for anti-Soviet agitation, and he was sentenced to 10 years in camps.316 Approximately 2,050 
people died in Popivka in 1932-1933. Four orphanages had to be opened in the village.317 
Sources of local oral memory blame the famine on the actions of ʻthe plenipotentiaries 
coming from outside and… collaborators among the local activistsʼ and name the head of the 
village council, Klym Vereshchaka, as one of the main culprits.318 This case study will explore the 
identities of the perpetrators and consider their actions, motives and later life by way of memoirs, 
oral history, interviews, village council documents, and other texts from the Myrhorod district and 
Poltava oblastʼ archives as well as the archival department at SBU in Poltava and the village 
museum.
As in Toporyshche, the perpetrators of the Holodomor in Popivka were shaped by the 
preceding events of revolution and Civil War. As in Toporyshche, most residents of Popivka did not
support the Bolsheviks at this time. The members of the revolutionary committee, including a 
widow Marfa Vereshchaka (mother of Klym), were brutally hacked to death in the local woods. 
Several Popivkians were part of Central Rada, the revolutionary Ukrainian national government, 
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while wealthier farmers joined the Union of Khliborobiv during Hetʼmanat (the Ukrainian state 
under the protectorate of the Central powers from 29th April to 26th December 1918). One of these 
farmers handed over a list of 95 peasants ʻsympathising to the Bolsheviksʼ to Denikinʼs troops in 
1919.319 Grain requisition in 1921 was accompanied with mass killing on both sides – of those who 
resisted prodrazverstka and of the KNS activists who enforced it. Over 20 people died as a result in 
the village.320 
Upon the victory of Bolshevik power, activists founded a collective farm and formed a 
Party cell, cooperative and credit society in 1923. In 1927, their collectivization efforts were 
supported by a Twenty-Five Thousander, Andrii Uslavtsev, although few Popivkians had joined the
collective by even 1932.321 In March 1930, based on a list compiled by the head of the village KNS, 
Tymophii Sereda,322 150 male peasants were sent to the northern Russia as ʻkulaksʼ.323 He himself 
moved into the house of the dekulakized peasant, Ivan Podoliaka. The victimsʼ families were forced
into the dugouts in the ravine, but in the autumn of 1930, they were deported to their fathers and 
husbands. 
The trial of this group of 150 peasants sparked a voluminous collection of testimonies from 
two groups: activists and wealthier peasants in the village. As in Toporyshche, the attempts of the 
latter to complain to the village officials about the activists failed, with repressions soon to follow. 
The grandson of Ivan Podoliaka, Vasylʼ, was driven to Popivka by the disturbing post-memory of 
dekulakization, and when he finally visited the village in 1957, he met Sereda who still lived in 
Podoliakaʼs house. Having glanced at ʻthe worst and delapitatedʼ house in the village, which now 
belonged to Sereda, Vasylʼ actually felt sympathetic to the perpetrators: ʻConfiscated kulak 
property did not make them wealthy. They were not used to work, they did not know how [to 
work]. That is why the famine started in Ukraine – all the hard-working farmers were gone.ʼ324
The six collective farms, now enlarged at the expense of the ʻkulakʼ lands and houses, 
needed tractor drivers. Courses were organised, bringing many young activists from the villages 
nearby, including the aforementioned Olesia Kulyk. These students also helped to procure grain. 
But despite a good harvest in 1932, Popivka failed to meet the grain procurement quotas. According
to the survivors' testimonies in the exhibition on the famine in Popivkaʼs museum, however, the 
village council met the original plan but failed the additional plan, whereas the district newspaper 
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Chervona Trybuna reported Popivka reaching only 19.5% of the original plan by December 1932.325 
On 2nd December Popivka and two other village councils were put on the ʻblack listʼ by the RPK. 
Apart from the standard economic repressions applied to Popivka, the key village officials 
– the party plenipotentiary, Odai; the secretary of the party cell, Getalo (also a student 
plenipotentiary); and the head of the village council, Ustymenko – received verbal warnings and an 
ultimatum to reach 100% within three days. When the men failed, they were removed from their 
positions. Ustymenko was replaced with Klym Vereshchaka. Several additional brigades, 5 persons 
in each, were sent to Popivka. The brigades had to work under the supervision of the 
plenipotentiaries and stay in Popivka until further notice.326 A 20-year-old Komsomol and aspiring 
writer Lev Kopelev was in one of these brigades. Here I read his account of the events in tandem 
with other sources.
Kopelev had already worked in the countryside in late 1929 as a teacher in the village of 
Okhochaia near Kharkiv. He describes his job at the time as distributing leaflets and papers to 
convince peasants to join the collectives. While ʻin some villages there were revolts and volynky, 
put out by cavalry police and the DPU military detachments,ʼ in the villages where Kopelev worked
there was ʻnot a gunshot was fired or a drop of blood spilt.ʼ327 He describes watching multiple trains
with the deported heading north all the time, with people ʻswarmingʼ inside and children crying, but
he mentions his assistance only once, referring to the ʻnon-violentʼ eviction of a priest. Despite his 
involvement in such activities, Kopelev had to flee the village with the chairman of the local 
collective farm and two district plenipotentiaries during the unrest prompted by the appearance of 
Stalin’s article on the excesses during collectivization in March 1930.328 While Kopelev constructs a
positive image of his participation in collectivization in Okhochaia, he does not explain the hostility
and consequent aggression of the peasants towards him. Indeed, by his own account, some peasants 
were throwing stones at him as he hastily fled the village. By the summer he was transferred to help
collectivization in the villages near Kakhovka, in Kherson oblast’.329
What were the activities that Kopelev assisted with during his year on the ground? Why did
they lead to such unrest that an armed DPU detachment had to be deployed to ʻpacifyʼ the village? 
That he remained an observer during the dispossession and deportation operations seems highly 
improbable. Memoirs of the other teacher plenipotentiaries indicate they had to do ʻsickening jobsʼ 
– i.e. to procure, to repress and to report.330 Moreover, in the following year, Kopelev actively 
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participated in the DPU-led project at the factory to dispose of a non-Communist delegate worker to
the city council. Although the worker was fired and left to starve, Kopelev did not regret his 
participation.331 Despite his young age, Kopelev clearly became accustomed to enforcing violent 
policies on the ground and to working in close cooperation with the DPU. When Kopelev was sent 
to the Myrhorod district by the oblastʼ party committee together with three other young men and a 
DPU officer in December 1932, Vereshchaka was appointed the head of the village council. 
The peasants in Popivka had been starving since the spring of 1932. Their options were 
limited: either to hide grain and risk being discovered and repressed, or to give up the remaining 
food voluntarily and face likely death. Kopelev admits that during his agitational work in Popivka 
he ʻthreatened, of course… those who did not want to give up their bread.ʼ332 Many had nothing to 
hide, so their provisions and valuables were confiscated instead. Kopelev calls it besspornoe izʼiatie
(indisputable confiscation) in which he personally participates. He provides a long list of what was 
‘usually’ found, thus implying his regular participation in the activity. Despite reducing his role to 
only ʻrecording confiscated items to prevent plunderʼ – more often than not, confiscation was 
exactly that, plunder, as survivors attest to seeing their possessions being used by activists in 
Popivka for years after the famine333 – Kopelevʼs part is undoubtedly larger. Later he admits to the 
actual confiscation of the items himself. If exchanged, these possessions could extend or save 
someoneʼs life. He admits to co-organizing meetings with peasants that lasted for days with victims 
not allowed to leave or sleep and detaining a girl he believed could have been a spy. Kopelev 
explains that it was easier to participate than not. Through perpetration he convinced himself that he
was doing it ʻfor the greater good – finding bread for his socialistic Fatherlandʼ334 and that he did not
see anyone starving to death at the time.
Again, such self-representation is at odds with probability. It is highly unlikely that 
Kopelev did not see peasants in Popivka starving to death. He mentions starvation only obliquely 
by accusing them of starving the state and their own families.335 Yet Kopelev knew there was no 
grain left at the village. In one case he explains how the quotas imposed on individual farmers 
equalled everything they harvested that year. The village officials argued that keeping anything for 
consumption (i.e. to sustain oneʼs life) was theft, and Kopelev agreed, harassing peasants at 
meetings with this line of reasoning.336 Neither was the girl Kopelev apprehended and held during a 
humiliating body search a spy. She was in fact a poorly educated farmerʼs daughter from Popivka 
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who returned from hospital after having an abortion and could provide little or no information to 
foreign intelligence services. Nor did she have any means to contact them: Myrhorod was far away 
from any border, and all means of communication were controlled by the authorities. When the seed
reserves were procured during his stay and some activists quit, Kopelev nonetheless carried on. 
What motivated Kopelev? Like many perpetrators of mass violence, Kopelev casts himself 
as ʻa true believer,ʼ in the same way Eichmann in his testimonies described himself in his early 
career as an ʻidealist.ʼ337 Like other perpetrators, Kopelev rationalises his participation by neccessity
at the time. His words can be compared to the recollections of mass killing by Eugene de Kock.
Kopelev, perpetrator of grain procurement in 
Popivka where over 2,000 died from starvation
De Kock – one of perpetrators of the state 
sanctioned mass killing during the Apartheid in 
South Africa
‘I spoke about German fascists, Japanese troops 
in Manchuria, insidious Poles. They all wanted 
to attack us, conquer, enslave and plunder. ... All
this threatened my country, hundreds of 
millions. So hundreds of thousands had to be 
discriminated.ʼ338 
‘… And we had to protect the country from this. 
The overall and general hue and cry was “Fight, 
resist, sacrifice, or you will be wiped out by the 
black man.” Rule by the black man was a sure 
means of destruction of the country.ʼ339
Like de Kock frantically trying to wash off the ‘smell of deathʼ,340 Kopelev was ill for two months 
upon his return from Popivka. Like de Kock, he chose to return to ʻworkʼ in the village, albeit in a 
different district. His colleagues, on the other hand, changed irrevocably. According to Kopelev, 
upon their return to Kharkiv, Frid, Rabizhanovich and Raev together collected emaciated children 
from the train stations and provided them with shelter and food from their own rations. Their 
actions were reported to the management of Kharkiv Tractor Factory, but the three of them were not
arrested until 14th February 1935. David Rabizhanovich and Lev Raev were 20-year-old 
Komsomols at the time of the famine, working as the editors at Kharkivsʼkyi Parovoznyk, whereas 
the slightly older Communist Frid was the chief editor of that newspaper. Frid had been known for 
cooperating with the DPU. They all were exiled to Ufa and Kazan for several years for anti-Soviet 
agitation. In 1936-1937 they were arrested again and sent to labour camps for 5 years. 
Rabizhanovich was pardoned in 1956, Raev and Frid in 1965.341
Kopelevʼs claim of belief as a ‘true believer’ is also problematic. The main incongruity lies 
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341 I. Baluta, N. Lapchynsʼka et al., eds. Reabilitovani Istoriieiu. Kharkivsʼka oblastʼ: knyha druha (Kharkiv: Oryhinal, 
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with his profession of humanist ideals, even during the famine. While other perpetrators quit or 
tried to help the starving peasants, Kopelev chose to continue – despite the fact that he found no 
grain and that his assumptions about the spies turned out to be implausible. Following a short break 
after his ʻworkʼ in Popivka, he returned to the ʻgrain front” in March 1933 – the month of a sharp 
increase in the number of deaths from starvation. 
Ultimately, Kopelevʼs perception of the peasants as the Others proves decisive. It originates
long before the famine. Kopelev writes about his hatred of wealthy peasants during NEP, when he 
complains about ‘busy markets, kulak carts with well fed horses, loud sellersʼ, and as a child, when 
hostile peasants looked at him with a sense of an ʻinsulting, indifferent, disdainful alienation.ʼ 
Equally insulting to Kopelev was when ʻa tan peasant with a moustache, in a washed out shirt with 
sun-bleached embroidery, smelling of sweat, tar and straw, sneered at him.ʼ342 Unlike the violations 
against German civilians during the Second World War, against which he protested, the mass 
killing of Ukrainian peasants provoked no empathy in Kopelev, despite his claims of being loyal to 
the humanist ideals at the time. His familyʼs perception of the Germans provides a stark difference 
to the aforementioned description of Ukrainian peasants: ‘[Germans] work hard, diligently, 
conscientiously and are the most cultured people in the world.ʼ343
The other ʻtrue believerʼ in Popivka, according to Kopelev, is Bubyr – a fanatic Communist
from the local landless peasants. Bubyr was the street name of Klym Vereshchaka, a perpetrator 
carved deep into local oral memory. During the famine, he oversaw the activists who searched the 
houses in teams of 3-5. The most ruthless of them, according to the survivors, were Klymʼs brother 
Dmytro, Iakiv Avramenko, Fedora Chapliak, Hurzhii, Lida Kriachun, Kryvych, Mykhailo Kurylo, 
Kuzʼmenko, Iosyp Lenda, A. Maladyka, Andrii Nesterenko, Sapʼian, I. Sokhatsʼkyi, Strychka and 
Voskobiinyk.344 Each collective farm brigade appointed its member to guard the fields in the 
summer of 1933. Hanna Kychenko recalls witnessing a woman being beaten to death by the field 
guards for ʻpilfering.ʼ345 This list includes hundreds of names: village council employees, 
Communists, teachers, Komsomol and collective farmers. As Kopelev commented, once all the 
grain from collective farms was procured on the order of the secretary of the Kharkiv oblast’ party 
committee, Terekhov, collective farmers joined the activists to search the houses of individual 
farmers that comprised half of Popivkaʼs adult population.346 This group of perpetrators was 
arguably compromised, as these men, women and children were already starving – despite 
Kopelev's assurances of Popivkians not dying until February 1933, that is, after his departure.
342 Kopelev, I sotvoril sebe kumira, p. 50. 
343 Ibid, p. 53. 
344 Myrhorod District Archive, File ʻOn Popivka during the Holodomorʼ, ark. 3, 5, 9, 12.
345 Ibid, ark. 5.
346 UCRDC, Interview with Kopelev, sound roll 3.
Contrary to Kopelevʼs portrayal, Red Army veteran Klym was not an orphan in his 
childhood nor an old bachelor in his mature years. He was a married father of three. Nonetheless, he
forced many ʻkulakʼ families to live in the dugouts in the ravine and indeed used their children as 
hostages.347 Klym starts his autobiography with the murder of his mother Marfa by the local 
Petliurites in 1918. In 1920 he joins ChOP, in 1923 he heads the local KNS, and in 1924 joins the 
party. At various times he chaired the collective farms in Popivka, worked in the village council and
as its head – in 1930, 1932 and 1937, that is, during key campaigns like dekulakization, grain 
procurement and the Great Terror. In 1941 he was evacuated to Voronezh and later mobilised to the
army. He feared his wife and their young daughter would be executed by Germans along with two 
collective farm chairmen in Popivka. In November 1942 he was put on trial for subordination and 
accused of defeatist and anti-Soviet remarks. He was sentenced to seven years in labour camps.348 
Sources of oral memory speak of retribution: in 1942 two men from Popivka met him in hospital 
and drowned him in the latrine for the suffering he inflicted.349 
Unlike his depiction in Kopelevʼs memoir, Klym was not a fearless fanatic. His superiors in
the army characterised him as an undisciplined liar who ʻundermines junior and middle-rank 
officers,ʼ whereas the soldiers were unanimous in concluding that Klym was open and vocal about 
his fear of dying, panicked during German attacks, and stole food from the kitchen. He repeatedly 
asked his commanders to send him to courses so that the war would finish while he was away.350 
Klym admitted to saying ʻif only we had a shot of vodka each, then we could say weʼre also for 
Soviet rule!ʼ as an analogy to Leninʼs expression about having 100,000 tractors winning peasantryʼs
loyalty to the authorities.351 From many interrogations and witness testimonies, it seems his arrest 
came as a result of the conflict between Klym and junior commanders. After years in power as a 
village official, he could not and did not want to submit to the authority of the junior officers, most 
of whom were 20 years younger than him. Both the officers and the soldiers unanimously 
commented on Klymʼs reluctance to risk his life and his fear of being killed.352 
The existing records of trials on Popivkians between 1932-1937 reveal that Klym and his 
team repressed anyone who criticised Soviet policies, grain procurement or his authority. His family
was disliked but feared, not unlike the Havryliuks in Toporyshche. Some cases bear the clichéd 
accusations of ʻanti-Soviet agitationʼ or ‘hostility to the Soviet rule,ʼ yet others reveal the corruption
of Klym and his colleagues. Like Havryliuk in Toporyshche, Klym testified against the victims of 
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the 1937 purges in Popivka. The victims included even the old Communist and the chairman at one 
of the collective farms, Cherviachuk.353 In the 1937 trials, the victims mention people dying in 1933
as an explanation for missing family members, a reference that others are expected to understand by
the simple mention of the year.354 Some also comment on Klym using his position to profit 
financially and provide details of his elaborated schemes of successfully obtaining consumer goods 
for himself and his inner circle.355
Division, silent but present, continued to affect the lives of Popivka residents long after the 
famine. As the protocols of the meetings of the collective farm board in 1968-1972 demonstrate, the
activists or members of their families kept powerful positions within the village. They still decided 
on the allocation of holidays, the distribution of the building materials or additional land for the 
vegetable plots, and the confirmation of the number of employment years needed to receive a state 
pension. Nothing further is known about the fate of Vereshchaka. It is unlikely that Kulish or his 
family survived. Nobody enquired about his pardon in 1990 when relatives of the repressed 
swamped the KGB with requests. After returning home from Popivka, Kopelev was sent to the 
village Vololahy in a tugboat brigade in March 1933. He volunteered to fight in the Second World 
War and eventually moved to Germany in 1974 where he stayed for the rest of his life. Kopelevʼs 
wife, Raisa Orlova, later commented on the motivations of the rank-and-file perpetrators of mass 
violence: ʻThe motives were different, the spiritual attunement was different, yet the objective result
… is exactly the same.ʼ356 Her words echoed Vasilii Grossmanʼs interpretation of the perpetrators of
the famine, which I will explore in Chapter 3.
Conclusion
In her research on the perpetrators of mass killing during the Apartheid in South Africa, 
Pumla Gobodo-Madizikela calls ideology or existing violence ʻa trick most perpetrators use, 
especially those sponsored by a powerful governmentʼ – from a rationalization of violence, 
legitimate at the time, to the ʻtruthʼ with which they downplay their guilt and agency.357 From this 
point of view, if the ʻkulaksʼs resisted collectivization, attacked officials and later ʻhoardedʼ grain, 
then repressions against them including deportations and executions were justified and necessary. 
As these case studies show, the actions of perpetrators can not be explained by ideological 
indoctrination alone. An interplay of motives accounts for their actions. Indeed, writing about his 
experience in the 1970s, Kopelev argues against dismissing ʻparticipants in development of the 
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357 Gobodo-Madikizela, A Human Being Died That Night, p. 23.
countryʼ as ʻcowards, stupid fanatics, cynical profiteers, bastards, foreignersʼ but as a complex 
variety.358 
We also see a clear division between the activists, who are usually the founding members 
of collective farms and joined before 1930, and those who were forced to join later, in particular 
during the famine or shortly after. This division ran deep: perpetrators and their families were more 
likely to receive benefits and privileges allocated by village officials for themselves or their inner 
circle. The privileges included trips to Moscow to various organised events, the allocation of 
bonuses or holidays or extra land, and the confirmation of employment record for state pension 
allocation decades after the famine.359 Sometimes this pattern persisted for generations, with the 
grandchildren of perpetrators still present in the village council or the district government. This is 
the trend that I observed both in Toporyshche and Popivka.
Succeeding in facilitation and advancing their career as village officials, perpetrators like 
Havryliuk and Vereshchaka were instrumental in executing the purges of 1937 on the village level. 
It is conceivable to conclude that the key perpetrators on the village level and most of the 
plenipotentiaries, including Kopelev, sought to accommodate themselves with the regime, 
collaborated with the DPU and were rewarded, at least for some time, with career opportunities. 
Their careers were interrupted briefly during the Second World War. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that some of them were lynched by the survivors, others were executed as Communists by the 
Germans, whereas some were found collaborating with the Nazis.360 In the case of Toporyshche and
Popivka, approximately half of the former perpetrators were at the front line during the war, others 
went into hiding and joined the Red Army only in 1944 and, even then, only in the auxiliary roles. 
While in their own accounts they might be represented as fighters for socialism, archival evidence, 
oral memory and comparative analysis suggests that they were ordinary people with various 
motivations.
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PART TWO
Cultural Memory of the Holodomor Perpetrators
The following chapters of the dissertation focus on cultural representations of the 
perpetrators. While it is generally accepted that most perpetrators of mass violence are ordinary 
people with rather banal motives,361 the rank-and-file perpetrators of the Holodomor remain on the 
margins of cultural memory in Ukraine. When they become the focus of artistic expression, 
perpetrators are often framed according to several distinct modalities based on the vesting of 
agency. Representation of the perpetrators in Soviet prose, for instance, corresponds with the Soviet
narrative of collectivization, in which agency is vested in characters who embrace participation. In 
samvydav novels, on the other hand, this agency dispersed: some perpetrators are indoctrinated, 
some settle scores, many simply follow orders. Authors in post-Soviet Ukraine and in the diaspora, 
by contrast, tend to displace agency by locating it with the savage, ethnically different Other or 
locals influenced by the Other. In the following four chapters. I will be tracing these modalities 
along with various artistic forms – prose, poetry, drama, film, museum – following a sequential 
chronological trajectory. 
During the first fifty years after the famine, not a single officially published Soviet novel or
poem presented the starvation inflicted on the population in 1932-1933 as the result of state policies
and their brutal enforcement. Indeed, any public mention of the famine was a criminal offence in 
the USSR.362 When Soviet writers did dare address the famine, their works were disseminated only 
in manuscript copies or published abroad. Soviet authors who did dwell on collectivization 
mentioned the famine in passing, but cast it as the result of ʻkulakʼ resistance to the campaigns 
enforced by Soviet officials who, as discussed in previous chapters, played a key role in the 
logistics of the Holodomor. Indeed, official Soviet cultural texts overviewed in this chapter focus 
either on collectivization or on the events preceding the famine, but not on the famine itself.
This overview cannot possibly include all available works on the subject of the famine, as 
some of them do not address the subject of the perpetrators. Instead this overview will explore the 
novels, poems, plays and films included in the advisory collections recommended for 
361 As argued by Arendt, Hilberg, Browning and other scholars.
362 Public acknowledgment of the 1932-1933 Famine, if reported, was punished under the Article 54-10 of the Criminal
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overthrow, undermine or weaken Soviet power or to commit particular counter-revolutionary crimes as well as for 
spreading or producing or storing literature of similar content – imprisonment for no less than 6 monthsʼ and up to 
execution. In 1957-58, following changes in the Criminal Code, spreading information on the famine would be 
persecuted under the article 56 ʻOn Criminal Responsibility for State Crimesʼ with the same punishment.
commemorative events issued by state institutions – from oblastʼ libraries and broadcasting 
companies to the Institute of National Memory of Ukraine and the Holodomor Memorial Museum –
or those that reached the mass audience through broadcast on national channels or large volumes in 
print.363 Such an approach is based on an understanding of cultural memory in the framework 
offered by Kansteiner, in which memory-makers – in this case, state institutions – actively seek to 
disseminate a produced memory of the perpetrators through the commemorative channels of prose, 
poetry, drama and film and spatial representation.364 
363 Zbirka metodychnykh rekomendatsii do vidznachennia pamʼiatnykh dat u zahalʼnoosvitnikh navchalʼnykh 
zakladakh, ed. H. Baikevych, O. Okhrimchuk (Dnipro: Lira, 2017), pp. 90-107, p. 90; ʻUkraiina pamʼiataie – svit 
vyznaie!ʼ Denʼ Informatsii. ed. O. Dachkovsʼka (Kamʼianetʼs-Podilʼsʼkyi: Kamʼianetʼs-Podilʼsʼka MTsBC 
Metodyko-bibliografichnyi viddil, 2015).
364 W. Kansteiner, ʻFinding Meaning in Memory: a Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies,ʼ History 
and Theory 41, (May 2002), pp. 179-197.
Chapter III
No Novel for the Ordinary Men?
Representation of the Rank-and-File Perpetrators of the Holodomor in Ukrainian Prose
In this chapter, whose title is a rewording of the opening line to William Butler Yeats’ 
poem Sailing to Byzantium,365 I consider whether Ukrainian novels on the famine reflect the 
participation of various perpetrator groups or instead offer a reductive reading of the perpetrators. 
To do so in a comparative frame, I employ Smeulers’s overarching typology of perpetrators of mass
violence. This typology includes seven groups of perpetrators based on their motivation: trained 
perpetrators like police or military, fanatics or ideological actors, careerists, profiteers, sadists, 
conformists and compromised perpetrators (who are forced to participate).366
Considering the long history of Ukrainian literature serving both as a public forum and a 
repository of cultural memory in absence of civil institutions, during the Soviet era writers had once
again to use Aesopian language to avoid censorship367 or to publish abroad or disseminate their 
works illegally via samvydav or samizdat (self-published) literature. A large number of literary 
works on the famine was written by the Ukrainian diaspora, some of which reached a wide 
readership in Ukraine after 1991.368 Since then a growing number of novels on the Holodomor have 
365
The original line ‘That is no country for old menʼ laments the young neglecting the wisdom of the old, which could 
also relate to the young perpetrators of the famine defying an older generation reluctant to support Soviet policies in 
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366 Smeulers, ed., Supranational criminology: towards a typology, p. 265.
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(1979) by Lina Kostenko. It was published in Soviet Ukraine. There is a reference to the perpetrators of the famine: 
mozhnovladtsi, which translates as ‘those who have power.ʼ Dibrova, V. ‘The Holodomor and the Contemporary 
Ukrainian Writer,ʼ Harvard Ukrainian Studies 30, no. 1/4 (2008), p. 269.
368 Although Vasylʼ Barka’s novel Zhovtyi Kniazʼ (The Yellow Prince) – a visceral account of the Holodomor centred 
been produced while older works have been re-published. Many literary critics argue, however, that
only few literary works on the Holodomor are widely read and that the number and the public 
attention do not correspond to the trauma of this man-made famine.369
The novels chosen for analysis are the ones that have reached the mass reader in Ukraine 
and thus became part of cultural memory. They include Soviet novels that were distributed to the 
public libraries from the 1930s onwards; the novels written by the diaspora that were included in 
school curricula after 1991 or used as film scripts; post-Soviet works that received literary acclaim; 
and works recommended for commemoration events by the Institute of National Memory of 
Ukraine.370 The novels are split into four groups, based chronologically on the political context in 
which they were produced: the first group is compiled of Soviet novels, the second group – novels 
by Soviet dissidents, the third group – novels written in the diaspora, the fourth group – novels 
composed in post-Soviet Ukraine. This exploratory overview therefore starts with Soviet novels and
then moves to works that have become available to the general public in Ukraine after 50 years of 
the famineʼs silencing. It includes dissident prose that was first disseminated via samvydav or 
samizdat, Ukrainian prose in diaspora and post-Soviet novels.
The novels discussed here approach the perpetrators from various positions. Soviet writers 
present unflinching activists as heroes and skim over the wider participation of conformists and 
compromised perpetrators, whereas the novels produced in diaspora and in post-Soviet Ukraine 
depict these unflinching activists as disillusioned and repentant idealists and focus primarily on the 
ethnically alien Other, who is a sadist, a profiteer, and usually a trained perpetrator. As we shall see,
samvydav and tamvydav works provide a more complex and nuanced representation. 
1. Soviet Novels
While Ukrainian Soviet literature of the early 1930s was subjected to censorship and was 
supposed ʻto show the most important, positive side of collectivization; to illuminate the key role of
village activists and Party cells in the socialistic transformation of the villageʼ371, it nevertheless 
offers an elaborate picture of collectivization in Ukraine and even the occasional mention of the 
on the fictional Katrannyk family – appeared in samizdat as early as 1962, it was published in Ukraine only in 1991.
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Holodomor,ʼ at Radio Svoboda on 28/11/2008; http://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/1353915.html accessed 01/04/2016.
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famine. Indeed, many Soviet writers were, if not perpetrators themselves, then at least witnesses of 
the famine offering first-hand accounts of the starvation in the village. Arkadii Liubchenko, the 
author of the first Soviet short novel about the famine, titled Kostryha (1933),372 based his narrative 
on his visits to the countryside at the time.373 The protagonist Matvii Kostryha is a ‘middle peasant’ 
who hides grain from officials and watches his family starve. Such presentations of peasants hiding 
grain can also be found in the memoirs of the Holodomor perpetrators.374 When Kostryha repeatedly
refuses to submit grain on requests from ʻa man from the district,ʼ ʻthe commissionʼ and ʻthe village
council,ʼ they take his potatoes and confiscate his property, thus effectively contributing to the 
starvation of his children. The perpetrators are nameless but omnipresent: ‘All teachers in the 
district were organised, together with pupils, to ʻpull peasants out of the debt to the state.ʼ375 These 
representatives of state ask Kostryhaʼs son where his father has hidden grain. Eventually the 
officials find the grain and take his children away: ʻYou can do what you like, Matvii, but [you] 
cannot torture the children. We are taking your boys to a pioneer camp. They will be better off 
there, and their future will be certain.ʼ376
Likewise, Ivan Kyrylenko, the author of a novel about collectivization titled Avanposty 
(The Outposts, 1933), had knowledge of the perpetrators on the ground through his position as a 
personal secretary of the Chairman of the TsVK of Soviet Ukraine, Hryhorii Petrovs’kyi. During 
the Holodomor, Petrovsʼkyi received thousands of letters from the countryside, some of which were
from the perpetrators commenting on their colleagues. The author of one letter notes how collective 
farm management and members of the RPK profit from violence in the village: ʻBinge drinking, 
threats... even the cases of physical violence … The dekulakizedd are forced to live in the dugouts. 
They are sentenced to starvation. The officials say: “we do what we want.” Such facts are not 
exceptional but common.ʼ377 As secretary, Kyrylenko was doubtlessly aware of such 
correspondence, which offered extensive detail on the mechanism of the Holodomor and the various
types of its perpetrators. 
The protagonists in Avanposty are officials involved in grain procurement: a village 
Komsomol leader Pavlo Motora; a worker from Kharkiv and TsK plenipotentiary Marko Obushnyi;
and the head of the village council Dovbnia, among others. It is not a first assignment for Obushnyi,
372 Kostryha is a surname of a character. The story was published in Communist on January 11, 1933.
373 Liubchenko describes one of his visits in April 1933 in the short novel Ioho taiemnytsia (His Secret) in 1966.
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375 Arkadii Liubchebko, ‘Kostryha,ʼ in Zbirka Ukraiinsʼkykh novel (New York: Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka v
Amerytsi, 1955), p. 151.
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377 From the letter from the students of Military Airforce Academy of RSChA to Hryhorii Petrovsʼkyi, on their 
participation in Novopskovsʼk district, Luhansʼk oblast’. TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 7, spr. 145, Ark. 62-67.
who has ʻbeautiful intentions to transform the village.ʼ378 Together with Motora he is determined to 
find and liquidate class enemies and everyone sympathetic to them. Obushnyi promises village 
activists to ʻsizzle’ the enemies in order to meet procurement targets. The name of the novel is 
telling: French ʻavant poste’ means a guarded beacon established during the offensive. Similarly the
novel presents perpetrators in militaristic terms, as soldiers in a hostile environment who follow 
orders, demonstrate vigilance, bravery and firm beliefs. They are contrasted with characters who 
desert, profit or question the orders. One of these characters is Dovbnia who is reluctant to ʻreveal 
enemies’379 in the collective farm, refuses to punish peasants for stealing the grain and calls the 
grain procurement plan unrealistic. As officious as Dovbnia is, he avoids making any decisions and 
uses his position to pursue his love interest. Only when the woman refuses Dovbnia does he try to 
use the law on protection of socialistic property to punish her for ʻpilferingʼ in 1932 – which 
implies she was starving at the time. In other words, the perpetrators in the novel are, based on 
Smeulersʼs typology, either fanatics or profiteers. 
Female perpetrators in Avanposty are ideological perpetrators too. The two women among 
the activists – a Komsomol Varvara Nezhurbida and a widow Khrystia – are later joined by another 
widow Maria. These women complain to Obushnyi that Dovbnia is not involving other women in 
the campaigns. In fact, most women in the village, according to Kyrylenko, remain ‘backward’ and 
openly hostile to the female activists. The peasant women spread rumours about Varvara being 
promiscuous and nearly lynch Khrystia and Maria. General condemnation of Varvara is exacerbated
by her defying gender expectations: together with Motora, she ʻfights the neighbourhood, 
dosvitky,380 perennial peasant passivity …ʼ381 and does not sleep at night in hope to catch other 
peasants milling grain. In the end Khrystia is promoted to the member of the collective farm board, 
Varvara is engaged to Motora, and other women in the village reconcile with them.
Kyrylenko’s fanatic perpetrators, however, vary in the degree of indoctrination. An episode 
in Avanposty that reads like a document is a speech by the secretary of Central Committee at the 
orientation for Party plenipotentiaries like Obushnyi: ʻThree hundred Bolsheviks heard the words 
and dressed them in familiar pictures of class struggle in the village.’382 Three hundred Bolsheviks, 
like three hundred Spartans, are outnumbered in their fight in the countryside. Most of them, like 
Obushnyi, worked in the factories or mines where their lives evoke those in Emile Zola’s Germinal 
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382 Ivan Kyrylenko, Avanposty (Kharkiv: Khudozhnia literatura, 1935), p. 11.
(1885) – i.e. characterised by a struggle for a better future. The wording of the official speech is 
strikingly similar to the speech of one republican leader recalled by Victor Kravchenko, who was 
also sent to the countryside in 1932.383 He remembers feeling inspired by militaristic slogans and 
anxious to meet expectations, although he had no ʻfamiliar pictures of class struggle’ and lacked 
specific instructions. According to Kravchenko, such ideological conditioning was enough to make 
many workers say that the starving peasants were somehow responsible for the famine and to make 
them enforce brutal policies on the ground. While Khlevniuk, one of the leading historians of 
Stalinism, posits that this line of thinking was shared by many Soviet officials and imposed on them
from above,384 General Petro Hryhorenko, himself a participant of those events, argues that these 
words were what many perpetrators wanted to believe as it made their life safer.385 Indeed, such 
testimonies present perpetrators in a positive light but do not necessarily reflect their actual 
motivation.
A close reading of Avanposty also reveals a number of other perpetrator types. The 
secretary of the RPK Havrysh explains the lack of local support of the officials to Obushnyi by 
stating that many peasants did not support Soviet rule when it was established: ʻAt that time every 
fifth [person] here was fighting for Petliura or in gangs. We can count on few.ʼ386 Coincidentally, 
the comments of this fictional character echo the words of local perpetrators in Kopelev’s memoir. 
In late 1932 Kopelev was sent to procure grain in the village of Petrivtsi (the name resembles that of
Petrivka in Avanposty) in the Poltava oblast’. A local DPU plenipotentiary explained the lack of 
local support to Kopelev in similar terms: ʻThere are counter-revolutionary elements in all villages 
here. In Petrivtsi there are about 20 of those who took arms against us and spilt our blood. The 
district is full of those who fought for Petliura, Makhno, Marusia… There were as many gangs in 
Civil War here as there are fleas on a dog.’387 In Avanposty, Obushnyi remains a cultural Other for 
many peasants given his standing as a plenipotentiary from the city, so his enemies spread rumours 
about him seducing Motora’s girlfriend Varvara: ʻAll those city folks are fooling us simpletons. 
They come over, spoil our girls, take our bread and are off …ʼ388 
These initially hostile activists eventually come to support Obushnyi. They correspond to 
another perpetrator type: conformists. They accept the orders from the authorities but do not 
necessarily approve of them. Upon his arrival, Obushnyi summons Red Army veterans, all members
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of the village council and collective farm board, poor peasants (members of KNS), and shock 
collective farmers – approximately 25 people. He notes to himself that only a few of the assembled 
genuinely embrace the idea of class struggle, whereas the vast majority are indifferent.389 One of 
these activists regards his participation in house searches – during which he receives verbal abuse 
from women and hears repeated denials of hiding grain from men – as an unpleasant job. Having 
concluded that the ideological education of prospective activists would be futile, Obushnyi 
threatens them with repression. He reminds them that the Party will punish those who tolerate the 
enemies even ʻafter the battle is over.ʼ Lastly, to ensure control over the activists, Obushnyi splits 
the peasants into small search brigades with one trusted comrade in each. He instructs them to 
ʻshake the grain out’ only when told to and to ʻpress harder’ on the individual peasants rather than 
on the collective farmers.390 Each search brigade is given a target and a part of the village in which 
to work and is subsequently assessed on its performance. After a few weeks, the trusted comrades 
from each brigade merge into one brigade in which all members are either relatives or close friends.
Such a brigade, according to the activists, will organise ʻa true devastation.’391 They abide by the 
rule, ʻNo hesitation at the front. Get an order – follow it!ʼ392
Kyrylenko also presents the reader with compromised perpetrators: young ambitious men 
and women in the Komsomol who follow Communists. They destroy the icons worshipped by their 
mothers. More innocuously, they play the accordion, an instrument that replaced the traditional 
kobza or fiddle during collectivization. This generational divide is addressed by other writers of the 
early 1930s: in Istoriia radosti (History of Happiness, 1934) Ivan Le portrays a pioneer Phonia who
denounces his father for hiding grain and has a mental breakdown. In the same novel a character 
named Mykyta Korovainii participates in the dekulakization of his own parents in order to become 
a chairman of the collective farm. In Voseny (In Autumn, 1933) by Mykola Dukyn, Komsomol 
Kyrylo reminds his mother that he might shoot her if she steals even a handful of grain from the 
collective farm again. He guards the barn and, at one point, shoots a peasant in the back.
In a similar vein, Hryhorii Epik portrays several groups of perpetrators in his novel Persha 
Vesna (The First Spring, 1933). Epik names over thirty people involved in grain procurement and 
collectivization in the village of Bahva where the head of the village council Khymochka struggles 
to establish a collective farm. Though he is backed by district officials and local poor peasants, most
farmers oppose him. In such a way, Epik argues, the peasants want to minimise their losses. Even 
when local delegate Pola reassures Komsomol plenipotentiary Lohvyn that the poor peasants will 
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follow ʻwhere you take us,ʼ393 he backs a local wealthy farmer Lytka who holds real power in the 
village at the time. Then Lohvyn engages local youth in grain procurement by promising them 
Komsomol membership if they prove themselves in finding grain. They respond with enthusiasm: 
ʻWe are not new at this! Who collected all the bread but us?ʼ, implying that they are already 
initiated into the enforcement of violent policies.394 The antagonist Lytka comments that support of 
these locals is crucial for grain procurement: ʻIf it were not for them, those city commissars would 
not find anything. They would have walked, sniffed and left. [But the locals] searched all over. 
They took everything and have not left a thing; they damaged [it all] and lived off on some of it.ʼ395 
In Epik’s representation, most activists are conformists who follow the orders of authorities.
A more fanatical type, represented by Lohvyn, is murdered by a mob. The women in the 
crowd also sexually assault several activists and destroy the newly created collective farm. Indeed, 
these were the risks that many perpetrators faced on the ground. In Mykola Dukyn’s short novel 
Did Topolia (Grandpa Topolia, 1933), a plenipotentiary from Moscow named Toporkov who 
chaired a Party cell and ‘organised the masses’ in a village is shot dead, like Lohvyn, through an 
open window by ʻkulaks’.396 Before Lohvyn dies in Epik’s novel, he condemns peasants who do not
appreciate the changes that he is fighting for: ʻWhat bastards! You work for them, and they kill 
you.ʼ397
Some of Lohvyn’s comrades-in-arms, who are brutalised by the events in the Civil War, 
display traits of sadism. Red Amy veterans Vol’ha Bosa and Mykola Chubuk remember local 
peasantry supporting the Whites during the war and killing Vol’ha’s husband. They now seek 
revenge: ʻYou, comrades-KNS-members, are not KNS until you break a skull of “kulak.”ʼ398 The 
presence of perpetrators in the village becomes intimidating: at night they ride from house to house 
with torches and instantly decide on individual cases of refusals to join the collective farm. Epik 
even compares the village council to the military headquarters of historic offensives on ʻperennial 
traditions of peasant backwardness and famines’ – in line with the official interpretation of the aims 
of collectivization.399 
In fact, many perpetrators on village and district levels in Epik’s novel see violence as a 
necessary tool to subjugate the majority in the village who are too backward to be persuaded with 
words. When the secretary of the RPK Kholod goes to Bahva after a lynching, he has no 
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reservations about violence, even against the poor peasants who need to be ʻsquashed without 
mercy... they are dark.ʼ400 In conversation with the village officials, Kholod dehumanises the 
peasants further by comparing them to dormant parasites. At the village meeting following the 
death of Lohvyn, he ignores the questions about helping the starving children of the repressed and 
announces that the village will be punished further. Likewise Volʼha and her comrades laugh at the 
claims that people are dying from hunger and ʻfall dead like flies.’401 
If Epik mentions the famine only in passing in 1933, Dokia Humenna writes about the 
conditions laying the groundwork for the devastation to come in her novel Lysty zi Stepovoii 
Ukraiiny (The Letters from Steppe Ukraine, 1928). In her work,  she awkwardly presents Soviet 
officials as unable to estimate how much ʻexcess’ grain would be stored by the individual peasants 
who refused to join the collectives. As a result, they have to ‘pump out’ all grain and resort to 
ʻexcesses.’402 Humenna concentrates on the management of one collective farm, highlighting its 
incompetence in agriculture, dependence on state investments, and even sexual corruption. In short, 
she presents the concerns of many farmers resisting collectivization at the time, many of which 
were ridiculed by other Soviet writers. Humenna reveals a foundational connection between these 
Soviet policies in the countryside and mass famine, portraying the perpetrators as marginal elements
of the village community. Her critical depictions of collective farms were enough for Humenna to 
be refused membership in the Writers Union of Ukraine and all the benefits it brought at the time, 
including employment, ration cards and accommodation.
 
Soviet prose during the Thaw
This sympathetic depiction of collectivization and its perpetrators, which was more or less 
in line with the official ideology at the time, continued until the death of Stalin. After Khrushchev 
denounced Stalin’s crimes and the ʻcult of personality’ at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, 
however, some Ukrainian Soviet writers dared to allude to collectivization and the famine again. As
critical as he was of Stalinism in the so-called ‘Secret Speech,’ Khrushchev did not question the 
official interpretation of collectivization and the role its perpetrators played at the time. Yet a 
number of Soviet writers did question this interpretation in an attempt to reassess the events of 
1932-1933. Famed Ukrainian writer Olesʼ Honchar mentions the famine in his novel Liudyna i 
Zbroia (Man and Arms, 1958). One of his characters, Reshetnyk, describes his experience of the 
Holodomor to his comrade-in-arms during the the Second World War. The only survivor in his 
family, Reshetnyk used to cut the ears of wheat while trying to avoid the field guards, who called 
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children like him ʻkulak hairdressers.ʼ403 He concludes that they were only hungry people, not 
ʻkulaks’. While Honchar does not explain who these field guards were or how the famine was 
organised, his very mention of its perpetrators mistaking the victims for enemies is significant in the
cultural memory of the Holodomor, especially given the novel’s reach to a wide readership.
Another novel that overcame the bounds of conventional censorship is Mykhailo 
Stel’makh’s novel Chotyry Brody (The Four Fords, 1978), which received the prestigious 
Shevchenko award in 1980. In the novel, Stel’makh describes many aspects of the famine that 
censors normally insisted on excluding, thus delaying the novel’s publication. Stel’makh describes 
how local officials tried to save the starving and blames the famine in the ʻwicked’ year on the poor 
harvest exacerbated by primitive agriculture, which the Party sought to change. From brief 
comments, we learn that some bread was taken away from the peasants as taxes or surplus. 
Stel’makh, coming from a KNS background and a student of agriculture during the Holodomor,404 
was very likely to be involved in grain procurement himself. Therefore he avoids explaining who 
requisitioned the grain, mentioning house searches only in passing.
The protagonist Bondarenko in Chotyry Brody is an ideological perpetrator. Like Stel’makh
himself, he returns to his native village as a teacher and confiscates grain in 1932-1933. The author 
does not delve into the process of house searches but repeatedly stresses Bondarenko’s firm 
socialist beliefs, his desire to change life for better, and his incompetence in managing the collective
farm. Bondarenko is appointed as chairman of a collective farm by district officials Musul’bas and 
Sahaidak, who are likened to fearless but fair kozaks and who, like other perpetrators in Soviet 
novels, are Red Army Veterans. Moreover, Sahaidak assigns Bondarenko the task of ʻsaving 
people’ and completing the sowing campaign in 1933 despite having no seeds. Having a carte 
blanche from the superiors who promise to ʻkeep their eyes open but not to slap his hands,’ 
Bondarenko orders his friend and a collective farmer, Vasyl’, to leave some of the procured milk for
the newly organised village nursery. When Vasyl’ reminds him that they would face trial for such 
action, Bondarenko reasons that they might not. Later in the novel Vasyl’ becomes a policeman 
while Bondarenko stays in his position of the farm chairman. 
A group of perpetrator-fanatics, however, compromise their beliefs when they tolerate the 
profiteers and careerists. Bondarenko believes it is the profiteer Mahazanyk who has exacerbated 
the famine in the village. Indeed, Mahazanyk uses the famine to his benefit: he sells the grain that 
he acquires through participation in requisition to desperate peasants at extortionate prices, settles 
scores with former enemies and pursues various love interests. Mahazanyk is a former Ukrainian 
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national activist and a successful entrepreneur who does not follow any ideology and welcomes the 
Nazis during the war when it means profit for him. When he approaches Bondarenko with business 
ideas about how to develop the struggling collective farm, Bondarenko refuses and lets the produce 
rot. 
The careerist district prosecutor Stupach is a convinced Communist, always dressed in 
military uniform. From short remarks we learn that he is a Jew. Born in a small town, he ʻdoes not 
know the village and does not want to know it’ and ʻthe early 1920s pushed the soul out of him.’ He
dislikes peasants who compare him to a vulture despite his handsome appearance. Ambitious, 
Stupach tends to see conspiracy everywhere and prefers to employ terror in his work ʻso that one 
would be scared of their own.’ He insists on taking all of the harvest of 1932 out of the village. 
Perpetrators Sahaidak and Musulbas comment on the necessity to tolerate people like him while 
constructing a better future. Stupach matches the description of the Chekist commissar of the post-
revolutionary years provided by Bilynkis: ʻA typical, rather good-looking man, he had the most 
unpleasant employment. He was sent, or maybe himself volunteered, whenever there was a need to 
abuse and insult someone.ʼ405 Through the words of Bondarenko, Stel’makh explains that 
executives like Stupach with their hatred towards the peasants are to blame for the 1932-1933 
famine. According to Myroslav Shkandrij, Jewish cadres were less visible in the violence of the 
Holodomor or in the terror of the thirties compared to the early years of the revolutionary and post-
revolutionary period.406
A similar depiction of the perpetrators could be found in other Soviet novels that remained 
firmly within the canon of social realism, such as Liudy ne angely (People Are No Angels, 1962) by
Ivan Stadniuk and Nevmyrushchyi Khlib (Immortal Bread, 1981) by Petro Lanovenko.407 The famine
is explained as a temporary phase in the socialist transformation of the village, caused by poor local 
management, ʻkulakʼ sabotage or natural causes. Its perpetrators – village activists, workers, 
teachers, village and district officials – are ideological perpetrators who are concerned about the 
lives of the peasants. As in Chotyry Brody, the famine is blamed on local officials who were either 
careerists or counter-revolutionaries.
2. Samvydav and Tamvydav Novels of the Soviet Period
Anatolii Dimarov’s I budutʼ liudy (There Will Be People, 1964) initially had a chapter on 
collectivization and the famine, but it was deemed inappropriate by reviewer Mul’tykh from the 
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Institute of the History of Party.408 Dimarov’s own father was dekulakized, and his mother relocated
as a teacher to another village with the children and changed their surname. In their new village, she
too had to participate in dekulakization so Dimarov knew perpetratorsʼ experience well.409 But 
Multykhʼs revision of his novel criticised his representation of perpetrators and epitomises the 
guidance for authors writing about the 1930s: ‘... completely re-evaluate the events in the village in 
late 1929 – early 1930 according to the documents and existing historiography …ʼ410 The chapter 
was published as a separate novel The Hungry Thirties (A Parable About Bread) abroad in 1989 
and in Ukraine in 1990. 
In this work Dimarov explores different types of perpetrators of the famine as well as their 
hierarchy – from village activists to the provincial leaders and Stalin from 1929 to 1933. The events
start in Khorol, where Hryhorii Ginzburg, the secretary of the RPK, finds himself under pressure 
from the oblast’ committee to speed up collectivisation in his district. He is also confused with the 
discrepancy between Stalinʼs views on collectivization and his own experience.411 Ginzburg writes a
letter to Stalin criticising his policy. He is then summoned to the first secretary of the oblastʼ Party 
committee, who expels him from the Party. Ginzburg shoots himself at the meeting. Such incidents 
indeed took place at the time. Maksudov, for example, notes the increased rates of suicide among 
Party officials during the famine as the result of their being ʻridden with guilt and full of sympathy 
for the starving’ as well as their inability to change anything.412 
Following his death, the Khorol district committee is ‘reinforced’ with the careerist Suslov, 
who follows orders with the conviction that the transformation of the village requires violence. 
Most of Ginzburg’s former colleagues immediately signal support of Suslovʼs methods. For 
instance, another member of the committee, Put’ko, supports Suslov by repeating his words and 
silently agreeing when he criticises him. He travels to the village of Tarasivka in Khorol district to 
find like-minded executives. Together with Suslov, Put’ko expels from the Party the head of the 
village council and Red Army veteran Hanzha, who refuses to use repressions in the village. His 
partner and fellow Communist Olʼha solemnly laments his imprisonment and reluctance to conform
but testifies against him, together with his nephew Volodʼka. A perpetrator and Red Army veteran 
like Volodʼka, Ol’ha receives a verbal warning for her lack of vigilance and is distrusted by Put’ko: 
ʻThis woman raised her hand herself. Besides, she had been Hanzhaʼs mistress. We wonʼt let you 
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forget that until the day you die, dearie! Youʼll remain forever “under suspicion.”ʼ413 At the same 
time Volod’ka is appointed as a chairman of the collective farm that he is to create. Initially he is 
enthusiastic and anxious to prove his loyalty to the Party and feels empowered by district backing: 
ʻAfter having been in town, Volod’ka suddenly felt that he wielded frightening power: he could run 
whoever he liked out of the village.’414 Despite his threats, only 12 out of 37 activists join the 
collective farm ʻvoluntarily.’ Worried that district officials would blame him, he gradually 
transforms into a committed perpetrator, compiling a list of people to be deported to Siberia and 
refusing to return food to his father-in-law who dies from the starvation. 
Dimarov suggests that ideology alone cannot adequately account for Volod’ka’s 
participation in the Holodomor, given the refusal of convinced Communists Ginzburg and Hanzha 
to participate. He therefore raises the question of the role of the modern state, and above all the 
culture of fear, in the vertical structure of the totalitarian state. When Ginzburg waits for a meeting 
in the reception room of the first secretary of the oblast,’ he finds himself in the company of other 
district officials waiting anxiously to be seen behind the big black leather doors. The material of 
these doors reminds him of the black leather of the Chekist uniform, which communicates the 
authority of higher Soviet officials over the rank-and-file officials. While Ginzburg gradually 
submits to the intimidation of the big black doors, he eventually finds the courage to protest – 
something most perpetrators in the novel cannot, or do not, do. In other words, Dimarov suggests 
that it was bureaucracy of the state that made people like Volodʼka dangerous, weaponising their  
dutiful official conscientiousness to facilitate the famine in his village. 
Indeed, Volodʼka is similar to Adolf Eichmann in his motives and his character. He is 
unaware of the wickedness of his actions: ʻHad he wanted people to die like this? Had he thought 
about this as he swept the grain out of the village? Sweeping it out to the last granule, just to fulfil 
that forthcoming plan …ʼ415 He has neither killed anyone personally, nor has he ordered anyone to 
be killed. He is not a sadist or psychopath; nor are his subordinates, who take the grain from the 
families in winter to save it for spring sowing and from ʻbeing fed to your children.’416 They seem 
ʻterribly and terrifyingly normal.’
Dimarov’s character of the teacher Tania is a classic example of a compromised 
perpetrator. During a meeting on dekulakization, she disapproves of the list for deportation, but 
remains silent as she fears for herself and her children. Defined through her relations to the men – 
her father was a priest, her husband is ʻkulak,ʼ her brother is repressed – she feels insecure and is 
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grateful not to be included in the dekulakization brigade. Tania lives with her two young sons in the
house of the deported; she is swollen from hunger and fears even responding to the school warden 
who comments on children suffering needlessly in the famine. Tania prefers not to discuss the 
intentions of the leaders out of the fear of losing her job or being arrested. Vulnerable and alone, 
Tania is desperate to survive and keeps her silence until her death in the 1980s.
Finally, Dimarov completes the circle of perpetrators by taking a local old man Grandpa 
Khlypavka to Stalin. While following the orders of Volod’ka to keep the starving away from the 
village grain store, Khlypavka believes that Stalin is not aware of the dire situation and decides to 
travel to Moscow to inform him. His son works at the railway and helps Khlypavka travel to 
Kharkiv in a first-class compartment – something impossible for most starving peasants at the time. 
His trip is cut short by cordons near Moscow, and he deduces that Stalin is aware of the starving 
peasants trying to reach the capital and does not want to see them. After the old man dies, he 
demands God punish Stalin and alleges his complicity in failing to do so: ʻYou teach us in the Holy 
Scriptures that all who pass by a crime become criminals themselves, that all who help bandits 
become bandits themselves. So who can judge us, if You turn from us?’417 When God asks the 
victims of the famine who killed them, they all point at Stalin. While God finds no adequate 
punishment for the ʻhorrific crimes’ of Stalin, Dimarov does not discuss punishment for Suslov, 
Khlypavka, Volodʼka and others who passed by a crime. 
Dimarov’s other novel set during the Holodomor, Samosud (Lynching, 1990), focusses 
entirely on careerist Danylo Sokalo and follows his rise from the village level perpetrator to the 
secretary of the RPK. An ambitious Komsomol, Danylo fights with religion in his village and 
ironically takes down a giant cross erected by his distant Cossack ancestor, after whom the village 
was named. To prevent it from being erected again, Danylo defecates on top of it. He also ensures 
that the village is renamed ‘Chervona Kommuna’ (Red Commune) to prove his loyalty to the cause.
Having secured a gun from district authorities, ʻhe has already felt important.’ Danylo is driven not 
only by career aspirations, but by jealousy: ʻThe older he got, the more he hated anyone who dared 
to live better than him.ʼ418 When he accidentally shoots his hand, he blames Vasyl’ Kovalenko for a 
failed assassination attempt – simply because Vasyl’ had better shoes than Danylo long ago. On 
advice of a policeman, he accuses four more men from the village, all of whom are executed after a 
widely publicised trial. 
In 1932 Danylo jumps at a chance to advance his career by volunteering to enforce grain 
procurement. At a key meeting with a member of the TsK KP(b)U, where other village officials 
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argue grain procurement quotas are impossible, Danylo raises his hand to promise 200% of the 
target. A careerist and a profiteer who keeps possessions of the deported for personal use, Danylo 
feels elated with his grand plans: ʻI will procure grain! I will do everything, comrade secretary! I 
will smash myself, but I will do it!ʼ He organises agitation brigades with teenagers, Komsomol, 
KNS and ʻpoor teachers who are responsible for everything’ and bullies the peasants into the 
collective by boarding up their houses and deporting those who resisted. While searching for grain, 
he starts with individual farmers who left the collective in 1930, avenging them for undermining his
efforts and achievements in the past. He learns of metal rods to prod the surfaces in the district and 
orders a local blacksmith to make some for his brigades. During the searches, he brutally kills, 
directly and indirectly, half the village. This loyalty eventually pays off, and he moves to the district
and eventually becomes the secretary of the RPK.
Danylo’s life changes quickly during the German invasion in 1941. Having stayed on the 
occupied territory, he destroys local supplies and accidentally kills his former Komsomol colleague 
Vustia, a conformist and a diligent worker herself. Now the chairwoman of the collective, she tried 
to prevent Danylo from burning the barn with hundreds of calves. One more murder later, he is 
arrested by Vasyl’ Kovalenko who returned to the village, and is now in the German police. 
Kovalenko allows the mob, headed by Vustia’s mother, to lynch Danylo. The murder is highly 
publicised in German newspapers. Once the village is freed from the Germans, it is burnt to the 
ground by the NKVD as collective reprisal for the lynching of the secretary of the district 
committee. Its male inhabitants are executed, whilst its surviving women and children are sent to 
the camps in Siberia.
Another novel set during the famine published abroad and circulated in samvydav is Vasilii 
Grossman’s Vse techet (Forever Flowing, 1970). Grossman presents the perpetrator of Stalinist 
policies according to four types: sadists, conformists, the compromised, and the ideologically 
driven. Grossman also includes a confession of a Party plenipotentiary deployed in Ukraine to 
procure grain named Anna Stepanovna Mikhaliova, a war widow living with her nephew in 
southern Russia. She finds a soulmate in the protagonist of the novel and confides in him. A few 
weeks later, Anna dies of lung cancer. Her account of the rank-and-file perpetrator is strikingly 
elaborate. 
In an interview, Grossman’s daughter, Ekaterina Korotkova, confirmed to me that he based 
Anna’s character on a woman named Pelageia Semenova, who was indeed a perpetrator of the 
famine in east Ukraine.419 Yet as opposed to Anna, Pelageia Semenova lived a long life and resided 
in central Moscow and worked as a maid in the family of the poet Nikolai Zabolotsʼkii, whom 
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Grossman knew well. Semenova was born into a peasant family in Likhoslavsk, Tver oblast’; after 
the famine, she returned to Russia. It is unknown how she reflected upon her participation in the 
Holodomor or how she explained her motivations. Controversy was not uncommon in her life: 
Zabolotsʼkyi, repressed in 1938 and released from the camps after Stalin’s death, actually suspected
that Semenova was reporting on him to the secret services and eventually asked her to leave. She 
then came to the Grossmans.420 
In Grossman’s novel, Anna compares her memories of grain procurement to a piece of 
shrapnel in her heart. At the time of collectivization, Anna was 22 years old; as she puts it, she was 
beautiful but unkind inside. She worked as a cleaner at the district executive committee in Russia 
and heard about the famine from the officials. She believed that starvation was caused not by 
collectivization but by extortionate procurement quotas and the confiscation of all foodstuffs. Later 
she was sent as a bookkeeper to a local collective farm and then transferred to work in the same 
capacity in Ukraine, where collectivization was facing more problems because ʻprivate property 
rules the head of the Khokhol.ʼ421
When describing the village activists in Grossman’s Vse techet, Anna notes that most 
people were honest or ordinary but that their actions led to exactly the same results as the actions of 
those who were cruel to the victims. Most of the activists were local, she explains: they were 
representatives of the RPK and executive committee, Komsomol, the DPU, police and sometimes 
even the military. During dekulakization, the empowered activists perceived themselves as heroes 
and stopped seeing the peasants whom they procured grain from, dekulakized or deported as human
beings. In Grossman’s Vse techet, this dehumanization, which was exacerbated by propaganda, is at
the root of their excessive violence. As Anna notes, she felt that the victims were ‘dirty’, ‘sick’ and 
‘backward’. She failed to see them as people, especially after regular meetings, special instructions 
and media messages about resistant peasants being nothing but ‘vermin’ and ‘parasites’. 
Anna was also included in a troika – as one of three officials with extended rights of 
executive power. She compiled lists for dekulakization. When it is decided whom to dekulakize at 
the village level, the principle for putting the list together is presented as far from ideological. In 
fact, the decision is often made to settle personal scores or to profit. Later Anna comments on her 
colleagues being ordinary people, some sentimental and few truly bad. She memorises all their 
conversations when they let down their guard while drunk. From all collected information, Anna 
concludes that the rank-and-file perpetrators were expected to provide their superiors with 
optimistic numbers, while the quotas from the top, based on those numbers, were disseminated back
420 Ibid.
421 V. Grossman, Forever Flowing (New York: Harper&Row, 1972), p. 149.
down. In her view, Stalin was aware of the famine but chose not to help the starving and carried on 
with the confiscation policy, thus killing Soviet citizens deliberately and hiding the truth from the 
world. What strikes her the most is that perpetrators like her, on all levels of the state machine, 
made this mass killing possible. This killing of men, women and even children convinces Anna that
human life in the Soviet Union is worthless. 
When peasants in Anna’s village start howling from hunger, she feels that she had to eat 
her rations in the field. In the field she hears hungry cries from a neighbouring village. None of her 
colleagues share the rations with the victims. At the time, a plenipotentiary from the city Party 
organization joked: ʻSuch parasites! They even search for acorns under the snow to avoid 
working.’422 Anna sees people driven by hunger to utter despair; these images stay in her memory 
for the rest of her life. When the last person in the village dies, the management of the collective 
farm is transferred to the city. Anna is offered a position of a chairwoman of another collective 
farm, a proposal she refuses. Instead she leaves Ukraine to work as a cook in Russia. 
Grossman’s Anna Mikhaliova consistently compares the man-made famine to the 
mechanism of the Holocaust: it involves a similar dehumanization of the victims, criminal decisions
of the leadership against civilians, and local conformity. She attempts to make sense of the trauma 
by comparison in her confession. Anna gains a vantage point over her experience and looks at it 
from a distance, an approach similar to that employed by the protagonist of Sartre’s short novel The
Wall (1939).423 Witnessing the inevitability of death during the famine, like Pablo anticipating the 
dreaded wall before his execution during the Civil War in Spain, Anna finds that she no longer 
cares about life. Her death is delayed for 20 years, a punishment that comes despite her repentance, 
which involves Anna seeing the victims as human beings once again. She expresses empathy for 
many deported ʻkulaksʼ – women, the old and children who died in the crowded cargo trains even 
before reaching their final destination. 
Another novel set during the famine that offers a nuanced approach in its depiction of 
perpetrators is Sl’ozy Bozhoi Materi (The Tears of Our Lady, 1990) by Ievhen Hutsalo. Like 
Grossman, Hutsalo avoids the dichotomy of reading perpetrators as either ideological fanatics or 
profiteers. All of them are local. Hutsalo confronts the violence in a Ukrainian rural community at 
the time, starting with an episode in which a lynching mob kills a teenager suspected of theft.424 He 
then portrays various perpetrators in one village, none of whom win from the tragedy. The first 
perpetrator, Harkusha, who with his family starves to death, is neither an ideological perpetrator nor
422 Ibid, p. 151.
423 Jean-Paul Sartre, trans. A. Brown, The Wall (London: Hesperus, 2005).
424 A similar incident of lynching before collectivization is described in the memoir by Dmitrii Goichenko, Krasnyi 
apokalipsis: skvoz raskulachivanie i Golodomor (Kyiv: Ababagalamaga, 2013), pp. 20-21.
a sadist. He is simply a neighbour whom the protagonist does not like. The second activist, Vasylʼ 
Hnoiovyi, enjoys the benefits of power and theft but loses his wife. Upon her death on the floor of a
manger, Olʼka asks Vasylʼ and her sister to move in together, adding that ʻthough he is a horrible 
thug, one can live with him.’425 While Harkusha explains his participation in mass violence and 
theft by his will for survival, whereas his colleague Mykola Khashchuvatyi seems to embrace the 
brutality and does not justify his participation. 
Hutsalo then proceeds to a characterisation of officials Matvii Shpytal’nyk, the chairman of
the collective farm, and Kindrat Iaremnyi, the head of the village council. Both are careerists who 
display sadistic traits. In the midst of the famine, they play chess in front of the starving peasants 
working in the field. They use official language to mask the facts, calling the starving peasants 
‘saboteurs’ and their slave labour ‘a holiday’. They question the ability of collective farmers to rise 
above their basic instincts and appreciate the modern music that they play in the fields. In a word, 
Shpytalʼnyk and Iaremnyi do not see the victims as humans. When a collective farmer receives a 
bowl of soup in the field without having worked that day, Shpytal’nyk knocks the bowl out of her 
hands despite knowing that he is sentencing her to death. 
No matter how callous their actions, these perpetrators are not subject to Hutsalo’s 
judgement. In the novel, the line between perpetrators and victims is often blurred. One of the 
activists dies of hunger along with his children, while another is brutalised beyond return to normal 
life. Perhaps to stress the depth of the tragedy rather than a division between perpetrators and 
victims, Hutsalo describes an episode of a beautiful woman in a silk dress stopping in the middle of 
the village where she sees emaciated children. Her face is depicted as the face of Mary in Orthodox 
icons – with narrow black eyebrows and wide eyes full of empathy. She heads to the train station 
from the district centre with a partner Dmytro Dmytrovych, an oblique district official, who tells her
that it is impossible to help all the starving children. As she gives away white bread to the starving 
children, she cries, with her tears ʻpouring’ or ‘shedding’ as in the novel’s title. 
3. The Ukrainian Novel in the Diaspora
Diaspora literature largely offers a different take on the perpetrators – from the position of 
the victim. While writers in diaspora have produced a number of works set during the famine, only 
a few have reached the mass reader in Ukraine since 1991. Today Maria: Khronika odnoho zhyttia 
(Maria: The Chronicle of One Life, 1934) by Ulas Samchuk426 and Plan do dvoru (Annihilation, 
425 Ievhen Hutsalo, Sliozy Bozhoi Materi, Ie. Hutsalo, Take strashne, take solodke zhyttia (Kyiv: Tempora, 2014), p. 
281.
426 Samchuk was long an advocate for the cause of independence in his publications in OUN periodicals, although he 
was not a member of that organization. See Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism: Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 
1929-1956 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015).
1951) by Todos’ Os’machka and Zovtyi Kniazʼ (The Yellow Prince, 1962) by Vasylʼ Barka are 
recommended for reading in school curricula; they now contribute to the work of cultural memory 
among younger generations of Ukrainians educated after 1991. Moreover, one of few fiction films 
related to the Holodomor, Holod-33 (1991), is based on Zhovtyi Kniazʼ. The depiction of the 
perpetrators in these novels is predominantly as the ethnically different Other, which is in line with 
a Ukrainian nationalist ideology focussed on Russian aggression in Ukraine.427 
Maria: Khronika odnoho zhyttia is the story of a Ukrainian peasant woman that starts with 
her birth and ends with her death in 1933. The events of the famine are depicted through the eyes of
characters closely related to Maria. Their stories point to the destructive interference of the outside 
world with the Ukrainian peasantry. Shkandrij argues that the militarism and imperial power in such
novels ʻtransform a civilized peasant into an uncouth military man’428 who verbally and physically 
abuses his family and speaks Russian. In order to escape this influence, one has to till his land and 
enjoy ʻthe fullness of existence.’ The author Samchuk applauds Maria’s second husband Kornii for 
becoming a farmer again: ʻGod himself is following you in the fields with a wind, in the sky, with 
the sun! God himself!ʼ429 In Samchuk’s interpretation, the Ukrainian village before the 1930s is ʻa 
golden country’ and ʻa country of labour and bread’ that the sun loves, warms and protects. That 
idyll is destroyed by locals who, according to Onats’kyi in his foreword to Maria’s edition in 1952, 
ʻdrown in the waves of evil and corruption of Moscow flooding.ʼ430 
In such a way, Samchuk gradually constructs an image of the perpetrator as the Other who 
exploits the Ukrainian population. Most of the Holodomor perpetrators in Maria are repeatedly cast 
as the Other. The attack on the peasantry by Komsomol activists, for instance, is likened to a Tatar 
invasion; as one of the tortured characters exclaims, ʻOur country has not known such a Tatar-like 
plundering.’431 The field guards are not collective farmers but ʻthe soldiers of great and bright future
that came here from the distant north’ or ʻthe creatures with high cheekbones.432
Yet the very life of the protagonist Maria defies the existence of such an idyllic village 
prior to collectivization and the famine. Orphaned at the age of six and neglected by her relatives, 
Maria starts working at the age of twelve. She is illiterate; despite her hard work, she remains in the 
lowest social stratum. Her first three children die of infectious diseases that regularly ravage the 
427 See Natalka Doliak, Chorna Doshka (Kharkiv: Klub Simeinoho Dozvillia, 2014); Svitlana Talan, Rozkolote Nebo 
(Kharkiv: Klub Simeinoho Dozvillia, 2015); Halyna Marchuk, Try Doli (Kyiv: Priorytet, 2012); Serhii Loboda, 
Vidlunnia (Lviv; Kal’varia, 2010).
428 Myroslav Shkandrij, Ukrainian Nationalism: Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 1929-1956 (London: Yale 
University Press, 2015), p. 232.
429 Ulas Samchuk, Maria. Khronika odnogo zhittia (Kyiv: Smoloskyp, 2014), p. 123.
430 Ibid, p. 12.
431 Ibid, p. 177.
432 Ibid, p. 187.
countryside. Thus, the village was a place of ʻlabour and bread’ as well as a place of violence and 
premature and infantile death. Likewise, in Samchuk’s novel, it is possible to find behaviour 
befitting a potential perpetrator among the locals prior to their exposure to the outside world or 
Communist ideology – i.e. the Other. As a child, Maria’s own son Maksym steals, despises hard 
work, and tortures animals. His parents explain his character as being ʻborn that way’ and call him a
ʻbastard’ and ʻbuffoon’ in public, convinced he will become nothing but a poor farmer. Therefore 
the village is neither void of violence nor of violent types who, under the influence of the Other, 
become the perpetrators of collectivization and the famine.
Maria’s son Maksym turns out to be the key village perpetrator. He represents the 
perpetrator-profiteer type. While Maria’s first husband Hnat explains Maksym’s participation by 
being possessed by the devil – he has a dream in which the devil oversees Maksym mutilating his 
mother – other farmers ridicule Maksym for trying to get rich without hard work. Maksym 
denounces his brother, disowns and evicts his parents, and sees his sister and infant niece starve to 
death. While Shkandrij regards him as one of many young fanatics who strip churches and ʻmake a 
mess’ out of farming, Maksym also supports Soviet policies for his own benefit. Indeed, he 
advocates for collective farming as well as for sexual emancipation and secularization, but at the 
same time he despises hard work, hires a maid and wants his children to leave the village to seek 
careers in the city. In the end Maksym is brutally murdered by his father – a premonition Maria had 
that ʻGod will punish [him] not with a bat.ʼ433 In short, Maksym combines many features of the 
Holodomor perpetrator: he is a Russian-speaking quisling, Communist, profiteer, sadist, and atheist 
punished by God. What is important here is that this character, however grotesque, places agency 
for the Holodomor back in the village. Local perpetrators are not simply ʻunconscious’ accomplices
who with ʻdemagogical slogans push the village to its moral and physical ruin.ʼ434
There are other perpetrators, and millions of them, according to Samchuk: Komsomol 
members who are ʻstrange, very strange young peopleʼ435 but also ʻmonsters,ʼ ʻhyenasʼ and 
ʻchildren with sold soulsʼ436 who search houses, destroy everything in sight, and torture the victims. 
Samchuk also points to the role of the modern state as the prime mover of the mechanism of the 
Holodomor on the ground: the policies initiated in the Central Committee are leveraged down 
through various officials and the media with its countless poets, epics and academics and enforced 
by the Party, the army and the security service. He looks at various links between the sil’kory who 
provided intelligence and the security services and between propaganda brigades and ʻclever-eyedʼ 
433 Ibid, p. 140.
434 Ibid, p. 15.
435 Ibid, p. 167.
436 Ibid, p. 176.
shock-workers and their brigade leaders. 
Plan do Dvoru (Annihilation, 1951) by Teodosii Os’machka, which was included in school 
curriculum on Ukrainian literature in 2002,437 is an episode in the life of a collectivized village in 
central Ukraine during the early 1930s. Os’machka was encouraged to write a novel on the man-
made famine by Volodymyr Vynnychenko,438 one of the leaders of Ukrainian national movement 
following the dissolution of the Russian Empire. In Osʼmachka’s novel, the perpetrators are the 
ethnically alien Other and diametrically opposed to the victims: ʻarmed, they [killed] the unarmed; 
full with food, they killed the starved and cold; smartly dressed, they killed the ragged and patched 
… [They] killed without warning or asking questions as they would kill prey.ʼ439 
This opposition between perpetrator and victim is stressed throughout Plan do Dvoru: the 
antagonists – the conforming chairman of the collective farm Khakhlov and the corrupt chekist 
Tiurin – are Russians, and the local Komsomol, while dressed like ordinary Ukrainian young men 
in embroidered shirts, carry Moscow rifles. Like other victims in the novel, the protagonist 
Neradʼko longs for an independent Ukraine and remarks that the Communists from Russia are 
enslaving it. While the actual grain requisition is mentioned only in passing, most of the groups 
instrumental in enforcing the famine are present: the DPU and police as trained perpetrators, village
officials and brigade leaders at the collective farm, village Komsomol and the informants among the
locals. Additionally, Osʼmachka mentions the role of education officials in persecuting the victims: 
when Neradʼko refuses to cooperate as a teacher, he is reported by a school inspector who, 
according to the protagonist, is no longer Ukrainian and is ʻbought by Moscow.ʼ 
Ethnic Ukrainians among the trained perpetrators are habituated to violence by the Other: 
‘[They] got used to arresting their fellow countrymen for nothing, and they take them to the prison 
in Balakleia day and night before dispatching them to Siberia, Kolyma, Solovky and some to the 
other world... The policeman shook his humanity off as if it was some awkward prostration.ʼ440 The 
local Komsomols vandalise the church, detain the arrested and even serve as prison guards and 
assist the murders. All of them, according to the narrator, are merely food for the Soviet state, 
which he compares to a pig: sooner or later everyone is either eaten or chewed up. In such a way 
Os’machka removes agency from local perpetrators who do not fit the trope of the ethnically alien 
Other.
The key perpetrator on the ground, Iermilo Tiurin, heads both the district police and the 
DPU. He epitomises all the qualities of the savage, ethnically alien Other: he is a sadist, profiteer, 
437 Snizhana Cherniuk, ‘Obrazna symvolika u tvorakh Todosia Osʼmachkyʼ (PhD diss., Natsional’na Akademia Nauk 
Ukraiiny, Instytut Literatury, 2002).
438 Todosʼ Osʼmachka, Plan do dvoru (Toronto: Vydavnytsvo Ukraiinsʼkoho Kanadiisʼkoho Legionu, 1951), p. 7.
439 Ibid, p. 171.
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careerist, rapist and murderer from Moscow. Tiurin stresses that in order to control countries like 
Ukraine one needs to use terror. He is feared even by his fellow Red Army veteran Khakhlov. 
Though Ieshkaʼs surname is a derogatory term for a Ukrainian, he is a Russian worker from 
Moscow who has met Lenin. While he approves ʻall means to speed up the triumph of the working 
class,ʼ he is tired of torture and murder. After the suicide of one brigade leader, Ieshka is distraught 
and leaves for the district to report Tiurin but returns to consult with his domineering wife. Indeed, 
Khakhlovʼs wife Masha is involved in all her husband’s decisions; however, her character might 
have been included for a different purpose. Osʼmachka was known for misogynist comments,441 so 
it is conceivable that with Masha’s domination Osʼmachka demonstrates Khakhlovʼs impotence to 
confront Tiurin. 
On the other hand, these antagonists would be helpless without locals who in the novel are 
the brigade leaders at the collective farm: Buntush, Tymish Klunok, Kopytʼko and Skakun. In fact, 
Buntush also works as the secretary of the village council and knows of all planned repressions by 
Tiurin or Khakhlov, whom he also assists. Although these local perpetrators seem ʻlike wordless 
treesʼ to the victim Shyian during the eviction of his family, he nevertheless appeals to compassion 
by calling them ʻbrothers, comrades and parents.ʼ442 In this poignant scene Shyian reminds them 
that he is a good person and helped each brigade leader in one way or the other. In his plea, he is 
joined by his wife and daughter. The sight of the desperate family makes Kopytʼko move the hat 
over the eyes of Klunok, who presumably might show sympathy towards the victims: ʻMaybe it is 
better not to look at it.ʼ443 In private conversations, however, these men express their disapproval of 
Soviet rule and the Russians policing Ukraine. Although they conform, not all of them survive: 
Klunok, for example, becomes increasingly paranoid and commits suicide. Such justice also 
extends to Tiurin, who is murdered, and to Komsomol Dulia, who is blinded while vandalising a 
church. 
During this eviction Tiurin brutally murders Shyian, but it is only Skakun who confronts 
the DPU officer. In fact, the other three brigade leaders hold Skakun back, with Buntush calling 
Skakun: ʻYou whore hydra of counter-revolution.ʼ444 Skakun was known for his short temper in the 
village and once tried to take his own life. When he is ordered to assist the eviction, Skakun takes a 
carving knife with presumable intention to kill Tiurin. On the way to the farmstead he is dissuaded 
by the girl he loves, and she takes his knife away. In his actions Skakunʼs character is reminiscent 
of Dostoevskyʼs Shatov in Besy (The Possessed, 1870-71). Disturbed by the changes from the 
441 Mykhailo Slaboshpytsʼkyi, ʻPysʼmennyk bezderzhavnoii natsii ne mih staty Nobelivsʼkym laureatom...ʼ 
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outside, they fail to make sense of the new order or to conform and attempt to establish justice. If 
Shatovʼs name resembles a bear roused in the middle of winter – shatun – that is either shot by the 
villagers or dies from starvation, Skakun’s names connotes a horse that is not easy to tame. It seems
there is no place for either of them. Like Shatov, he is killed (by Tiurin) without hesitation. 
In the novel Zhovtyi Kniaz (The Yellow Prince, 1962), Vasylʼ Barka narrates the story of 
the Katrannyk family, who endure the famine. In the foreword the author names the perpetrators 
responsible for the suffering and death: the army, the security services, the police, and workers from
Russia. Those who executed the orders on the ground had nothing humane left in them, implies 
Barka. They were ʻdevilish cast awaysʼ who shoot children ʻpilferingʼ in the fields and take away 
the last porridge from a baby. The appearance of the perpetrators is often compared by the victims 
to such sinister beasts as demons, dragons and snakes. They are also compared to the soldiers even 
when they come to desacralise the local church. Barka states that Komsomol members felt uneasy 
before looting the church as they faced the crowd of local people they knew well. The young men 
tried to avoid direct eye contact and replied to the questions with impatience. 
In the novel itself, however, Barka offers the reader a more nuanced presentation. While 
reiterating the interpretation of the famine as the struggle between evil and good, Myron believes it 
was enabled by collectivization, when some locals joined the collectives, conformed and followed 
the new rules, receiving powers and guns. Likewise, the antagonist Party plenipotentiary 
Otrokhodin is first and foremost a careerist. He walks away from the woman he loves when she 
faces repressions so that the relationship would not tarnish his membership in the Party. Otrokhodin
despises the peasantry but regards deployment in the country as a step to advance his career. He 
already dreams of the benefits of living in the capital: medals, holidays, money. Otrokhodin 
believes the Party line can change and prefers to stay loyal to the Party leader rather than to the 
ideology. 
Barka also includes a perpetrator-fanatic in the action of the novel. When the Katrannyks 
queue for bread in the city, they hear a story of a village perpetrator who died for no apparent 
reason. Coming from a wealthy farmer family, he was convinced collectivization was needed to 
transform the peasantry and agriculture. His sudden death, presumably from a heart attack, is 
interpreted as a poetic justice by Katrannyk. His wife, who had previously supported his 
Communist beliefs and regarded the starving as guilty, now repents and turns to God. 
A glimpse of the perpetrators whose motivation was primarily to follow an order is given in
the detailed depiction of a house search. During the search, one of the victims, an old woman, 
approaches a fellow peasant guarding the finds in the cart. She pleads with him to leave food for the
children. At first the man ignores the old woman, recalling to himself the orders of Otrokhodin to 
take even crumbs. He also remembers the orders coming from the very top, rendering the old 
woman’s pleas irrelevant. When the woman tries to take food from the cart, he immediately knocks 
her down. Moreover, when collective farm workers try to chew a few grains while working in the 
field, the guards, who come from the same village, lash out and threaten them with arrests. They 
search the clothes of farmers for grain, even those who are Communists. Myron Katrannyk thinks 
that the fellow villagers who voted in favour of the collective farm are no better than the officials 
procuring grain. These followers are impersonalised by Lukʼian who always raises his arm, 
preferring to follow orders rather than defy them. But most victims in the novel name only one type 
of perpetrators – ʻthe possessed ones from the capital cityʼ – when explaining who was involved in 
the house searches.
Barka develops the character of the perpetrator-conformist further in portraying bureaucrats
in the city facing starving peasants on the street. The bureaucrats carry on with their daily routines, 
enjoy their generous rations and make ʻspeeches on building happiness.ʼ445 The narrator is 
dismayed: ‘... not a single being has ever bathed in lies, like the Red Party. … Whoever dared to 
disagree or appeal to conscience is savaged at once.ʼ446 When a group of civil servants see Myron 
overhearing them discussing food, they swiftly finish their conversation as he is not one of ʻthemʼ. 
They express a disgust at the starving. Indignant at the sights of bread queues in the city, they blame
the peasantry for the famine. Eventually, the bureaucrats become immune to the suffering and 
death. Myron observes newspaper employees ignoring a corpse of a dead woman in a puddle of 
mud when they come out to smoke outside their office. The corpse has been lying there for many 
days.
Finally, Barka also alludes to characters who do not follow orders and try to help the 
victims. A Party official, Zinchenko, allows peasants to mow hay in the park; he is swiftly replaced 
by a more vigilant Communist. Likewise, the head of the local collective farm advises artisans to 
flee the village and fears a tragic end for himself. Like Dimarov, Barka mentions a secretary of the 
RPK who commits suicide after the orders from Moscow, thus vesting agency back in the Kremlin. 
Myron and a village accountant happen to be nearby at the time and read the note of the deceased, 
who viewed the orders as the death sentence for the village and refused to execute them. Together 
with the accountant, Myron concludes that at least this person was honest ʻin their own wayʼ. While
he presents various types of perpetrators and their motives, Barka repeatedly underscores 
throughout the novel that Moscow is the site of a concentration of evil that ʻtakes blood,ʼ447 with 
most perpetrators portrayed in yellow and grey as servants of the Yellow Prince.
445 Vasylʼ Barka, Zhovtyi Kniazʼ (Kyiv: Naukova Dumka, 2008), p. 162.
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4. Post-Soviet Ukrainian Prose
The number of novels based on the Holodomor in Ukraine has been steadily increasing 
since 1991. Three novels in particular have received, or were nominated for, prestigious awards in 
Ukraine: Chorna Doshka (The Black Board, 2014) by Natalka Doliak; Rozkolote Nebo (The Broken
Sky, 2015) by Svitlana Talan448; and Tema dlia Medytatsii (The Theme for Meditation, 2004) by 
Leonid Kononovych.449 Other recent works present readings of the Holodomor perpetrators in line 
with these three prominent works.450
Chorna Doshka is a story of a perpetrator-turned-victim Olesʼ Ternovyi in a village of 
Veselivka. His diary is re-discovered by his great-grandson Sashko whose name stresses trans-
generational connection between the famine and today (both names derive from Oleksandr). Sashko
also has nightmares about the starving peasants who his great-grandfather had seen in real life. In 
the end of the novel it is revealed that Sashko is also the offspring of another perpetrator in 
Veselivka. The name of the novel highlights the experience of the village on so called ʻblack 
board,ʼ when a number of repressive measures were applied until fulfilment of grain procurement 
quota. These measures included withdrawal of all vital supplies like matches, salt and gas as well as
its inhabitants being prevented from leaving the village. At the end of 1933 Veselivka ceased to 
exist.
Doliak starts with ideological perpetrators: a reporter from the district newspaper Olesʼ and 
a head of the local village council Palamarchuk. They both become disillusioned with the state 
policies, though at first they justify the violence of collectivization. Olesʼ listens to the instructors 
from Russia, thinks in Russian, yet persuades his parents to join the collective farm for rather banal 
reasons: ʻyou have to do what you are asked to do...The times are such …ʼ451 Doliak briefly 
mentions that Olesʼ and Palamarchuk are members of the search brigades and dekulakized the 
peasants, Olesʼ also keeps the belongings he confiscates on behalf of the state. Deployment to 
procure grain in his own village becomes a turning point. He stays with his parents, loses his ration 
as a reporter, confronts local officials and eventually finds himself in a mass grave. In the same 
time, Palamarchuk writes a letter to the top authorities about the policies leading to the famine for 
which he is arrested and shot dead. While the narrator refers to them as the initial true believers, 
they also display the qualities of conformists and profiteers.
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The second type of perpetrator – the sadists and criminals – is represented by the chekist 
Kaliuzhnyi. He hates peasants, tortures them and rapes a reporter. In his activities he is joined by 
two DPU servicemen: Mark Milʼman and his Russian colleague Vesna. They are assisted by many 
locals: a chairman of the collective farm Hilʼ ko, a head of the local KNS Zabolotnyi and a Russian 
Party plenipotentiary Vladimir. Doliak also mentions a power thirsty sociopath and drunkard 
Hrishka. She stresses Russian ethnicity of some perpetrators, poor command of Ukrainian language,
previous criminal past and alcohol addiction. In fact, it is only Kaliuzhnyi who speaks Ukrainian 
fluently. Thus the language becomes a marker for perpetrator. Most of them wear black leather 
jackets and thus are referred to as chornoshkuri (black-skins) by the victims. Shkandrij regards 
perpetrators wearing black leather jackets as an additional tool to make the violence 
ʻpsychologically palatable to perpetrators and observers alike.ʼ452 
The figure of the ethnically alien Other is further elaborated with the character of Mark 
Milʼman that had worked in other districts in Kharkiv oblast’ before coming to Veselivka. While in 
the Soviet prose on collectivization Jews are at the background and a similar character could be 
found only in Chotyry Brody (Stupach with his ʻByzantine eyes,ʼ beautiful looks and unflinching 
ways), post-Soviet prose is abundant with Jews as chief perpetrators on the ground. Doliakʼs Mark 
Milʼman is also ʻa man with Asian cheek bonesʼ453 that murders children in front of their parents as 
a torture and enjoys the benefits his position offers. Milʼman is extremely sadistic: on one occasion 
he accuses one peasant of anti-semitism for which that person is later tortured to death; on another 
occasion he throws two women into an enclosure with a bull for entertainment.
This reading of the Chekist is not new. In 1923 Vynnychenko described a typical Chekist as
a Jew coming from a traditional milieu of a small town. Jewish petty bourgeoisie and intelligentsia 
joined the Party ranks or the army in their struggle to survive during the post-revolutionary period. 
He traced the fury of the unflinching Jewish Chekist to his experience of desperate unemployment 
and pogroms when his family was likely to be brutally murdered and their property stolen. Thus the 
Chekist took part in grain requisition of the early 1920s which contributed to establishing the link 
between Jews and Communists in popular perception in the village.454 While the presence of Jews 
within the Party and the Cheka and its successors was indeed large in the 1920s,455 making their 
participation disproportionate to their part in the general population, the number of Ukrainians in 
Soviet administration began to increase consistently from late 1920s.456 Making up about a third of 
the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine and their involvement in less than popular 
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enforcement policies might explain the impression that Jews were behind collectivisation and the 
famine that followed. Shkandrij also traces identification of the Bolshevik literary figure with the 
Jewish commissar to redeployment of the rhetoric of militant Bolshevism in the late 1920s, when 
these popular perceptions of Jewish-Bolshevism connection were reinforced.457 
Additionally, there is a group of compromised perpetrators – the local youth: Oktiabryn, 
Lavryn, Sirozhunia and Maladyk girls who disown their parents; pioneers from a local school who 
take part in public harassment of individual farmers. As a vulnerable perpetrator Oktiabryn has an 
emotional breakdown after attacking a former friend. The victims express ambiguity in judging 
their participation: ʻ… scooped children up and stuffed their brains with tales […] When you take 
each of them separately, there is nothing wrong with them, boys like boys.ʼ458 The rest of the 
perpetrators are mentioned briefly or collectively like ʻgroups of chanting pioneersʼ that verbally 
abused dekulakized peasants. While the narrator explains that from 1932 expropriations were done 
by people sent to the village from all parts of the USSR, the victims in the novel comment on them 
being local: ʻPeople are ours [local], yet something changed them in such a way.ʼ459 None of the 
perpetrators benefit from their participation. Moreover, all of them, except Olesʼ, are punished: 
become insane, repressed by higher authorities, commit suicide or killed like Kaliuzhnyi. 
Lastly, Doliak mentions another group of perpetrators, albeit obliquely. This group includes
perpetrators who do not display pleasure in participation, nor receive substantial benefit. They 
follow orders. This group includes a local teacher, Anna Serhiivna, who humiliates children of 
individual farmers at school and a local doctor, Lanovsʼkyi, that does not state starvation in the 
death certificates. They are joined by a local perpetrator, Kyrylo Perekotypole, who at some point 
questions local perpetratorsʼ own safety in the forthcoming events. The surname of Perekotypole 
translates as ʻtumbleweedʼ which could be interpreted as his lack of commitment to the village. 
According to other characters, Kyrylo travelled the country searching easy fortune and returned 
home with nothing. He is not directly involved in violence during the searches, but still contributes 
to the famine by assisting the logistics of the famine.
Another novel in the post-Soviet prose on the Holodomor is Rozkolote Nebo by Svitlana 
Talan, which follows a young woman, Varvara, and her family through collectivization and the 
famine. Rozkolote Nebo is a chronicle of industrious farmers losing their fortunes and lives. Talan 
draws a striking distinction between antagonists and protagonists, which makes a panoply of 
perpetrators similar to the one in Chorna Doshka. The first type of the perpetrator is that of a 
repentant ideological perpetrator – Kuzʼma Shcherbak. He is the head of the local Party cell. 
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Having worked in the city, he is sent to his native village of Pidkopaivka as a plenipotentiary to set 
up a collective farm and help grain procurement. Though Kuzʼma is a staunch Communist, he 
believes in voluntary, non-violent collectivization and questions the orders from above. During 
dekulakization of Varvaraʼs father he calmly explains that resistance leads to further repressions. 
Kuzʼma shows pain at seeing peasants suffering and dying; he condemns abuse of power by some 
officials. Unable to change anything, he distributes food to the peasants which leads to his arrest 
and death.
The officials working alongside Kuzʼma are two former poor peasants: a Red Army veteran
and collective farm chairman, Semen Stupak, and the head of the village council, Maksym 
Zhabʼiak. At first the author characterises them as honest and respectable people based on their 
reputation in the village. Soon their motives for holding key positions become questionable when 
they accept a bribe from Varvaraʼs father and profit from dekulakizing their neighbours. For 
example, Stupak takes a cow from his neighbour Odarka, a widow with six young children whose 
foodstuffs have been confiscated already. Only one child in that family survived. Though Stupak 
and Zhabʼiak seem to be profiteers, they gain little, Stupak is murdered whereas the new chairman 
of the collective farm secures food for the farm canteen in order to organise a sowing campaign in 
early 1933. 
The main perpetrators – the DPU servicemen Ivan Lupikov and Hryhorii Bykov – represent
several groups: conformists, sadists, profiteers and the savage, the savage, ethnically alien Other. 
Lupikov believes the ends justify the means and quotes Stalin: ʻYou cannot make an omelette 
without breaking the eggs.ʼ460 Though he is often confused by information disseminated from the 
top, he never fails to follow orders. In November 1932 Ivan is joined by Bykov. A self-described 
fanatic, he explains that only tough young people should take part in house searches as organises 
local Komsomol into search brigades. He also uses metal rods to reveal the grain hidden 
underground and leverages the orders to confiscate all food. He tortures peasants and is abusive to 
the activists. Bykov is a link between the district and the village level in the vertical chain of 
perpetration. He uses extreme violence and benefits personally. Together with Lupikov he 
represents the Other.
Seemingly there are no ordinary people among the local perpetrators. They are the idle, 
drunks and local criminals most of whom are known for their deviant behaviour prior to 
collectivization. One of the search brigade members is Hanna, who used to work for Varvaraʼs 
family. Now a Komsomol, she resents her previous social inferiority and seeks retribution. Hanna 
wears a red scarf and a black leather jacket given to her by Bykov. Her attire is the literary vogue 
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for violence and in defiance of gender expectations of the conservative village society. Hanna 
becomes promiscuous and sexually abusive and even urinates in front of the victims into the food 
that she cannot confiscate. Once all supplies in the village are exhausted, Bykov takes her jacket 
back as he leaves the village while Hanna dies from malnutrition.
A special role among the village perpetrators, however, is reserved for a quisling son. In the
same way as Maksym in Maria, Varvaraʼs brother Mykhailo disowns and evicts his parents. During
the eviction his mother commits suicide. Like in Maria, his parents question themselves why their 
son rebels against traditions and does not want to till the land. Mykhailo benefits from participation 
and hopes his children will move to the city. Like Maksym, Mykhailo is murdered. Clearly a 
profiteering type of local perpetrator, this character is nevertheless described as alien to the village 
community and its rules and, therefore, is removed from the village. Nevertheless Mykhailo is just 
one of the locals that confiscates food and reports their neighbours. 
Finally, Talan uses poetic justice for all perpetrators in the novel. Firstly, the travelling 
musician Danylo claims that those ʻwithout Godʼ will be punished. A similar prophecy was 
expressed by the local priest shortly before the church is closed down. Some of the antagonists are 
murdered while others die from illness. Like Doliak, Talan describes the famine in its entirety: 
dekulakization and deportation of individual peasants, closure of a local church, violent requisition 
of grain and foodstuffs, various survival strategies, mental breakdown, rape, child abandonment, 
necrophagy, cannibalism, suicide and murder. In order to produce a novel that encompasses almost 
all aspects of the famine the post-memory authors need to consult primary sources, secondary 
works and archival documents. As a result, both Doliak and Talan created examples of cultural 
memory par excellence but avoided mentioning the largest group of perpetrators – ordinary people. 
The novel Tema dlia medytatsii by Leonid Kononovych offers a new take on the 
Holodomor perpetrator – their life after the famine.461 As the survivors and the perpetrators continue
to live in the same village, Kononovych suggests, the past events shape their lives. In particular, the 
murder of Iurʼs grandfather during the Holodomor has long-term implications for his family. 
Orphaned at a young age and raised by his widowed grandmother Chakunka, Iur constantly reminds
the local officials of the murder they committed. At university he gets involved with the dissidents, 
is interrogated by the KGB, loses his love and lives in exile. Upon returning from the Serb-Croat 
war he is convinced that his familyʼs incompatibility with the local establishment lies in the past. 
He tracks the surviving and now dying activists only to realise that the problem primarily is the 
regime rather than with the individual perpetrators. 
The novel is written in a form of meditation by the protagonist during which he tries to 
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make sense of his life. The absence of chronological sequence and the narrator’s moving from one 
episode to another without any warning reveals a trauma in post-memory of the Holodomor. 
Morever, gaps in the sentences are the main pointers in such narratives of traumatic past.462 This 
new format of the Holodomor novel also resembles that of the French existentialists, which 
Kononovych has been translating into Ukrainian. In particular, like the protagonist in Sartreʼs story,
The Wall, set amidst Spanish Civil War, Iur deals with traumatic experience from temporal and 
spacial distance. In both cases the main characters rise above the fear of violence and local 
perpetrators, and the feeling of loss but are unable to resume their previous lives. Before reaching 
that stage, however, Iur tries to trace the perpetrators – an exercise that becomes a jigsaw puzzle in 
the 1990s: Iur remembers his family mentioning various names as the victims always spoke of 
them, albeit in passing. Iur learns about them as a child from Chakunka who constructs his post-
memory. She calls them Bolsheviks and ʻbad people.ʼ In the 1960s, when Iur randomly asks her 
who are the ʻmost importantʼ people while thinking about the lyrics from a famous song, Chakunka 
names the activists and calls them ʻnot good peopleʼ and ʻparasitesʼ who destroyed their family.
First, there are profiteers. It is a local family of Stoians that played a central role in the 
village during the famine and in Iurʼs life. The eldest Stoian was a friend of Iurʼs grandfather; 
together they joined Petliuraʼs forces during the Civil War. Consequently Stoian switched sides, 
took part in collectivization and facilitated the murder of Iur senior. His son became the head of the 
village council and his grandson reported on the dissidents (and Iur) to the KGB in the 1970s. 
Stoian the grandson argues that the Soviet rule is, in effect, ordinary peoples rule and he urges Iur to
conform. The Stoians kept key positions locally long after the Holodomor and the collapse of the 
USSR.
Secondly, there is a large group of sadists. In the novel these activists are four attractive 
women – Dziakunka, Bovkunykha, Chykyldykha and Stepa Ivashchenko. They enjoy conducting 
house searches, humiliating their victims as well as torturing and murdering them. For instance, 
Stepa burned heels, gauged the eyes out and stabbed the peasants who did not meet the grain 
quotas. While trying to understand their motives, Iur recalls that Dziakunka is mentally unstable, 
Bovkunykha was promiscuous and Stepaʼs sexual frustration developed into psychosis. Based on 
his observations, Iur concludes that between 30% to 40% of the activists were mentally ill, even 
before the famine and their aberrant behaviour became the new norm. Iur also posits that young, 
beautiful women were the cruelest of all because they ʻrefused to fulfil traditional female roles of 
housekeeping and childbirth and became the activists instead.ʼ463 Having compared the female 
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activists of the 1930s with female Komsomol members of the 1970s, Iur adds that it was their 
sexual frustration that eventually made them participate and resulted in their mental breakdown. 
This explanation of female perpetrators is not new. Violent women are often portrayed in 
the media and literature as abnormal, insane maniacs that are often more cruel than their male 
counterparts. Sjoberg and Gentry argue that the portrayal of female perpetrators in the media and 
literature is reduced to ʻmothers, monsters or whores.ʼ464 They either deny their womanhood or 
abuse their sexuality. As the traditional rural community celebrated nurturing, virtuous and 
restrained women, female participation in mass violence during the Holodomor did not fit in that 
worldview. While ordinary women too can commit horrendous crimes and physically or sexually 
abuse and kill for the same reasons as men,465 Iur sees them as mentally or sexually disturbed 
women.
Finally, Iur reveals the largest group of perpetrators – seemingly ordinary people. One of 
them, Bahrii, was a former plenipotentiary who was in charge of the search brigades and after the 
famine became the head master in the village school. He has an ordinary house, suffers from age-
related illnesses and sees no sense in establishing higher moral ground for either side. Bahrii 
explains his participation by the circumstances. While we know that he killed at least three people 
on his own initiative in 1933, he interprets the past as a necessary evil. In fact, his narrative is 
similar to Iurʼs: only the perpetrators are the victims. That is, he recalls Iur's grandfather killing 
many Communists who had large families. He stresses that Iur grandfather was not popular in the 
village and over 40 people were involved in rounding him up. Thus he implies a large number of 
locals among perpetrators. Bahrii quotes other people in the village accusing Iur of causing trouble 
by looking into the past. Iur understands that with perpetrators entrenched in the state machine and 
with a silent acceptance of the masses, his country still remains the hostage of its gruesome past.
To compensate for the absence of justice, the author turns to poetic justice as well as the 
cases of brutal revenge done to the local perpetrators after the famine. While Stoian senior dies of 
alcoholism, all but one female perpetrator become mentally ill. Bovkunykha is torn apart by the 
Soviet partisans when she was fleeing with the retreating Germans during the The Second World 
War. One of the partisans was Pavlo, who she threw out in the snow with his three siblings in 1933. 
As all his brothers died from hypothermia, Pavlo thanked God for the chance to exact revenge. 
Poetic justice extends to the children of the perpetrators too – Dziakunkaʼs son became a thief and 
died from drug addiction while Stoianʼs grandson dies in a car crash. Other perpetrators are killed 
or commit suicide like Hordii who buried many starving peasants alive. The author also places the 
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guilt of perpetrators escaping the justice with the survivors. Eventually Iur argues the village 
perpetrators do have agency as they were all born in the same small thatched village huts as the 
victims.
Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that most Ukrainian novels operate with a narrow 
understanding of perpetrators of the Holodomor on the ground, characterising agency as either 
embraced (as fanatics) or displaced (as foreign Others). The militant Bolshevik writing of 1928-
1933 focuses on a war in the countryside that demands action and a suspension of compassion and 
critical thinking. In accordance with the official position on collectivization, the rank-and-file 
perpetrators are fanatics, eager to transform the countryside at all costs. War is the dominant 
metaphor; the village is backward; traditionalist ways need to be upturned like the soil in the 
boundaries between the fields of individual farmers. They are the village Komsomol, KNS 
members, emancipated village women and Party plenipotentiaries who sometimes come from 
outside Ukraine but mostly come from within the republic. As we have seen, many characters are 
based on the actual perpetrators.
At the same time, writers in Ukrainian diaspora and in independent Ukraine stress the 
Otherness of the perpetrators. They tend to be Russians or Jews. Even if the perpetrators of the 
Holodomor are locals, they do not truly belong to the village. They are quisling sons, profiteers or 
people known for their deviant behaviour who later face poetic justice. While source of oral 
memory describe brigades being drawn mainly from local residents – as we have seen in previous 
chapters, and especially in the two case studies – in these novels, they speak Russian, have Asian 
facial features or come from the city. 
Samvydav and tamvydav novels, however, offer a more nuanced picture of the men and 
women on the ground. Grossman, Dimarov and Hutsalo avoid totalising narratives. All three writers
explore various groups of perpetrators within a wider context, examining their motivation and 
actions and considering the ways that they make sense of their experience. The number of Russian-
speaking characters in their novels reflect the number of Russian-speaking Communists among 
district officials at the time. By and large the rank-and-file perpetrators of the Holodomor in the 
novels of Dimarov, Hutsalo and Grossman are ordinary people in extraordinary circumstances. In 
post-Soviet prose, meanwhile, Ukrainian writers continue to grapple with the sensitive issue of local
perpetration, offering a prosopographical reading of the perpetrators as the savage Other or village 
outcasts while mentioning other groups of perpetrators obliquely. 
Chapter IV
Representation of the Rank-and-File Perpetrators of the Holodomor in Poetry
As the Holodomor unfolded, folk verse, proverbs, sayings and epic songs captured its 
tragedy in real time. More often than not, they were unpublished and confined to sources of oral 
memory and archival texts. They chiefly focus on the suffering of the victims and blame Lenin and 
Stalin for the famine, or at times Kaganovich, Molotov or Postyshev. Some focus on local officials 
and collective farmers who participated in the famine: e.g. ʻThereʼs no bread, thereʼs no fat, ʼCause 
the local authorities took it allʼ466 or ʻLentils, peas, potatoes, beets – all was taken by tugboat – let 
the peasants perishʼ467 or ʻThe brigade leader carries a whip – Drives people to Siberiaʼ.468 Others 
allude to local perpetrators, however, stressing that their vigilance leads to devastation and death. A 
few reflect upon the vertical order of perpetration: e.g. ʻBeware woman, the tugboat is coming, led 
by the plenipotentiaryʼ or ʻThe plenipotentiary jokes well: with his gun and his fines, youʼll give 
him the last grain.ʼ469
Poems cast ʻconfiscatorsʼ as desirable bachelors given that they have ʻlots of bread, and 
butter and cheeseʼ:470
Don’t despair Hapko,
That we are Communists, 
Muzhyks will work,
And we will eat!
…
Stalin take a glance
At how KNS dance.
They are not at all productive,
So they signed up for the collective.
...
During harvest our street 
Is so quiet and neat
That you hear easily
How the mistress snores.ʼ471
Such verse outlines various groups of perpetrators: young Pioneers with ʻcast iron headsʼ and ʻtin 
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eyesʼ who are compared to devils from hell and ʻbandits in powerʼ. They can call for revenge, 
invoking victims who should rise from their graves and kill katsapy (a derogatory word for 
Russians) who waste food or feed fish with Communists and Komsomols. At the same time, folk 
verses composed by the perpetrators themselves often elucidate their relationship with the victims. 
For instance, school children were taught short verses to chant to the ʻkulaksʼ in which they 
emphasised their position of power: ʻwatch out kulaks,ʼ ʻyou are dead kulaksʼ.472 
In Duma pro Holod (Epic Song About Hunger), recorded from the minstrel Ievhen Movchan in 
1967, the perpetrators are placed within a power vertical. When Stalin orders the procurement of 
more grain even if it means robbing people of their last scrap of food, ʻMany people from tugboat 
lot got used to such work...ʼ473 
1. Soviet Poetry
One of the first poets to write about village residents who become instrumental in 
facilitating the famine on the ground was Pavlo Tychyna in ‘Chystyla Maty Kartopliu’ (Mother 
Was Peeling Potatoes..., 1926). His earlier poem ‘Holod’ (Hunger, 1921), often mistakenly 
attributed to the poetry about the Holodomor, was actually written about the famine in 1921. In 
‘Chystyla Maty Kartopliu’, Tychyna describes the young local Communists who will become the 
perpetrators of grain procurement in 1932-1933. It centres on a nameless young man whose family 
disapproves of his loyalty to the ʻAnti-Christʼ and ʻthe enemyʼ. His mother foresees the famine in 
colloquial language and laments their poverty, comparing herself to the oppressed Ukraine, while 
his father acts as a messiah whom the son condemns and threatens with sanctions from the village 
council. The old man calls his son to fight the ʻLenin-Anti-Christʼ and confronts him in the end of 
the poem.474 
In 1933, at the height of the Holodomor, Tychyna wrote a poem titled ‘Pisnia Traktorystky.
Abo iak Olesia Kulyk na kursy traktorystiv tikala 1930 r.’ (The Song of the Female Tractor Driver. 
Or How Olesia Kukyk Fled to the Tractor Driving Courses in 1930, 1933).475 This renowned poem, 
which was included in the curriculum in Soviet Ukraine as a text to be learnt by heart in the final 
years of school, was based on the experience of Olesia Kulyk from the village of Popivka in Poltava
oblast’, who was discussed earlier in this dissertation. The poem is dated 7th December 1933 when 
Tychyna visited the village. Olesia, then working as a chauffeur at the collective farm, drove him to 
the village. She was likely to be involved in facilitation of the famine in Popivka, where more than 
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2,000 people starved to death.
‘Pisnia Traktorystky’ is written as a folk song. It sings of a young Komsomol girl putting 
her embroidery aside and, despite her disapproving mother, rushes with other Komsomol members 
to enrol in tractor driving courses. Olesia defies her mother’s religiosity and conservatism and 
leaves the house before anyone is awake. She longs to be able to drive the tractor herself and joins 
the collective farm following the example of other girls in the village. On the way to the Popivka 
Olesia gets into a cart with young men. Here Tychyna writes back to the popular folk song ‘Iikhaly 
kozaky’ (Kozaks Were Riding), originally recorded in the same Poltava oblast’, which warns of the 
dangers faced by young girls getting into carts with strangers.476 But ‘Pisnia Traktorystky’ presents 
the world as a different place: the young men are Komsomol and therefore safe and unthreatening: 
‘All of them are familiar, all of them are ours...ʼ 
In the same year Tychyna writes about fighting the bourgeoisie in his (in)famous poem 
‘Partiia vede’ (The Party Leads, 1933), which was published in Pravda in late 1933. From the first 
lines, his lyrical persona insists that the suffering of the enemies does not bother people like him: 
‘...let them die.ʼ The warriors of the Soviet state will kill its enemies, one after another. 
This concept of war in the countryside would be developed further by Leonid 
Pervomaisʼkyi. Like Epik and Kyrylenko, Pervomaisʼkyi remembers most peasants being hostile to 
the Bolsheviks, particularly due to their policies in the countryside. In his ‘Trypilsʼka trahediia’ 
(Trypillian Tragedy, 1929) he describes the killing of a group of Komsomol in 1919, concluding 
that the Ukrainian village was ‘duped’ into supporting the Greens. He stresses the unflinching ways 
of the militant Stalinist in ‘Lyst z Kyieva’ (Letter from Kyiv, 1933) in which his lyrical persona 
claims not to be disturbed by ‘the tedious frog-like wailing.ʼ These words were written in March 
1933, at the peak of the famine; they are aimed at the peasants and showcase the antagonism 
between the village and trained perpetrators, which stems from the revolutionary years. This theme 
is developed further in his poem ‘Molodistʼ brata: Roman u virshakh’ (Youth of Brother: A novel in
Verse, 1933). Shkandrij argues Pervomaisʼkyi’s articulation of war between Bolsheviks and the 
peasants is reminiscent of Molotov and Kaganovich, who in November 1932 called to fight with the
Petliurites:
… I know your nature—in feeble, farmstead nights 
You have been fashioned by Stolypinites with their cozy, rich peasant women. 
And later you grew up and returned to your dark corners, 
Having completed commercial and agro-veterinary institutes.
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And then near Trypillia you used to kill my brothers . . . 
But we filled your guts full of devils anyway! . . . 
We know. What we want. We are an Osnaz detachment. 
I am a soldier of poetry in it. A rank-and-file soldier.477
Similar to Dukyn, Epik and Kyrylenko, Pervomaisʼkyi presents the DPU servicemen during
the famine – described as ‘the deadly struggle for life, breadʼ – as potent heroes who ‘turn over the 
virgin lands and plough across the boundaries’ in his poem ‘Syn partii’ (Son of the Party, 1933). 
Here young, strong, militant and progressive Stalinists are juxtaposed with a backward ‘eternal rural
idiocyʼ, as we also see in Persha Vesna or Avanposty. Shkandrij compares this cult of violent action
in Pervomaisʼkyʼs poetry with the rhetoric of youthful virility in Italian fascism in the 1920s, which 
discussed in the research of Barbara Spackman.478 Knowingly or not, many Soviet writers of 
collectivization adopted the master trope of Italian fascist writings of potent leaders ʻrapingʼ the 
feminized masses, who are described as dark, backward and primitive. Such poetry conditions the 
reader to accept the perpetrators as heroes and develop contempt rather than compassion for the 
famine’s victims.
Similar in its message is Ivan Molchanov’s ‘Prokati nas Petrusha na traktore’ (Give Us a 
Ride On the Tractor, Petrusha, 1929), which is part of the longer poem ‘Ognennyi Traktorist’ (Fiery
Tractor Driver, 1929). The song was widely broadcast on the radio across the USSR in the early 
1930s and revived again in the 1950s. It implores Petrusha, a Komsomol tractor driver, to stay 
strong despite the danger of jealous ʻkulakʼ attacking him. It is based on the story of the tractor 
driver named Piotr Diakov, who was reported by Komsomolʼskaia Pravda as murdered by a ʻkulakʼ
in a Siberian village on the eve of collectivization. A journalist investigation in the 1950s by the 
chief editor of Izvestia, Aleksei Adzhubei, revealed that Diakov survived the attack, during which 
he was set alight. An additional FSB investigation by Aleksandr Petrushin discovered that Diakov 
accidentally dropped a burning match during inspection of the tractor’s fuel reservoir, thus catching 
fire. The ʻkulaksʼ accused in the initial investigation were punished for a crime they did not 
commit.479 Regardless of the reality of Diakovʼs circumstances, Molchanov’s song shaped the 
popular perception of village perpetrators in Soviet society. As Leonid Brezhnev recalled in his 
memoir, it inspired and motivated young people across the country to fight ʻkulaksʼ and be ever 
vigilant against the ʻkulaks threat’.480
2. Dissident Poetry
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Poems like ‘Khrest’ (The Cross, 1976) by Mykola Rudenko – founder of the Ukrainian 
Helsinki Group – present a radically different perspective on the events of collectivisation and the 
famine. In the poem, a Bolshevik commissar named Myron returns home during the famine to find 
his native village nearly deserted. Haunted by the voices of his mother whose grave he cannot find, 
he meets Jesus Christ who trusts him to carry the cross for Ukraine. Myron is disenchanted with the 
Communist regime and calls it evil. He is eventually arrested by the DPU and dies. Rudenko 
dedicates the work to his friend and colleague General Petro Hryhorenko, whose experience in the 
collectivisation campaign was similar to Myron’s own. Both Rudenko and Hryhorenko were 
examples of Soviet figures of authority who became disillusioned with Soviet power and engaged 
with dissent. They were stripped of all their awards and privileges, incarcerated and forced into 
exile. Like Myron, they carried the cross of individual protest.
Myron is burdened with a cognitive dissonance brought on by experience as a Red Army 
veteran and by the sight of the suffering of his people. He is emotionally devastated during his 
desperate search for his motherʼs grave. He accidentally comes across the set of a propaganda film 
that denies the famine in Ukraine. The Russian actors explain to Myron that they were brought to 
the village, although do not like the idea of being there. The chairman of the collective farm, 
meanwhile, is far from being apologetic. He promises to lay those who cannot be ‘re-educatedʼ into 
the graves. He professes a lack of guilt for starving men, women and children to death, concluding 
that ‘their deaths, we’ll say it straightly, won’t bother us one bit.ʼ481 Rudenko’s lyrical persona 
asserts that the officials ‘whose heart has spurned all truth and feelingʼ and who now ask ‘why rub 
this salt into the wounds congealingʼ were complicit in the murder of millions and even refused 
foreign aid to save the starving. Indeed, he compares Ukraine over the last three hundred years to a 
cow bred for slaughter:
Each next dolt can milk you dry, 
Then from your stalls, that self-same wastrel, 
Will steal your last, remaining child.482
Rudenko approaches the whole vertical order of the famine perpetrators though Biblical allegories 
and comparisons. For instance, the trained perpetrators at the DPU are ‘the hellish antipode of 
Christʼ, ‘mute Judasʼ or ‘the Bible Beastʼ.483 The profiteering type, represented by Party officials, 
stops at nothing to advance career or profit:
481 M. Rudenko, Khrest (Kyiv: Smoloskyp, 1996), p. 49.
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The man of malice mouths Hosannahs, 
His liege to praise, extols the five-year plan.
And meanwhile, to secure his next advancement,
Murders his mother with his own two hands.484
These lines are seemingly aimed at Pavlo Tychyna485 whose poems are referenced throughout 
‘Khrest’. In particular, the song of Christine in ‘Khrest’ is strikingly similar to the lamentation of 
the starving cannibal mother in Tychynaʼs ‘Zahupalo v dveri prykladom’ (Rifle Knocking on the 
Door, 1921). More strikingly, both the chairman of the collective farm and a famous poet herd the 
peasants to mass graves, repeating the lines from Tychynaʼs poem ‘Partia vede’ included in school 
textbooks throughout Soviet Ukraine: ‘Stick and kill! Kill and stick!ʼ Rudenko frames the 
Holodomor as a profound conflict between Good and Evil, with the latter, at least temporarily, 
prevailing over the former: ‘a lust for powerʼ and ‘prideʼs subverting blissʼ has ‘silenced Good on 
Earth.ʼ 
3. Poetry in the Diaspora and in Independent Ukraine
One of the first Ukrainian poets in emigration to address the famine was Iurii Klen in 
‘Prokliati roky’ (The Damned Years, 1937) which was published in Ukraine only in 1991, although 
it was known in Ukraine as early as the 1960s among some members of the intelligentsia.486 In 
‘Prokliati roky’, the poet examines the famine in the historical context of Ukraine losing its chance 
to become independent some ten years earlier. Here Klen compares the Soviet regime to a one 
hundred-headed hydra that exploits the antagonism between older and younger generations to its 
advantage. The ‘monsterʼ does not have a distinctive face; it tortures people and ‘poisons their 
souls.ʼ487 Klen widens historical context even further to Kievan Rus, implying that many of his 
contemporaries in Ukraine, like Kipchak prisoners centuries earlier, forget their roots and become 
yanychary, ‘janissaries’ who would sooner kill each other:
The time will come when loyal Malorosy
For sugar, bread and fat and other little treasures
Will chop the heads of their own brothers.488
Klen also alludes to the role of Ukrainian Soviet poets in the mechanism of the famine who ‘glorify 
hell for bread and butterʼ and win the trust of many Ukrainians by writing in their native language. 
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Nonetheless they ʻput the seed of fight between brothers.ʼ489 Here, in reflecting on the famine and 
on the complicity of those who failed to create a Ukrainian state, Klen writes back to official poets 
like Volodymyr Sosiura, who during collectivization justifies support for the Soviet regime with the
following words:
The time of romanticism is gone
The one that drove us to death
For some imagined Ukraine 
They fooled us with.490
Like Klen, the poet Ievhen Malaniuk casts the Holodomor as the work of evil. Describing the 
Ukrainian countryside after the famine in ‘Tam vyskhla zhinka kuliamy proshyta’ (There is a 
Withered Woman Shot With Bullets, 1938), he characterises the perpetrators of the Holodomor in 
succinct terms: ‘They rule the emptiness of land – Anti-Christ and insatiable Adonai...ʼ. The 
allusion to ‘Adonaiʼ, a Hebrew name for God, may suggest that the perpetrator should be situated 
with ethnic Jews; whatever the intention of the reference, Malaniuk frames the perpetrator of the 
Holodomor as a horrific, frightening Other, a far cry from the ordinary Ukrainians who executed 
Kremlin policy on the ground.
According to the towering Ukrainian literary critic Ivan Dziuba, the poem ‘Selo’ (The 
Village, 1960) by Ivan Kachurovsʼkyi stands out among works on the Holodomor for its artistic 
value. In Dziuba’s view, its significance rivals that of Barka’s Zhovtyi Kniazʼ.491 The poem is a 
story of a village enduring the Holodomor. Kachurovsʼkyi begins by evoking the idyll of the 
Ukrainian landscape only to contrast it subsequently with antagonisms within the village. Based on 
the recollections of famine survivors whom he met in his native village, which his family fled in 
1933, Kachurovsʼkyi retains the names of the victims but changes the names of perpetrators, whom 
he casts as idle simpletons and fools wracked by envy of others. Not unlike Mak and Osʼmachka, 
Kachurovsʼkyi argues that the famine was possible because Ukrainians failed to create their own 
state in 1920:
We are to blame ourselves... in 1920 
We did not fear loss or misfortune, 
We hoped just for a moment, 
That people would raise up. 
489 Ibid, p. 28.
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…
And here our peasant men, like eagles –
Deserters from all armies they were... 
They did not join us just as well. 
Ten years later those who did not rise
They said went to Solovki to graze.
We are to blame. It is a reprisal.
…
Because being docile is a crime!492 
A more recent poem with the wide resonance of ‘Selo’ is ‘The Holodomor’ (2006) by Nina 
Vynohrads’ka. It has been well received by critics and adapted into a song.493 The poem paints an 
idyll of Ukrainian hard-working peasants disrupted by collectivization. In 1933 the activists and 
Komsomols take everything; they are deaf to people asking them for mercy. Vynohrads’ka 
intersperses her verses with archival documents of the Soviet leadershipʼs decisions leading to the 
Holodomor. We learn that district officials threaten the village council, where the Communist 
speaks Russian and calls Ukraine Malorossia, ‘Little Russia’: ‘Today he lords, today he rules, 
spares or punishes... and like that everyday.ʼ494 Vynohrads’ka finishes with a call to arms. Her 
lyrical persona calls on the reader to speak out and demands historical justice for the perpetrators: 
the Communists, the DPU and ‘every beast who killed us then.ʼ 
Perpetrators in the form of DPU servicemen can be found in many Ukrainian poems written 
since 1991. In ‘Pamʼiati zhertv Holodomoru’ (To the Memory of the Holodomor Victims, 2008), 
Lesia Sydorovych describes the rank-and-file perpetrators in broad brush strokes:
The beastly faces come to life
With epaulettes. Holodomor
Took lives by following the order.
Without home. With no regret.495
Perpetrators in the form of Communists and Russians appear in Ihor Stozhar’s ‘Holod’ 
(Hunger, 2014), which was published on the social media account of the Holodomor Memorial 
Museum. Here the survivors call local perpetrators ‘gangsʼ that came from nowhere or armed 
moskals (a pejorative term for Russians) with Ukrainian locals as sidekicks.496 Likewise, in another 
poem titled ‘The Holodomor’ (2012), Liudmyla Palahniak firmly defines the perpetrators as 
Russians. The poem is widely available on social media channels and in various online resources of 
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contemporary poetry. It is often used in commemorative events in educational institutions.497
Holodomor. The years of Moscow in Ukraine. 
The call of distress and desperation.
The crown of thorns and a noose around neck.
That Older Brother [the Russians] gave us as donation.
Another Holodomor poem adapted as a song is ‘The Communards’ (2012) by Vasylʼ Riabko, a 
prominent figure during the EuroMaidan in Kharkiv. His poem confronts the perpetrators of grain 
requisitions during collectivization. They are portrayed as fanatics who come to transform the 
village. They worship Lenin; they are violent and ready to spill the blood of anyone who opposes 
them. The Russian poet Valerii Prokoshin deploys even starker, highly disturbing imagery 
interspersed with biblical references in ‘Russkoe kladbishche’ (Russian Cemetery, 2009), in which 
the perpetrators – 25 Red Army soldiers – figuratively devour infants alive, whereas their 
commissar eats a victim’s mother. The local old cook prepares food for them ‘from brothers and 
sisters.ʼ 
Conclusion
Like official Soviet novels, Soviet poetry often centres on the stories of actual perpetrators 
of collectivization, such as Olesia Kulyk and Piotr Diakov, who are praised for their courage, 
strength and determination. And similar to dissident prose, dissident Ukrainian poems like 
Rudenko’s ‘Khrest’ offer a more nuanced, complex depiction of the perpetrators: they are 
profiteers, fanatics, repentant fanatics, trained perpetrators, ordinary people. In the diaspora, 
meanwhile, poets like Kachurovsʼkyi and Klen reflect upon their counterparts within Soviet 
Ukraine – official poets like Tychyna and Sosiura – whose panegyrics to Stalinism helped enable 
the inhumane policies of the 1930s. When confronting the rank-and-file perpetrators of the 
Holodomor, they tend to cast them as marginal and abnormal elements of the village, emphasizing 
the role of the Other in organizing the Holodomor and placing the famine in locus theologicus,498 in 
which the perpetrators act as the agents of evil and the victims represent the martyrs. As we have 
seen, this trope of the Other, primarily Russian Communists, in facilitating the famine is prevalent 
in poetry written in Ukraine after 1991. 
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Chapter V
Representation of the Rank-and-File Perpetrators of the Holodomor in Drama
The Soviet Ukrainian playwright Mykola Kulish, who was executed by the Stalinist regime 
in 1937, sought in his work ‘to unravel the national question… but not with kid gloves.’499 One of 
his last plays, Proshchai, selo (Good Bye, Village, 1933), unravels this question with hard-hitting 
allusions to collectivization and the famine. Following pressure by Soviet censors, Kulish renamed 
it Povorot Marka (Mark Returns, 1934) to distract from interpretations of the play as a requiem for 
a village dying during the famine. It focuses on the return of a Communist, Marko, to his native 
village after an eleven-year absence. There he finds himself the object of many questions about 
Soviet policies from village residents. Locals conjecture about his arrival: Marko could be a 
people’s advocate, a journalist, or a plenipotentiary to enforce collectivization. Indeed, Marko is a 
Party plenipotentiary and successfully completes collectivization in his native village, pointing out 
mistakes to his friends and, more importantly, revealing and removing ‘class enemies’.
Each character in Kulishʼs play is dynamic and alive, and the perpetrators of 
collectivization are no exception. A ‘female delegateʼ named Oksana is an avid perpetrator of house
searches for grain from the onset of collectivization. During her house searches, ‘the yards are dug, 
and souls are troubledʼ. Nonetheless Oksana does not let ‘hoardersʼ ‘rot bread in pits.ʼ500 As a 
mature woman, she is addressed as baba and at times ridiculed for being a spinster. Once a religious
woman, she told Marko off for laughing in the church when he was a child. Marko comments that 
she made a holy place out of the farmʼs office by decorating it with the embroidered towels that she 
confiscated from the peasants. At the conclusion of the play, Oksana organizes a collective burning 
of icons and is paired with her critic in a dance by the fire. What is meant primarily as a comic 
scene is also poignant, even disturbing. Indeed, the image of perpetrators publicly celebrating the 
destruction of the icons would stay in local oral memory for generations.
The protagonist Marko, interpreted as a prodigal son by his sister-in-law Motrona, does not 
see a middle ground during collectivization. In his view, the peasants should either accept the policy
or disappear as a class. Having left the village during revolution, Marko loses contact with his 
family or with neighbours until he volunteers to assist collectivization on the ground. His dialogues 
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with his family reveal the intimate contradictions that many perpetrators navigated on the ground. 
Both his father Roman and grandmother Vasylyna urge him to let them work and improve their lot 
at their own pace: ‘Why disturb people Marko? Why herd everyone into collectives? Once uprooted
from the land, will they settle us anew?ʼ501 Marko patiently explains to them that socialism can only 
be built on a collective farm system and that individual farmers cannot compete against the 
efficiency of mechanised labour. In practice, however, Marko divides the village into classes and 
uses them to repress all enemies, including the village philosopher Zosim.
The character of Marko is similar to Marko Obushnyi in Kyrylenkoʼs Avanposty; he is an 
unflinching party plenipotentiary assisting collectivization and grain procurement who represents 
the official Party line in the village. Like Obushnyi with ‘Party spectaclesʼ, Marko uses ‘Party 
binocularsʼ to identify ‘kulaksʼ and other alien elements whom he eliminates from the village. He 
also guides younger perpetrators, including pioneers and Komsomols in the village. Oksanaʼs 
adopted daughter, the Komsomol Nadiika, is portrayed as a young fanatic who refuses to let 
Dmytryk, son of a ‘kulakʼ, join the Komsomol. To prove his loyalty to the regime, Dmytryk tries to 
set his parents’ house – the best on the street – on fire. Dmytryk also reports his parents and sister 
for hiding gold. 
Local officials who collaborate with Marko include the local collectiveʼs chairman Petro 
and Red Army veteran Parkhimcha. They compete against each other in the collectivization efforts, 
with Parkhimcha feeling unfairly treated by the younger generation of activists who secure various 
positions and Party membership during collectivization. Marko disapproves of Parkhimcha’s 
methods in driving everyone, regardless of their background, into the farms and allowing the 
campaign to be accompanied by alcohol consumption and debauchery. The peasants who join the 
collective during the ‘alcohol drive,ʼ as Marko calls it, are seven widows who explain that they 
were promised ‘a paradise.ʼ Petro, an old friend of Marko, uses dubious practices in managing the 
farm: he oversees the theft of wood to build the stables and fails to look after the orchard or to build
a school. Kulish’s criticisms of such incompetence are peppered throughout his dramatic corpus; his
earlier play Komuna v stepakh (Commune in Steppe, 1926), for instance, addresses the question of 
viability of collective farms, simultaneously portraying perpetrators as genuine believers in 
socialism and criticising them for incompetence, laziness and promiscuity.
Another Soviet play on the subject is Potomky (Offsprings, 1938) by Iurii Ianovsʼkyi, in 
which a repressed ʻkulakʼ named Hrytsʼko returns in 1938 to his native village, where he faces the 
hostility of the perpetrators of collectivisation and famine and commits a crime. The famine and its 
perpetration are mentioned only in passing, with Hrytsʼkoʼs father, buried in the garden, being said 
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to have starved to death. In Ianovs’kyi’s play, the peasants did hoard grain and hide it in pits. 
Meanwhile, the Holodomor perpetrators – Red Army veterans named Holeсhnyk and Horlytsia, 
whose surnames speak to humble origins – ‘threw Hrytsʼko barefoot in the snowʼ during 
dekulakization. The head of the village council, Odarka Pryimak, is also a Red Army veteran, but 
does not hold grudges against Hrytsʼko, who opposed both the Bolsheviks and collectivization. The 
play meets all the practical requirements of a Soviet official work of art justifying collectivization: 
the collective farmers are shown to live well, the dekulakized peasants are shown to have been 
punished fairly, and the perpetrators are shown defending the farms against potential enemies. The 
crime Hrytsʼko commits shortly after his release only serves to justify the previous repressions 
against everyone opposing collectivization. In other words, there is no such phenomenon as a 
‘reformed kulakʼ: as Ianovs’kyi suggests, the Red Amy veterans were right to harbour low 
expectations of Hryts’ko. Potomky confers higher moral ground to those who facilitated violent 
Soviet policies in the village during collectivisation and famine.
One of the better known plays related to the famine published in diaspora502 is Tysiacha 
deviatsot trydtsiat tretii rik (One Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty Third Year, 1942) by Serhii 
Kokot-Lediansʼkyi. There are no village perpetrators; in fact they are not mentioned at all. Instead 
Kokot-Lediansʼkyi presents characters who were likely bystanders to the famine – students in Kyiv 
in spring 1933. From the start of the play, the students refer to dying peasants on the street, but they 
react to this knowledge in divergent ways. While the children of Party functionaries condemn the 
starving peasants and demand that they go back to work at the collective farms, some students from 
the countryside try to help the starving.
The protagonist, Halia, asks for a day off in order to save her parents in the village. She is 
refused by the head of the student trade union Iasha, who reminds her that Rector Volin has 
forbidden students from going to the countryside. In a 1950 edition of the play, Iasha is described as
a careerist: ‘one who crossed the line of settlement and cannot quench his thirst for powerʼ.503 The 
secretary of the student trade union, Bashlyk, reminds Halia that he too received a letter from his 
parents in the village asking for help. But he would not ‘compromise Komsomol discipline and risk 
my Komsomol ticket, my stipend or even the institute – I canʼt.ʼ504 His words are echoed in the 
public speech of Oktriabrina Pervomaiskaia, a more fanatical student who calls upon his comrades 
to persecute class enemies who spread rumours about the famine in the countryside. Haliaʼs fellow 
student Pavlo alludes to Bashlyk and Volin as profiteers who are not necessarily firm believers in 
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socialism. Pavlo also remarks that it is the passivity of bystanders like them that makes such 
tragedies possible. In effect Kokot-Lediansʼkyi examines the question of perpetrators well beyond 
the village, to places and moments in which profiteers, careerists, fanatics and, crucially, bystanders
fail to help victims or to protest when in the position to do so.
Another play written in diaspora, by poet Bohdan Boichuk, is Holod (Hunger, 1962). This 
play is an existential interpretation of the famine, which Boichuk’s family endured. As in Beckett’s 
En attendant Godot (1953), two characters – a Man and a Woman – search for the meaning of their 
existence while starving. They engage in a discussion about their lives before the famine and briefly
interact with other characters, described as the poet and the baby. Fundamentally, they come to 
terms with their mortality, the presence (or absence) of God, and the importance of sacrifice. Along 
the way they affirm the value of their lives and overcome the actions of the perpetrators, who are 
present in the play as ‘those in the uniform.ʼ They are brutal, faceless men in military uniform who 
take bread, rape and kill. Described schematically and performed in pantomime, they explicitly 
represent the environment of rot and devastation in which the Man and the Woman find themselves.
Holod could be placed within a broader literary movement of the Theatre of the Absurd, as it 
showcases characters who struggle to find purpose in life and confront the absurdity of existence. 
When the Man and Woman come to terms with this absurdity, however, they in turn discover their 
purpose: to save the child and defy ‘those in uniform.ʼ
Written primarily for British audiences,505 Natalia Vorozhbit’s The Grain Store (2009) has 
been performed in Ukrainian theatres since 2010.506 It has been very influential in contributing to 
the cultural memory of the Holodomor on stage over the past decade. While some critics place The 
Grain Store within the long shadow of Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath (1939),507 others see the 
influence of the didactic approach of Brecht.508 The play focusses on the traumatic experience of the
village during the famine through the story of a young couple named Arsei and Mokryna. 
Vorozhbitʼs rank-and-file perpetrators follow the Soviet Ukrainian dramatic tradition; that is, most 
of them are local people, despite the names of some of them suggesting Russian origin. In fact, they
move the play forward: Party plenipotentiary Mortko; agitators Ivan, Masha, Vasilii and Iurko; and 
local perpetrators Rudenko, Havrilo, Iukhym and Arsei. 
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Mortko represents the fanatical perpetrator. He is a Party plenipotentiary who in 1931 
volunteers to fight a ‘kulakʼ uprising that he anticipates would follow mass collectivization in 
Ukraine. In Poltava he is ‘elected Head of the Savinsʼkii Agricultural Districtʼ – very likely a 
reference to the appointed position of the secretary of the RPK or district executive committee. 
Thus he oversees collectivization and grain procurement on the ground. Before this assignment, 
Mortko ‘saw action in Kazakhstan,’ but during the peak mortality in March 1933, he nevertheless 
falls into despair, especially when his efforts to procure grain or turn peasants into collective 
farmers fail. For a short time this cognitive dissonance drives him insane.
A month later, however, Mortko no longer despairs. He creates, in effect, a Potemkin 
collective farm for a visiting American journalist with the help of dying peasants. Having 
dehumanised the peasants – ʻthey arenʼt people. Theyʼre enemiesʼ509 – Mortko uses gratuitous 
violence against the starving despite protestations from his underlings: ʻItʼs easy to seem kind. 
Canʼt you see Iʼm doing work here that no one else will do, but without it the next step is 
impossible? … no one will appreciate the sacrifice I made for the future of this wretched country of 
mine.ʼ510 He also motivates young perpetrators by promising to send them to town to study or work,
thus sparing them from grain procurement that none of them enjoy. His role in facilitating the 
famine on the ground is therefore crucial. As Havrylo comments: ʻI didnʼt need that [bloodbath]. 
But none of the others would get their hands dirty. Not Arsei, not the actors, not even that idiot 
Iukhym. Mortko had to do it all. Without Mortko, nothing gets done.ʼ511
The character of Arsei is more ambivalent. Called a ʻpauperʼ by other peasants, Mokryna 
tells Arsei that he can ʻonly work to a masterʼ and reminds him that his family lost the land and 
money they possessed in 1919 because of their idleness. In 1931 Arsei joins the perpetrators and 
warns Mokryna of the imminent destruction of the wealthier farmers, with her survival depending 
on their relationship. In 1932 Arsei takes part in the dekulakization of his wifeʼs family and 
auctions off their possessions. This is the moment Arsei transforms into Mortko; he begins to wear 
the same greatcoat and a leather cap, whereas the peasants buying the possessions of the ʻkulaksʼ 
transform from bystanders into followers. Mokrynaʼs brother reminds them that shortly they will 
follow suit and perish like the ʻkulaksʼ. He also tries to reason with Arsei, reminding him of their 
shared childhood, but to no avail. At the same time Arsei refuses to execute the peasants and tries to
convince Mortko to spare lives, saves Mokryna and her mother from starvation and, even during his
visual transformation, looks ʻslightly embarassed.ʼ He is critical of staging the happy life of the 
collective farm for the American and hopes to start a new life with Mokryna in the city where there 
509 Vorozhbit, The Grain Store, p. 47.
510 Ibid, p. 51.
511 Ibid, p. 77.
will be ʻno envying other people.ʼ512 There is no obvious fanatical or sadist element in Arseiʼs 
motivation; he aspires to live a normal, better life.
The circumstances of Arseiʼs demise, however, are unclear. Mortko sends him to study at 
the Party school, and Arsei returns with excellent references, telling Mokryna that now they have a 
chance to move to the city after the famine. Trusted to meet the American guests, he is allowed to 
keep confiscated goods. He even helps Mokryna obtain food. Moreover, as Arseiʼs wife, Mokryna 
is not prosecuted for instigating disobedience at the rehearsal of the film, nor for pushing the 
heavily pregnant agitator Masha. But in May 1933 Mortko decides to kill Arsei for hiding a sack of 
grain in Mokrynaʼs house. Since Arsei refused to shoot famine victims, Mortko ʻsaw the spark of 
treason in [his] eyes all alongʼ.513 Arsei admits he is guilty but seizes the moment to murder Mortko.
The rest of the perpetrators fall into the types of the marginal: drunks, good-for-nothing 
profiteers, promiscuous women. Perpetrators Iukhym and Havrylo are described as drunks by Arsei:
ʻIʼve known them since I was a kid. Theyʼd jump off the bell tower for a drop of vodka.ʼ514 When 
Havrylo confesses to taking part in a massacre, he also explains, with reverence to the legal, that he 
was following orders and that the food the peasants ate belonged to the state. Iukhym reluctantly 
agrees to execute his neighbour Samson whome he asks to turn away so that he doesnʼt see 
Samsonʼs face. Iukhymʼs wife, on the other hand, becomes promiscuous during the famine. So does
agitator Masha, who eventually falls pregnant by one of the victims, Samson. Having confronted 
Samson about his paternity, Masha summarises a prosopographical reading of the female 
perpetrators as abnormal women juxtaposed with the conservative Mokryna, who needs a wedding 
in the church to feel as Arseiʼs wife: ʻA Soviet woman doesnʼt need a husband. Iʼve got all my 
comrades to look after me.ʼ515 Ivan, Masha, Vasilii and Iurko follow the orders of the superiors and 
show no sympathy toward the victims, making public performances out of the house searches and 
the confiscation of foodstuffs. Most hope for promotion and escape to the city, or as Rudenko 
succinctly puts it: ʻOut of this hell.ʼ516 
Overall, in Vorozhbit’s The Grain Store, most perpetrators do not benefit from their 
participation in the famine: Mortko is murdered; Arsei dies along with several of the agitators; Ivan 
is eaten by a cannibal; Vasilii dies from starvation; Masha dies during childbirth; Havrylo and 
Iukhimʼs wife each go insane. Mortko is replaced in the office by Lionechka, a young man whose 
foot had been severed by a wealthy neighbour. Lionechka wears a large greatcoat similar to 
Morkoʼs, thus following in his footsteps after the famine. Iurko, described in the play only 
512 Ibid, p. 55.
513 Ibid, p. 81.
514 Ibid, p. 45.
515 Ibid, p. 71.
516 Ibid, p. 57.
obliquely, saves Mokryna from being buried alive, and the two go on to have a family before Iurko 
dies at the front during the Second World War. Vorozhbit presents the full spectrum of rank-and-
file perpetrators: while some correspond to the clichés of the Other and the abnormal – such as the 
local drunks and the agitators Masha, Ivan and Vasilii – the key characters of Mortko, Arsei, Iurko 
and Rudenko are presented, tragically and poignantly, as ordinary people who become 
progressively complicit in state-sanctioned mass violence.
Conclusion
At times circumventing prevalent censorship, a number of Ukrainian plays engage in a 
coherent reflection on the tragedy of the Holodomor and on the ordinary people who facilitated it. 
As we have seen, due to the constraints of the genre, some characters are portrayed in broad brush 
strokes and simplified by way of pantomime, as in Boichuk’s Holod. Yet these plays largely bear a 
significant number of similarities in their depictions of the rank-and-file perpetrators of the famine: 
they foreground the key role of the fanatic type of perpetrator; underscore the importance of 
previous experience that habituates the perpetrators to violence; allude to brutality on all sides; and 
feature female perpetrators who tend toward the ʻabnormalʼ. They are single old women or widows;
some of them are even village officials (Odarka in Potomky, Oktiabryna in Tysiacha devʼiatsot 
trydtsiat tretii rik and Oksana in Povorot Marka). They defy gender expectations by having 
multiple partners (Masha in The Grain Store) or by intimidating people who dare to approach them.
As in Soviet Ukrainian prose, the protagonists in the drama of Ianovsʼkyi and Kulish are 
fanatics and ‘true believers’ who believe they can transform the village for the better through 
collectivization. They are ready to sacrifice themselves as well as those who oppose 
collectivization; they are ready to expel and repress class enemies, even if they include their own 
family members. These perpetrators speak in the language of official Soviet discourse, answering 
those who challenge them with Party slogans. Nonetheless, like all the playwrights discussed in this
chapter, Ianovs’kyi and Kulish still present such characters as ‘agentful’; they always have the 
choice to act or not to act. Indeed, Parkhimcha and Petro in Povorot Marka, Odarka in Potomky, 
and Arsei in The Grain Store all hesitate before following orders; they express doubt and reveal 
conflicted emotions. While there are fanatical perpetrators like Marko in Povorot Marka, the Red 
Amy veterans in Potomky, or Oktiabryna in Tysiacha deviatsot trydtsiat tretii rik and Mortko in The
Grain Store, most of perpetrators presented are ordinary local people whose previous experiences 
only influence their choice to help perpetrate the famine. These experiences do not determine it. 
Chapter VI
Representation of the Rank-and-File Perpetrators of the Holodomor in Film
ʻOf all arts, cinema is the most important for us.ʼ
V. Lenin517
The Soviet Union invested great significance in the reach and impact of film, and arguably 
no other genre is as widely resonant in shaping the cultural memory of the Holodomor today. I will 
explore Ukrainian films on the subject chronologically according to two groups: feature films and 
documentaries. Like other cultural texts related to the Holodomor, the number of films on the 
famine is constantly growing. The films analysed here have been chosen based on the size of the 
audience reached via screenings in cinemas or broadcasts on major television channels – and on 
their acknowledged significance according to use in the sphere of education or to 2017 
recommendations by the Institute of National Memory of Ukraine for public commemoration of the 
Holodomor. I posit that these films are helping Ukrainian audiences translate post-memories of the 
famine – typically, at the level of the everyday, the domain of proverbs and transmitted stories – 
into intensely visual forms. 
Feature Films
The first film to portray collectivization activists in Ukraine is Oleksandr Dovzhenkoʼs 
classic Zemlia (Earth, 1930). This silent film tells a story of young Komsomol Vasylʼ Trubenko, 
who brings a tractor from Kharkiv to his village, where some peasants still refuse to give up their 
land for the collective farm. Vasylʼ ploughs the border between the fields of the collective farm and 
that of ʻkulakʼ Arkhyp Bilokinʼ. In response, Arkhipʼs son Khoma kills Vasylʼ. Widely considered 
to be Dovzhenko’s best film as well as one of the best in the history of Soviet cinema, Zemlia 
stands out for its glorious presentation of the Ukrainian countryside and for its ambiguous reading 
of those who will eventually become the perpetrators of the famine in 1932-33.
The film begins with the peaceful death of Vasylʼs grandfather Semen, who lies among an 
abundance of apples in his orchard surrounded by his family. Vasylʼ looks at Semen with love, but 
notes that his grandfather’s ploughing of the land earth oxen for seventy five years is not 
remarkable. Dovzhenko often under-supplies his silent films with intertitles, leaving the audience to
fill in gaps in speech and dialogue. Here Vasyl’s speaks enthusiastically about what ʻis worth of a 
517 This phrase is attributed to Lenin by Lunacharskii in his letter to Boltianskii on 29th January 1925. See Sovetskoe 
kino, No. 1-2 (1933), p. 10.
medal in life,ʼ but without a clear reference to an antecedent. He could be speaking about tractors 
changing the perennial way of tilling land or about people like him transforming the village despite 
all the risks. After a triumphant ploughing of the ʻkulakʼ fields, Vasylʼ spends emotional moments 
with his beloved, holding her gently and smiling dreamily. The future looks bright, and Vasylʼ 
cannot keep his feet on the ground, dancing in the twilight on his way home. Svashenko, a veteran 
of the Berezil theatre who played Vasylʼ, recalled Dovzhenko explaining to him what he expected 
from that dance: ʻwe do not need an elaborate hopak [Ukrainian folk dance performed by men]... it 
should be a simple dance, clear and straight to the point in its moves. Not like your feet dancing on 
their own, but as if your soul and happiness are dancing with them.ʼ518 
Svashenko also reflected on Dovzhenko making him bathe in the local river each morning 
to keep his thoughts clean and clear, just like Vasyl’s thoughts. In the notes on the film that 
Dovzhenko reconstructed from memory (the original was destroyed during the Second World War),
the hardworking ninteen-year-old Vasylʼ sees the layout of collective fields as his own life plan, 
ʻfrom a redneck to a public figure, and maybe to fame.ʼ To fulfil his ambitions, Vasylʼ denounces 
the ʻkulakʼ Bilokinʼ for hoarding grain and sabotage in a local newspaper, knowing what 
repercussions it might have for that family. Indeed, ʻsoon the family of Bilokinʼ is disappeared 
without a trace to Siberiaʼ.519 For the deporation to take place, the family’s name had to be 
presumably added to the list of peasants who were to be executed or re-settled by local perpetrators 
– Vasylʼs comrades. In the film they include Soroka, the chairman of the collective farm; Maksym 
Prytuliak, an enthusiastic secretary of the Komsomol cell; and Komsomol Shumylo. In the world of 
Zemlia, these are precisely the figures who would facilitate grain procurement that would lead to 
mass man-made famine in only a few years’ time. 
These perpetrators appear as different types in Dovzhenko’s film. Prytuliak displays the 
qualities of a careerist. Knowing that the tractor has stalled in its triumphant march to the village, he
informs district officials on the phone that it has arrived at the village safely. To the dismayed 
messenger, Prytuliak responds, ʻThe tractor canʼt stop!ʼ He also asks in a letter to higher authorities 
for permission to confiscate the barns of the wealthier peasants for the needs of his collective farm 
instead of constructing new premises. 
Komsomol Shumylo, meanwhile, is neither an ideologue nor a profiteer. He is resourceful 
and hardworking when under threat of repression from Chupryna, he fixes the tractorʼs radiator by 
urinating in it. Later he becomes a Stakhanovite: his portraits are published in national papers, and 
journalists write his biography. 
518 S. Svashenko, ʻTak rozhdalsia tanets,ʼ Dovzhenko v vospominaniiakh sovremennikov ed. L. Plazhitnova, Iu. 
Solntseva (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1982). 
519 A. Dovzhenko, Zemlia: kniga-film (Moscow: Biuro propagandy sovetskogo kinoiskusstva, 1966).
Dovzhenko’s characterisation of these activists earned criticism on the pages of Izvestiia 
from a certain Dem’ian Bednyi. He saw their urinating into a radiator of the broken tractor to be an 
unacceptable mockery of collectivization.520 The office of Izvestiia was flooded with letters from the
viewers complaining about Bednyi’s assessment, and the All-Ukrainian Union of Revolutionary 
Cinema Workers in Kharkiv on 6th April 1930 concluded that his criticisms were unfair. In two days
the film was returned to the cinemas. A week later, it was again banned despite successful 
premieres abroad, which eventually help secure its place as an iconic monument to Ukrainian 
cinematic culture.521 This success is, however, at times overshadowed by the tragic legacy of the 
famine. Indeed, Zemlia was filmed in the village of Iaresʼky in the Poltava oblast’, which was hit 
particularly hard by the famine. Most of the village’s inhabitants starred in the film as extras, and 
untold numbers of them perished during the height of the Holodomor. In fact, in light of a recent 
discovery made by Ukrainian director Leonid Muzhuk, a child extra whose close-up is featured in 
the final cut of Zemlia was one of the first to die from hunger only three years after filming.522
Soviet films that dwell on collective farms after Zemlia do not focus on collectivization as 
such. The comedies directed by Pyriev – such as Traktoristy (The Tractor Drivers, 1939) or 
Bogataia Nevesta (The Rich Bride, 1937) – predictably depict a comfortable life on the farms, with 
an abundance of provisions. There are of course no mentions of the famine or even references to the
ways in which villages were collectivized. We only see the collective farm brigades or MTS well 
established, and village officials only allude to the past when comparing the imminent war with 
Germany to their victory against kulaks and bandits.
This situation largely persists until the years after Stalinʼs death, when the novel 
Podniataia tselina (Virgin Land Upturned, 1932-1959) by Nobel prize winner Michail Sholokhov, 
is adapted into a film with the same title (1959-1961). Though Podniataia tselina focuses on 
collectivization in the Don region, the novel has great relevance to this discussion as a text that 
installs an image of the perpetrators in cultural memory by way of its inclusion in a compulsory 
course on Russian literature in the school curriculum across the USSR. 
Its plot is simple: Semen Davydov, a plenipotentiary from Leningrad, becomes a chairman 
of the collective farm that he helps to create in a village in the Don region. Davydov is assisted by 
Nagulʼnov, the secretary of the local party cell, and Razmetnov, the head of the village council. 
Despite resistance from the ʻkulaksʼ, they establish the collective farm and procure grain. Prior to 
the organisation of the collective farm, Davydov insists on dekulakization. After the first day of this
520 D. Bednyi, ʻFilosofy,ʼ Izvestiia, 4th April 1930. 
521 O. Shama, ʻZemlia obetovannaia. Triumf i tragediia Gomera ukrainskogo kino Aleksandra Dovzhenko,ʼ Novoe 
Vremia, 10th April 2015. 
522 See Ukraiinsʼka nich 33-oho (Ukrainian Night ʼ33, 1994-1998 by L. Muzhuk) later in this chapter. 
ʻworkʼ, which involves deporting families with children to Solovki in the middle of winter without 
warm clothes, Razmetnov refuses to continue. His remarks to Davydov and Nagulʼnov resonate 
with those of Browningʼs policemen during their initiation to mass murder: 
Razmetnovʼs monologue on dekulakization Policemen on their first execution of the Jews
I wonʼt take part in dekulakization again. … I 
was not taught it. I... I canʼt fight with children! 
It’s different in war… I wonʼt do it again! Itʼs 
not right. Am I an executioner? Or is my heart 
made of stone? … Do you know how many 
children Lapshinov has? As soon as we arrived, 
they all stood up, and my hair stood up too. We 
started kicking them out of the house, and 
women fell down as if dead. We poured water 
onto on them. I closed my eyes and ears and 
fled.523
… Buchmann made clear to Hagen that as a 
Hamburg businessman and reserve lieutenant, he 
would in no case participate in such an action, in 
which defenceless women and children are 
shot.524
We men were upset about that and said we 
couldnʼt bear [the executions] either.525
One policeman approached First Sergeant 
Kammer … He confessed that the task was 
ʻrepugnantʼ to him...526
They [the policemen] pleaded that they too were 
fathers with children and could not continue.527
 
Razmetnovʼs colleagues, however, are not sympathetic. Davydov echoes Stalin’s response to 
Sholokhov, who wrote to the Communist leader in 1933 about the excessive violence during 
collectivization: 
Davydovʼs response Stalinʼs response
Youʼre sorry for them … you feel pity for them. 
And have they had pity for us? Have our 
enemies ever wept over the tears of our 
children? Did they ever weep over the orphans 
when they killed their parents? Eh? … You feel 
sorry that we deport kulak families? Big deal! 
We deport them so that we can build our life. … 
You are the Soviet rule here, and I am supposed 
to agitate you?! … You are so tolerant! You are 
Communist first and then ... Itʼs a fact!528
… Respected peasants ... organised sabotage (!) 
and were keen to leave the workers and the Red 
Army without bread. While this sabotage was 
quiet and seemed to be done without malice 
(without blood), the fact is that your respected 
peasants waged a ʻquietʼ war on Soviet rule. A 
war to starve [the Soviet state]... It is clear as the 
clear sky that the peasants are not as innocent as 
they seem from afar.529
Davydov and Nagulʼnov involve torture and incarceration in the grain procurement campaigns, 
which Razmetnov later admits contributes to efficiency. During their attempt to take seeds, 
Razmetnov and Davydov are beaten by a mob of women, which was a popular form of protest (and 
despair) during the famine. Indeed, one of the characters in the film states that Davydov is taking 
523  M. Sholokhov, Virgin Soil Upturned, trans. Stephen Garry (London: W. & J. Mackay, 1977), p. 22.
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529  I. Stalin, Sochineniia, vol. 18. (Tver: Soiuz, 2006), p. 49.
the seeds with the intent of starving their children and of exporting grain abroad to buy cars that 
would be later used by ʻParty people to cruise around with their short-haired women.ʼ Wounded, 
Davydov responds with words echoing Epikʼs plenipotentiary Lohvyn: ʻI am doing all this for you 
damned people, and you, bastards, are killing me?!ʼ Like Vasylʼ in Dovzhenkoʼs Zemlia he is not 
afraid to die because he believes that the collective farms constitute his legacy. 
In Podniataia tselina, however, the perpetrators are reported for their violence. Nagulʼnov 
is expelled from the Party despite his previous service in 1st Cavalry Army530, ʻacting out of best 
intentionsʼ and his ʻlife-long contempt for private propertyʼ. Acting in line with Stalinʼs article on 
the excesses on the ground, the district bureaucrats condemn Nagulnovʼs violent methods despite 
their previous tacit approval. During the vote on expulsion, they fear each other and raise their 
hands only after reading each otherʼs body language. The formal, removed relationship between the 
district and village officials was also explored in Dimarovʼs The Hungry Thirties. Like Dimarovʼs 
character Ginzburg, Nagulnov intends to take his life, which he cannot imagine outside the Party. 
He reflects on the nature of perpetrators like him: ʻThe revolution will not suffer. There are plenty 
of people following it. One less, one more.ʼ After picturing the triumph of his enemies, Nagulʼnov 
decides to live.
Davydov and Nagulʼnov are eventually murdered. These fanatics and sociopaths, who are 
shaped by ideology and previous experience of violence, make regular references to their traumatic 
past to justify their brutality. They display a misogynistic attitude by insulting women and regarding
them as ʻevil.ʼ They comment that women are ʻnot good even at giving birthʼ and banish Lushka, 
whom they both presumably love, out of the village. They neglect the non-agricultural needs of the 
village – education, healthcare and welfare – to the point that peasants complain about being treated
like livestock. Their death marks a pivotal moment when the fanatic type of perpetrator is removed, 
whereas followers like Razmetnov and other collective farmers stay in the village to preserve the 
memory of the murdered.
Various perpetrators of collectivization can be also found in Vavylon XX (Babylon XX, 
Mykolaichuk, 1979). The film’s title was panned by the Soviet critics for mocking the Soviet 
project, and the film’s form was criticised for its excessive ‘poetic’ ‘formalist’ form.531 It is based 
on a novel by Vasylʼ Zemliak titled Lebedyna Zhraia (The Flock of Swans, 1971), which tells of 
the conflict between the collective farmers and the peasants in the village of Babylon in ways both 
530 I. Babel wrote about violence against civilians perpetrated by the 1st Cavalry in his 1920 Diary and The Red 
Cavalry.
531 S. Vasylʼiev, ʻPro te, iak zrobleno Vavylon XXʼ in Novyny Natsionalnoii Spilky Kinematohrafistiv Ukraiiny on 
09.05.2016, last accessed on 17.10.2017. http://www.ukrkino.com.ua/about/spilkanews/?id=5135
comic and tragic. The film’s grotesquerie, symbolism, and strategic omissions and silences in 
characterisation allow the audience more freedom of interpretation than Podniataia tselina. In 
Vavylon XX the perpetrators of collectivisation are compared to swans known to sacrifice their lives
when losing their loved ones. In the case of the perpetrators, their sacrifice is related to their 
transformation of the village.
A fanatical type of perpetrator is represented by a sailor named Klym Synytsia, a Red Army
veteran and the founder of the commune. Facing execution, he shouts to the peasants the slogan, 
ʻEither join the collective farm or live in poverty.ʼ In the film he is followed by a group of nameless
young men who walk in a shape of a flock of flying birds dressed in the same clothes. Their march 
and revolutionary songs are contrasted with the folk dance and songs that the communars can be 
seen joining. Meanwhile, an ideological perpetrator and young poet named Volodia Iavorsʼkyi  
starts a relationship with Malʼva Kozhushna, a widow of another Red Army veteran and comrade in
arms of Synytsia. He is killed by ʻkulakʼ Danʼka, Malʼvaʼs former lover. The murder is symbolic: 
after all, Volodia is called ʻthe glory and conscienceʼ of the commune itself.
Malʼva, on the other hand, is not an ideological perpetrator like Volodia. She is a follower. 
She joins the collective farm to find a feeling of belonging, which she lost when her husband died. 
As the secretary at the village council, she explicitly says that wealthier farmers deserve to be taxed 
heavily. In return someone paints ʻslutʼ on her fence, and she is taken to be executed by the 
ʻkulaks.ʼ Some of the peasants feel uneasy about shooting the now heavily pregnant Malʼva with 
the rest. Unlike Synytsia and the head of the village council Ruban, who is outraged by the peasant 
rebellion and subordination, Mal’va is silent as she awaits execution. 
In the film’s symbolic final scene, a mass brawl breaks out at Babylon on a religious 
holiday. A cavalry detachment saves the perpetrators of collectivization and famine – both fanatics 
and followers – from being executed by the ‘kulaks’, who flee. The village philosopher Fabian, 
meanwhile, shields Malʼva from being shot. He dies as a bystander to collectivization. As 
prominent film critic Serhii Trymbach points out, this type of character is novel in Soviet cinema.532
Fabian is neither a fanatic, nor careerist or follower. He is not apprehended by the ʻkulaksʼ with 
other perpetrators, but he nonetheless joins them to be executed. Fabian is critical of collectivization
but does not resist it. He has no land and does not join the collective, but he shares a dinner visually 
reminiscent of the Last Supper with the perpetrators. He challenges Ruban, the only outsider whom 
Synytsia has to introduce in the village, about his views that the disciples misinterpreted Jesus 
Christ. Ruban replies that he and people like him are gods. When Fabian continues to question 
collectivization, Ruban and Synytsia fail to understand him and respond with clichéd Soviet 
532 S. Trymbach, ʻVavilon XXʼ in Iskusstvo kino (2011) vol. 6 (April).
slogans. They speak a different language. 
The next film depicting perpetrators of the Holodomor appears after the dissolution of the 
USSR. Holod-33 (Hunger-33, Ianchuk, 1991) is based on Barka’s novel Yellow Prince, which is 
discussed above. The film was produced under consultation with historian James Mace, and the 
screenplay was written by Serhii Diachenko and Lesʼ Taniuk. It was first shown on UT-1 channel in
November 1991, right before the referendum on Ukrainian independence on 1 December. 
Unlike Barka’s novel, Holod-33 deals with the perpetrators obliquely, portraying them as 
ʻuniformly monstrous.ʼ533 They first appear at the church during a service. Accompanied by police, 
a group of perpetrators enter the premises to confiscate the icons and other valuables. The crowd 
inside prevents them from doing so. On another occasion, a group of perpetrators searches the 
house of the protagonist Myron and take all his food. After being denounced by a Komsomol for 
hiding a silver chalice, Myron is tortured by two DPU servicemen, one of them clearly a sadist. 
They flaunt the food and grain in storage, which is slowly rotting while peasants die. The armed 
guards by the mill shoot hundreds of starving men with machine guns. Most perpetrators are armed,
some wear military coats. Some are alien to the village, while others are local. As Myron observes, 
‘many anti-Christs came from us but did not belong among us.ʼ
Povodyr (The Guide, Sanin, 2014) is a story of an American boy whose engineer father is 
murdered while trying to take documents about the famine from Kharkiv to Moscow. The boy 
becomes a guide for a blind kobzar or minstrel. He escapes abroad. With the famine as an important
background, the film proceeds to focus on the fate of the kobzari who perished in the repressions of 
the early 1930s. Povodyr broke the box office record in Ukraine in 2015. In the first nine weeks of 
its screening, it was seen by 360,064 viewers in 150 cinemas in Ukraine.534 On 25th February 2015 
the film was broadcast on the highly popular national channel Inter,535 thus reaching the mass 
viewer in Ukraine. It was also Ukraineʼs 2015 entry into the National Academy Awards in the 
category ʻForeign Language Film.ʼ536
Unlike Holod-33, Povodyr features perpetrators who are not nameless. The main 
antagonist, named Volodymyr, is a DPU officer who pursues the American boy and accompanies a 
prodotriad – an armed food detachment – sent to the district to procure grain. Volodymyr follows 
533 S. Holden, ʻA Familyʼs Struggle in Stalin's Man-Made Famine,ʼ The New York Times, 15th December 1993.
534 ʻBoks ofic 1 2015ʼ, KinoTeatr UA 6 January 2015. Accessed on 13 June 2018: https://kino-
teatr.ua/uk/main/box_article/article_id/199.phtml
535 V. Samchenko, ʻSlipi ne ti, khto nezriachiʼ, Ukraina Moloda 20 February 2015. Accessed on 21 October 2017: 
http://www.umoloda.kiev.ua/number/2612/164/91907/ 
536 ʻFilʼm “Povodyr” Olesia Sanina predstavliatyme Ukraiinu na premiiu “Oskar”ʼ, Radio Svoboda 9 September 2014. 
Accessed on 3 October 2017: https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/26574991.html 
orders from the DPU commissar Lipetsʼkyi. On arrival to the village Kalynivka, he is greeted by the
chairman of the collective farm whose daughter is celebrating a wedding. The chairman informs 
Volodymyr that the collective farm has fulfilled 112% of the grain quota. In another shot, we see 
Volodymyr handing over a document that he signs without reading to a local man, who is a secret 
informant for the DPU charged with murdering the collective farmʼs head. While the man looks 
confused, he nonetheless obeys. Meanwhile, a voice outside the office shouts abuse at the arrivals 
for not leaving enough bread for people with which to survive until spring. The chairman is indeed 
ultimately killed by Volodymyrʼs men. 
In Povodyr we see the modern state in action: railway station employees reporting to the 
DPU, a storehouse being emptied by peasant men in civilian clothes, a kobzar singing a folk song 
about the ʻcommuneʼ taking away all food. A voiceover tells of an order to commanders of Red 
Army bases to assist the DPU servicemen in tackling ʻkulakʼ revolts and grain procurement 
sabotage within relevant districts. We see Volodymyr asking a commander of a division stationed 
locally for a platoon to round up people in Kalynivka. The commander responds: ʻWe are a regular 
army! Canʼt you do it on your own? … I’ve got unexperienced young boys. Four had to go to the 
tribunal. They saw all that filth and tried to flee.ʼ Volodymyr insists on his compliance and adds: 
ʻThis is not to be discussed.ʼ 
But the perpetrators in Povodyr are Ukrainians. They speak Ukrainian. Volodymyr himself 
is later revealed to be a traitor of the Ukrainian National Army who switched sides and executed his
own comrades. He speaks Ukrainian and Russian based on the situation. A trained perpetrator, he is
both a careerist and enjoys the benefits his position offers. His wife, a celebrated singer, pleads with
him to save the lives of the kobzari and even collects the signatures of foreign artists to spare them 
from repressions. Her actions compromise Volodymyr, who tolerates her. In this sense, he is no 
ideological perpetrator. At the end of the film he is killed by the protagonist kobzar.
Bitter Harvest (Hirki Zhnyva, Mendeliuk, 2017) follows the story of the peasants Natalka 
and Iurii during collectivization and the famine in a tableaux of crucial moments. While the film 
received mostly negative reviews abroad and a mixed reception in Ukraine, even reminding the 
director of the Institute of National Memory of a ʻcomic book,ʼ537 the film reached over 131,000 
viewers within five weeks of its screening in cinemas alone. In the first minutes of Bitter Harvest, 
surveying scenes of the idyllic Ukrainian village, Iurii addresses the question of perpetrators with 
mythical language: ʻdragons do exist, and there is actual evil out there.ʼ This threat is later 
compared to a Tatar invasion and associated the Tsar who ʻconquered us, stole our freedom.ʼ 
537 ‘“Fil’m iak komiks”: Vidhuk V’iatrovycha pro hollivuds’yi fil’m pro Holodomor “Hirki zhnyva”’, Novynarnia 23 
February 2017. Accessed on 1 October 2017: https://novynarnia.com/2017/02/23/film-yak-komiks-vidguk-v-
yatrovicha-pro-gollivudskiy-film-pro-golodomor-girki-zhniva/
Agency for the Holodomor perpetration is placed firmly with the ʻevilʼ Other, while the village 
community is homogenous and morally ʻgood.ʼ 
The perpetrators are depicted according to a binary opposition between reformed 
Communist Mykola and the DPU officer Sergei, whose excessive portrayal in the film borders on 
the parodic. Donning a black leather coast, Sergei comes with his troops to the village to establish a 
collective farm and to confiscate grain and valuables. He speaks Russian, fluent in the language of 
Bolshevik power.538 He runs over peasants and shoots them casually. He routinely dehumanizes the 
victims: while seducing Natalka with a modern gown and food, he does not converse with her in 
order not to develop emotional attachment. Many critics of the film argued that the characters have 
little ʻpsychological depth.ʼ539 Indeed, Sergei is an archetype of nearly biblical proportions: he 
humiliates Natalka by ordering her to wash his feet and wipe them with her hair, in a clear allusion 
to the figure of the anti-Christ. 
Young Communists like Mykola believe the famine to be an ʻillness of growth,ʼ a temporary
and justified detour on route to a better, socialistic state. The editor of the local newspaper, he 
eventually commits suicide. Iurii sees his death as the result of the incongruence of being a 
Ukrainian patriot and a Communist at the same time. Other repentant perpetrators, like a worker 
from the storehouse at the train station, who is also a Red Army veteran, perish. Before helping 
Iurii, he tells him that the famine ravages in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus but that people like 
him just follow the orders. Local Red Army veteran Boiko, who returns from fighting to farming 
and no longer speaks Russian, refuses to join the collective farm, much like Kornii in like 
Samchuk’s Maria. Meanwhile, 
the mechanism of the famine – i.e. confiscation of all foodstuffs by the locals and their 
facilitation of the starvation – is absent in the film. Iurii tells his friends how collectivization is 
conducted by ʻsoldier troops descending onto the villages and herding the peasants into collectives 
without askingʼ. Collectivization is therefore conducted by nameless soldiers; there are no village or
district officials in sight, not even KNS members or local Komsomol. 
Documentaries
As we have seen, the men and women who facilitated collectivization were often those who
perpetrated the famine. In this section, I therefore begin with Soviet documentaries about 
collectivization before proceeding to documentaries about the Holodomor itself. 
538 Sergei is seen in the film handing peasants bulky papers each time he orders them to the collective. According to 
survivor testimonies, no such abundant documentation was used beyond the application they had to sign at the 
village council or in the office of the collective farm.
539 ‘“Fil’m iak komiks”’: Ibid.
Most of these Soviet documentaries and chronicles of the first Five Year Plan are aimed 
primarily at a foreign audience and the younger generations; naturally, they provide images of the 
collective farms that the ideologues wanted audiences to see – but nonetheless, images offer us 
views of the early collective farms and, moreover, of the perpetrators of the famine to come. 
Dziga Vertov’s Odinadtsiatyi (The Eleventh Year, 1928) demonstrates a transformed 
Ukraine eleven years after the revolution. Village activists bring electricity into the village, with a 
long close up of electricity wires on a thatched roof of a Ukrainian cottage serving as illustration of 
the drastic changes in the countryside. Later Komsomols meet in the village council in the village of
Tyvriv, Vinnytsia oblast’, where more than 33 identities of the famine's victims were 
established.540Vertov’s 
 Enthuziazm. Simfoniia Donbassa (Enthusiam. The Donbas Symphony, 1930) presents us 
with a collection of sounds (and a video chronicle) of a newly industrialised and collectivized 
Donbas. Collective farmers drive tractors, and harvesters sing songs. Farming brigade number four 
meets in the field, where they decide to challenge brigade number six at the same gigantic collective
farm to harvesting goals. This decision is met with applause, with one farmer dancing the hopak. 
Indeed, the use of this folk dance to celebrate the advent of collective farms is a refrain in 
Khvylovyi’s notes Po Barvikivskomu raionu (1931), Dovzhenkoʼs Zemlia, and a number of plays 
discussed above.541 The film finishes with a large rally in the city hailing collectivization; Kosior 
greets the rally from a platform with a smile. As the collective farmers go back to work, a slogan on
the screen reads: ʻTo the front with songsʼ. Similar to Donbas in its presentation of ‘agentful’ 
perpetrators of collectivization is Nebuvalyi Pokhid (An Unprecedented Campaign, Kaufman, 
1930), shot by Vertov’s brother Mikhail Kaufman. Focusing on enthusiastic Twenty-Five 
Thousanders working in the villages, a remastered print of the film was screened at various film 
festivals in Ukraine in 2017, providing contemporary audiences with a rare glimpse into the 
propaganda collectivization campaign and helping to foster a new visualization of stories circulating
in post-memory of the period. 
Beyond the Soviet Union, the 1980s witness the appearance of key documentaries produced
in the diaspora centring on the famine itself. Here I group these films alongside those produced by 
state organizations in the wake of glasnost and during the early 1990s and those produced during 
the term of the former President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko. Moving chronologically to identify
540 Natsional’na knyha pam’iati zhertv Holodomoru 1932-1933 rr v Ukraiini. Vinnytsʼka oblast’ ed. V. Latsyba, V. 
Vyzha, P. Kravchenko et al. (Vinnytsia: DP ʻDFK,’ 2008), p. 620. On Vertov’s importance to Soviet documentary 
cinema, see, for instance, J. Hicks, Dziga Vertov: Defining Documentary Film (London; New York: I.B.Tauris, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
541 Mykola Khvylovyi, ʻPo Barvinkovs’komu raionu’ in Tvory v p’iat’iokh tomakh, volume III, ed. H. Kostiuk (Ellicott 
City-Toronto: Smoloskyp, 1982), p. 483.
representational patterns oriented on the rank-and-file perpetrator of the Holodomor, I focus on 
documentaries broadcast nationally or recommended for screening by the Institute of National 
Memory of Ukraine.
In Canada, La Famine Inconnue 
(Neznanyi Holod, Hukalo, 1983) intersperses clips from Soviet documentaries with expert 
commentary and survivor testimonies. When asked about the identities of the perpetrators of the 
famine, historian Mace starts with Stalin and his associates in the Kremlin and then mentions the 
‘Dnipropetrovsk mafia’, including Brezhnev. He explains that the latter was part of the group that 
provided Ukraine with all the officials and plenipotentiaries sent to the countryside to confiscate 
grain. After Mace, Kopelev self-identifies as a perpetrator, claiming that ʻall of us were part of the 
construction of this system, although I was young and stupidʼ. 
Harvest of Despair (Znyva Rozpachu, Novytskyi, 1984), also produced in Canada, follows 
the format of La Famine Inconnue. According to the narrator, young activists from the city were 
sent to the village to enforce collectivization. Presented as a former Soviet ʻactivistʼ, Kopelev notes 
that he assisted in the promotion of propaganda in the villages, but ʻthank God, did not kill, 
imprison or denounce anyone.’ In 1930 Petro Hryhorenko helped grain procurement as a student 
and recounts how the Komsomol friends in his native village starved to death after giving all the 
grain they had to the state. Survivor Myroslava Utka from Dnipropetrovs’k oblast’ explains how the
perpetrators – ʻa group of people – the activists – if you could call them people’ – evicted her 
family. They threw young children onto the street in the middle of winter. Another survivor, Motria 
Dutka, a midwife in the village, concludes that those who went from house to house and who took 
everything were Russians. The narrator confirms that 112,000 ʻreliable members of the Communist 
Party were to guard the harvest and livestock from the starving peasants’, and that in 1934 a further 
27,000 Russian Communists came to replace purged Ukrainian Party officials. No supporting 
evidence is provided, however.
The first documentary on the famine produced in Soviet Ukraine is 33-ii. Svidchennia 
ochevydtsiv (33rd. Survivor Testimonies, Laktionov-Stezenko, 1989), largely a collection of 
survivor testimonies that the director and his team began to collect in 1987. The film features many 
photos of the famine perpetrators, including the ʻshock-workers of grain procurement in 1932’. It 
also uses chronicle footage of a young man guarding the field. His name is Kovalev, responsible for
part of the field. In the footage, he catches a couple of ʻhairdressers’, peasant men with small bags 
who were cutting ears of wheat for consumption. For his work, Kovalev is given the house of a 
dekulakized peasant.
The film also includes testimonies from perpetrators themselves. A former female DPU 
guard claiming that the DPU people like her were exceptionally polite with the inmates, even with 
political ones, is juxtaposed with an emotional account by a man who witnessed his father, a Red 
Army veteran, being brutally beaten to death during the search by a DPU officer. A second 
testimony is given by Marian Malakhovs’kyi (b.1911), who as a Komsomol was ʻmobilised’ to help
collectivization. He recalls an all-night meeting to force individual farmers into collectives which, 
together with extortionate taxation, destroyed the farmers and helped result in the famine. He 
concludes that Stalin alone should assume all responsibility for the famine. The last testimony is by 
a man named Mikhail Petrovich, who dismisses the fact that all foodstuffs were confiscated as 
ʻnonsense’ and claims that ʻnobody terrorized individual peasants.’ In 33-ii. Svidchennia 
ochevydtsiv, the perpetrators are locals, some of whom show remorse, while others engage in 
unrepentant denial.
O hore, tse zh hosti do mene (Oh No, The Guests Are Coming To Me, Fareniuk, 1989) 
features a testimony of an 82-year-old woman named only as Olʼha Pavlivna. Its title is taken from 
Tychynaʼs 1921 poem ‘Holod’. As Bohdan Stupka narrates the novel Ia Romantyka (Me, the 
Romantic, 1933) by Mykola Khvylovyi on the radio in the background, Olʼha starts her story of 
personal trauma with the arrest of her husband as a ʻkulak.ʼ She describes local authorities as 
ʻbanditsʼ, ʻgangʼ or ʻdogsʼ who followed orders. Those who were stronger participated and worked 
hard to demonstrate their loyalty. On their motivation Olʼha comments tersely: ʻIf there had been no
order, they would not have done itʼ and ʻif some cross themselves, the rest do it as well’. Her story 
exposes the most populous group of perpetrators of the Holodomor – the followers.
Pid znakom bidy (Under the Sign of Misfortune, Krainii, 1990) stands out from other 
documentaries for two reasons. Firstly, its production team consists of established professionals in 
the film industry: Iurii Chernichenko wrote the film, while Kost Stepankov narrated it. 
Chernichenko locates the causes of the famine in the size of the harvest in 1930. In his presentation,
the leaders at the top increased grain procurement quotas which, together with ʻcruel pressure from 
the top, obliging zeal in the middle and indifference at the bottom’, resulted in the famine. During 
the famine, as the film explains, tens of thousands of officials were purged from the Party and lost 
their jobs for sabotaging grain procurement. ʻThose who did have conscience and honour were 
disposed of’, Stepankov says in voiceover. He narrates an ʻordinary’ episode of grain procurement 
in 1932 that took place in Otradna in the Tykhoretsk district in Kuban’. The Party cell decided to 
give collective farmers 800g of grain for labour day instead of 400g. The judge sentenced the whole
cell to be executed. When they were headed to their death, the father of the Party cell secretary 
Kotov, who was himself a Red Army Veteran, addressed his son: ʻWe fought for the commune and 
now we will die for the people’. He was executed too. The survivors then tell of brutal murders 
committed by the farmers who guarded the fields.
Secondly, Pid znakom bidy offers a unique perspective on the perpetrators, who are not 
named but listed alphabetically. The first man starts his story by rationalising collectivization and 
explaining why it was needed. He asserts that peasants themselves flocked into the collectives 
without meetings to convince them or without pressure from above. The peasants understood the 
needs of industrialization, he insists. He admits that ‘life was difficult [then]ʼ but argues that the 
famine was not man-made: ʻThere was a bad harvest of all agricultural produce.’ In 1932-1933 he 
was a member of a brigade that searched and confiscated grain. He claims that they used to find 
bread hidden by the peasants and that ʻa lot of work had been conducted in the villages to convince 
people to hide bread. How you hid bread and how you supported collectivization defined your 
political faceʼ (time code 00:13:30). In Bolshevik language he justifies his participation for the 
greater good. There is no remorse or mention of the starving peasants.
The second perpetrator admits that he knew that the famine was man-made but was afraid 
to talk with others about it, adding that ʻI felt [the famine] was deliberate damageʼ. As a member of 
the Komsomol, he was sent with others to search peasant households. He recalls the most common 
signs indicating where the starving peasants were hiding bread; usually a woman would stand or lie 
on the pit with the hidden grain. He used a metal rod to locate it and then remove it all. The last 
perpetrator, presumably a worker from the city, remembers the hostility of the starving peasants 
towards plenipotentiaries like him. The peasants openly asked him if he came to see them dying. He
claims on one occasion to have walked into a house where a woman was eating a child.
Ukraiinsʼka Nich 33-ho (Ukrainian Nightʼ33, Heorhienko and Muzhuk, 1994-1998) is a 
composite of four films: Strakh (Fear), Zhakh (Horror), Hiliotyna (Guillotine) and Sprava 
Hrushevsʼkoho (The Case of Hrushevsʼkyi). The series was produced by the state-owned company 
Ukrtelefilm and broadcast on various TV channels, including national Novyi Kanal. The 
filmmaker’s position on the perpetrators is clear: either they were foreign Others from beyond 
Ukraine; local perpetrators on the margins of the village, devoid of agency; or ordinary people 
compromised into perpetration. 
To develop the first point, filmmaker Muzhuk calls Ukrainians in the leadership of 
Ukrainian Soviet republic malorosy, ‘Little Russians’. ‘Enchanted by brotherly Moscow,’ he 
explains, ‘they long like mad to put their heads on scaffold, sentencing their duped people to capital
punishmentʼ (Hilyotyna, time code 00:57:53). He locates perpetrator agency in Moscow. Together 
with Postyshev, he claims that 15,000 Communists from Russia were sent to work in Ukraine 
during the famine, which amounts to 20 in each district – without giving a source, however. The 
narrator emphasises that these chuzhi (alien) people were ʻthe occupation corpus that finished 
Ukraineʼ. Muzhuk explains that local perpetrators were the idle in the village who became the 
vanguard or agrarian proletariat, seizing all power in the village, dekulakizing their neighbours and 
keeping confiscated possessions. He contends that such people taught their children about ʻclass 
senseʼ, which would remains in their genes today. Meanwhile, famine survivors Topchii Stepan and
Tretiak Nadia speak of sadists torturing the victims: burning them in ovens, disembowelling them, 
leaving them to die in the woods, evicting families with young children in the middle of a winter 
night. They claim that the perpetrators wanted victims to die ʻunder the fenceʼ to show what could 
happen to the rest (time code 01:03:58). To sustain this sadistic behaviour, the narrator alleges, 
Stalin called for an increase in vodka production.
Ukraiinsʼka Nich 33-ho also showcases compromised perpetrators, including those who 
fought to survive themselves. Such compromised perpetrators included Soviet youth who were keen
to find enemies, even within their own families. Their loyalty to the regime was tested with their 
readiness ʻto throw their father out on the streetʼ. Muzhuk revisits the village of Iaresʼky where 
Dovzhenko filmed his acclaimed Zemlia. The chairman of the collective farm there was a local 
peasant named Makhtei Tarasenko, whom the villagers begged to save their children. He agreed 
with the appointed Russian official to distribute some food to the starving, but after someone 
denounced him, he was sentenced to death by the district officials. According to Muzhuk, the 
Bolsheviks executed almost all its district officials shortly after the famine (time code 00:34:10).
Chas temriavy (Time of Darkness, Dudka, 2003) features Ukrainian historian Vasylʼ 
Marochko as its main expert. He states that grain procurement in 1928 was executed by RSChA and
the ODPU. Survivor Olʼha Tsymbaliuk from Velyka Berezka in Khmelʼnytsʼk oblast’ speaks of a 
search brigade from the village dekulakizing her family and recalls going to the head of the village 
council who oversaw their eviction. The film uses archival materials, including a letter to Kosior 
from a perpetrator named Hryhorii Tkachenko, who asserts that Soviet policies were being 
undermined by the starvation of the peasantry. 
In a similar way, Holodomor. Ukraiina, XX stolittia: Tekhnolohiia henotsydu (Holodomor. 
Ukraine in XX century: Technology of the Genocide, Deriugin, 2005), which was commissioned by
the charity foundation ʻUkraine-3000ʼ, regards perpetrators of the famine on the ground as the alien 
Other. They are Communists, the DPU and members of tugboat brigades. Nonetheless, one of the 
experts in the film, Oleh Bozhko, argues that these perpetrators had to rely on local collaboration as 
party officials and the DPU alone could not locate hidden grain. 
Velykyi Holod (Great Famine, Ovechkin, 2005), which was broadcast on the 1+1 national 
channel, frames perpetrators according to the following groups: KNS, tugboat brigades, police and 
Party plenipotentiaries. Their motivations are varied: some were terrorized into participation, while 
others ʻdid not have souls and were not human’. The film features an expert medical professional 
who classifies the perpetrators as mentally healthy people whose consciousness was ʻviolated with 
Communist nonsense’. In fact, the narrator adds, the DPU did not have enough servicemen to do the
job. The next generation was thus raised in terror and bred to be obedient. 
Eduard Lozovyi, who wrote the screenplay, also examines the role of the field guards who 
ʻoften made choices between the lives of their families and other people. Sometimes they did not 
have a choiceʼ. He illustrates this point with the story of Kostiantyn Honchar, who let people dig for
potatoes in the field. Discovered, he served a year in prison, during which time his family was 
dekulakized. The narrator concludes that we cannot judge these young people for participating, 
even though they sentenced their neighbours to a slow death, as their actions were sanctioned by the
state. In his concluding words, Lozovyi calls rank-and-file perpetrators – ʻthose who killed and 
those who did not intervene’ – ʻour ancestors tooʼ.
Khlibna Hilliotyna (Bread Guillotine, Kobryn, 2008) was also commissioned by 1+1. The 
film is a monologue of a generic perpetrator of the famine, a fictional recollection of a Twenty-Five 
Thousander sent to a village to enforce collectivization. He starts his story in 1918 while listening to
Lenin speak at a rally and boast that the Bolsheviks realised that bread is the best tool to establish 
control. The perpetrators explains: ʻI was acting consciously, I was building a new world. Violence 
was just a means to lead generally dark, backward people, and I had no time to explain, so I had to 
force people for their own good. I first arrived in Muravʼiovʼs army in the first Bolshevik offensive 
against Ukraine.ʼ.542 He elaborates that social stratification was an effective tool to atomise society 
and justifies such division with the demands of time: ʻI understood that many innocent people 
would fall victim to the uncompromising battle we are waging. As a human I could empathise, but 
as a Bolshevik, I did not have such a right. I understood it was not about bread: I went back to a 
unfinished Civil War which would last for a long time.ʼ Delivering this monologue, in other words, 
is an imagined ideological perpetrator.
The story continues in the autumn of 1935 with chronicle footage showing, as the narrator 
puts it, ʻa playful Marusia Demchenko chatting to Stalin.ʼ While the narrator claims that ‘new 
peopleʼ like Demchenko – without honour and independent thinking – lived the rest of their lives 
trying to forget ʻhow it really was,ʼ Demchenko’s tactile interaction with Stalin does not look like a 
meeting between  a victims and a perpetrator. (Indeed, as I suggest in Chapter One, Demchenko can
542 Mykola Kvylovyi described such perpetrators in his notes Po Barvinkivsʼkomu raionu (On Barvinkove District, 
1931). According to Kvylovyi, during collectivization, local officials both faced terror and terrorized the peasants 
who opposed collectivization. They organized the collective burning of icons, dekulakized peasants and confiscated 
grain during house searches with crowbars for piercing surfaces – activities that become routine during the 
Holodomor a year later. M. Khvylovyi, ʻPo Barvinkivsʼkomu raionu. Z bloknotu korrespondentaʼ (Kharkiv: DVU, 
1930).
be understood as a perpetrator in her village.) 
The film’s narrator adds that the Bolsheviks used criminals to enforce their policies and 
established a network of professional informers. Within a year of the Law on Protection of 
Socialistic Property, the narrator claims, there were 300,000 convictions and 15,000 executions in 
Soviet Ukraine. This claim is not verified by sources; in fact, historians elsewhere provide numbers 
for the same period that are considerably lower, about 55,000 and 2,000 respectively.543 The 
narrator provides another unverified figure – 200,000 new settlers from Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan who came to live in Ukrainian villages devastated by the famine. Again, archival 
evidence suggests that the number of settlers were over 100,000 and that most of them returned 
home within a year. The episode finishes with Demchenko receiving the Land Ownership Act – the 
first document of its kind in Ukraine – for her collective farm in Starosillia, ʻwhere hundreds diedʼ 
in the famine. 
The narrator also raises the question of a wider complicity that made the famine possible: 
the participation of teachers in tugboat brigades, the doctors who agreed to hide the facts of 
starvation in death certificates. He concludes that Ukraine’s post-Soviet corruption stems from the 
mechanism of the Holodomor and from totalitarian ideology in particular. It is ideology, not people,
that should be subject to punishment, argue the filmmakers. 
Zhyvi (The Living, Bukovsʼkyi, 2008) is a award-winning film commissioned by the 
charity foundation ʻUkraine-3000ʼ and financed by private donations. In 2009 Bukovsʼkyi received 
the state award of ʻPeopleʼs Artistʼ for directing the film.544 Zhyvi is an intertwined story told by 
several survivors and by entries from the diaries of Welsh journalist Gareth Jones, who witnessed 
the famine first-hand in 1933. It places the agency of perpetration with a Communist regime that 
sought to punish Ukrainian peasants and solve the national question. At the same time, the narrator 
leaves pauses long enough for people to speak for themselves. Victor Yushchenko, the former 
President of Ukraine, calls the people who facilitated the death of 400-500 people in his village 
skoty (beasts). Bukovsʼkyi explains that he included this footage not as homage but for its honesty; 
here, argues the filmmaker, Yushchenko was ‘at his most honestʼ about the famine.545
Some survivors in Zhyvi explain the motives of the village and district officials as those 
simply following the orders from above: ʻThey were given instructions.ʼ Others call them normal 
543 Yu. Shapoval, ʻPovelitelnaia neobkhodimostʼ: god 1932.ʼ 
544 ‘Zhyvi. Filʼm Serhiia Bukovsʼkoho’, UA Pershiy 20 September 2015. Accessed on 1 October 2017: 
http://1tv.com.ua/news/announces/74209; ‘ТВі pokazhe filʼm Zhyvi Serhiia Bukovsʼkoho’, BigmirNet 21 
November 2012. Accessed on 1 October 2017: http://news.bigmir.net/entertaiment/641233-TVi-pokaje-film-Jivi-
Sergiya-Bykovskogo
545 S. Bukovsʼkyi, ʻLiudy postupovo zrozumiiut, shcho stalosia. Holovne – stroiem nikoho nikudy ne zahaniatyʼ in 
Denʼ on 17.04.2009 https://day.Kyiv.ua/uk/article/intervyu/sergiy-bukovskiy-lyudi-postupovo-zrozumiyut-shcho-
stalosya-golovne-stroiem-nikogo
people but with ʻthe conscience of dogsʼ: ʻThatʼs all it takes, a conscience of a dog.ʼ Ultimately the 
survivors stress that the perpetrators were nashi, locals who committed ‘the greatest sinʼ by taking 
food from the disabled or by refusing to let a child pick discarded grain in the field after the harvest.
Jones’s story of the perpetrators is somewhat different: he reports the words of a Party functionary 
from the Moscow political department who is sent to Ukraine along with 2,700 other ʻbest and 
strongestʼ officials (time code 00:39:00). The official declares his intentions to destroy the ʻkulaksʼ 
and the opposition and to ensure advancement of Red Army Veterans on the Party ladder. 
A more telling picture of the rank-and-file perpetrators in Zhyvi is provided with a chronicle
of collective farm brigade leader Ivan Kolesnik, who leaves for a collective farmers’ conference in 
Kharkiv in March 1933, when the famine reached its peak. He puts on clean clothes, kisses his wife 
and daughter, puts a Pravda newspaper in a small suitcase, and takes a bundle of food from his 
wife. Outside the house he is cheered by over a dozen of his friends who look as excited as he does. 
Nobody looks emaciated. These individuals are likely to be perpetrators in the collective farm 
Chervonyi Nezamozhnyk in the Barvinkove district in the Kharkiv oblast’, which delegated 
Kolesnik to the conference. 
Zhorna (Stone Mill, Geen, 2008) is a collection of survivor testimonies. The perpetrators 
are activists who are idle and local drunks. ʻThey were lazy and didnʼt have much. There was a lot 
of hatred. Those who had nothing to lose joined the farms at onceʼ (time code 00:11:07). The film 
reveals particularly poignant details by way of a ‘report of the Bohodukhiv regional pioneer 
organization at the fifth district Party conference on the fulfilment of Postyshevʼs instructions 
concerning protection of socialist property and struggle against harvest losses’. Here the role of 
children in the mechanism of the famine is in evidence: they ʻdetectedʼ the ʻthievesʼ in December 
1932. The film also explains how brigades of 5-6 perpetrators were split to ʻworkʼ on 50-70 houses.
Those brigades that failed to find bread were dismissed, and new people appointed. One survivor 
accuses Stalin of organizing the famine (time code 00:58:39), whereas another blames locals, 
stating that Stalin did not order them to take everything (time code 00:59:16).
Zakliattia Bezpamʼiatstva: Holodomor 1932-1933 rr. na Luhanshchyni (The Curse of 
Amnesia: The Holodomor 1932-1933 in Luhans’k Oblast’, Kramarenko, 2009) is another 
composite of testimonies, produced by Iryna Mahryts’ka. Most of them are vignettes offering 
insight into survival strategies as well as indelible images of cannibalism. Survivors recount the 
burial of people alive and whole villages wiped out by starvation. While the survivors reflect on the 
rank-and-file perpetrators, the narrator concludes that they were same kind of people who take 
economic advantage of the peasants in Ukraine today: the so-called Red Barons. 
One survivor calls perpetrators ‘Party people’ sent to the village; they are not local. But all 
others blame locals. One woman focuses on her neighbours, who seized her family’s cow. She 
ponders the reasons why this childless couple took the cow from them – a family with five children 
– and concludes that she can never know. 
The film presents other examples of local officials not only refusing to help the starving but
purposefully destroying village resources that peasants could use to survive. Some officials tortured 
peasants in front of their children to reveal where the food is hidden. Ivan Chervenko adds: 
ʻActivists were from the poor class, and where would you find a clever man from the poor class? If 
he is clever, even from the poor, he can still become a minister. If he has nothing in his head, he 
would drink himself to death.ʼ When the interviewer asks Ivan to confirm that the perpetrators were
idle, the interviewerʼs assistant exclaims ʻthey were drunksʼ, and Ivan agrees. He gives an example 
of an idle local man who made a hole in the wall of his house to dispose of rubbish to save him the 
trouble of walking outside. During collectivization, Ivan claims that this man became a chairman of 
the collective farm. He confirms that local officials were appointed by the district or KGB who 
were looking for ‘crueler’ people able to facilitate collectivization.
The narrator argues that in 1932-1933 the Bolshevik leaders confiscated the bread with the 
help of countless local perpetrators from the idle and marginal elements in society. In such a way, 
the narrator claims, the leaders provided themselves with an alibi. The narrator cites one of the TsK 
KP(b)U secretaries, Mendel Khataievich, who instructed party brigades to take grain by all possible 
means to teach Ukrainian villages the nature of Bolshevik decisiveness: ʻBetter do more than less, 
and Party and Stalin is behind you.ʼ Almost all secretaries of the district Party committees were 
replaced with non-Ukrainians in January 1933.
The short documentary Holod 33 roku. Motoroshnyi filʼm pro trahediiu Ukraiinsʼkoho 
narodu ʻ19.33ʼ (1933 Hunger. A Poignant Film About the Tragedy of Ukrainian people ʻ19.33,ʼ 
Shevchenko, 2016) features personal stories of the survivors with commentary by historians 
Volodymyr Serhiichuk and Larysa Didkovsʼka. This film is accessible online546 and is used at 
schools and colleges during lessons on the Holodomor.547 The perpetratorsʼ depiction follows 
Prokliattia Bezpamʼiatstva: they are poor peasants who seized the opportunities that the new regime
546 ʻHolod 33 roku. Motoroshnyi filʼm pro trhediiu ukraiinsʼkoho narodu “19.33”ʼ,  24Kanal 26 November 2016. 
Accessed on 1 October 2017: 
https://24tv.ua/golod_33_roku_motoroshniy_film_pro_tragediyu_ukrayinskogo_narodu_1933_n753435; ʻHolod 33 
roku. Motoroshnyi filʼm pro trhediiu ukraiinsʼkoho narodu “19.33”ʼ, GloriaTV 25 November 2017. Accessed on 
01.12.2017:  https://gloria.tv/video/cREux1BsA3ec1eqVTECtfwuQH
547 ʻHolodomor. My pamʼiataiemo!ʼ, VP NUBiP Ukraiiny ʻZalishchytsʼkyi ahrarnyi koledzh im. Ie. Khraplyvohoʼ 
21.12.2013. Accessed on 1 October 2017: http://zkol.org.ua/index.php/2013-12-21-10-42-13/vikhovni-zakhodi/882-
holodomor-my-pam-iataiemo
offered. Such films offer survivor testimonies as well as historiansʼ commentary to convey the 
narrative of the Holodomor as genocide organised along ethnic lines. But survivor testimonies at 
times deviate from this narrative. In particular, Maria Kornienko has reservations about naming the 
local perpetrators because their children still live in the same village. Eventually she agrees and 
names all three perpetrators who searched her house and took away even potato peels. The narrator 
concludes: they were not ʻephemeral Communists.ʼ They were neighbours who, after the famine, 
explained their participation by their wanting to survive, to which Maria rhetorically, ‘Did she wish 
to survive as well?’
Conclusion
In January 2017 Ukraine’s Minister of Culture, Ievhen Nyshchuk, announced a 
screenwriting competition for another feature film on the Holodomor, in which he likened local 
perpetrators to mankurty – people without nationality or identity who forget from whence they 
come.548 His reduction is partly due to the feature films discussed above, which present conflicted 
views of the perpetrators. In Soviet films, they are ideological perpetrators; in some post-Soviet 
films, they are sadists and the prosopographical Other; in other post-Soviet films, they are ordinary 
people. Indeed, the Soviet feature films on collectivization largely portray activists on the ground as
uncompromising Communists or Komsomols trying to change the village for the better. In Zemlia 
and Podnitaia Tselina they effectively dehumanise the ʻkulaksʼ before deporting them. Notably, 
most of the Soviet-era films foreground ideological perpetrators who eventually disappear from the 
scene, leaving follower perpetrators to maintain the collective farm system. Vavylon XX, on the 
other hand, demonstrates that this system divides villages, leaving little room for bystanders, and 
posits, not without controversy, that collectivization failed to be a movement from below. The post-
Soviet 
feature films produced after 1991, meanwhile, tend to present perpetrators without 
individuality. The nameless Komsomols and the sadists in Holod-33, like the countless soldiers in 
Bitter Harvest, are not sufficient to explain how the starvation of millions of victims in 1932-33 was
facilitated on the ground. Only in Povodyr does the viewer learn of the decisions that led to the 
famine, with the Red Army assisting the DPU in grain procurement and combatting ʻkulak 
sabotageʼ and local collaboration. 
In the realm of Soviet documentary film, 
548 ʻUriad bere na sebe vidpovidal’nist’ na uves’ svit zaiavyty: Holodomor v Ukraiini 1932-33 rokiv buv henotsydom 
proty ukraiins’koho narodu, – Ievhen Nyshchuk’, Uriadovyi Portal. Iedynyi veb-portal orhaniv vykonavchoii vlady 
Ukraiiny 19.01.2018. Accessed on 21 January 2018: https://www.kmu.gov.ua/ua/news/uryad-bere-na-sebe-
vidpovidalnist-na-uves-svit-zayaviti-golodomor-v-ukrayini-1932-33-rokiv-buv-genocidom-proti-ukrayinskogo-
narodu-yevgen-nishuk
activists are hard-working, enthusiastic people ready to change their lives for better. They 
work for the greater good, welcome and support state policies. Or at least they seem so. In 
Enthuziazm. Simfoniia Donbassa, a close up of a young beautiful girl working in the field is 
replaced with a picture of her supposedly from behind. These pictures are of different women 
entirely. Documentaries produced in the Ukrainian diaspora, by contrast, establish a format that 
later Ukrainian films will follow: a composite story illustrated with Soviet chronicle or feature film 
footage and supported by survivors testimonies and historian input, often provided without 
references. In the main, they also reproduce the image of the perpetrator as nameless, ruthless and 
ideological figure – or as an alien Other, as demonstrated by Cold War films like Harvest of 
Despair, which place the agency of perpetration with thousands of Communists and Russians. 
While documentaries like Ukraiinsʼka Nich 33-ho produced between 1989-1994 follow the 
nationalist trope of the Holodomor perpetrator as a savage, aberrant and compromised Other devoid
of agency, others let retired local perpetrators speak for themselves. In 33-ii. Svidchennia 
ochevydtsiv they deny the famine and show no remorse, not unlike the perpetrators of mass violence
in Indonesia in Joshua Oppenheimerʼs The Act of Killing. Meanwhile the former members of the 
search brigade in Pid znakom bidy try to make sense of the violence, with one of the perpetrators 
accepting the fact that they were to blame. The interview of the repressed official’s daughter in 
Iaresʼky presents an excellent example of post-memory of the traumatic past, whereas the survivor 
in O hore, tse zh hosti do mene raises the question of the followers being the main group of 
perpetrators on the ground.
The more nationalist trope is maintained in the documentaries of mid 2000s and after: the 
perpetrators were DPU servicemen, Communists from Russia, criminals and compromised locals. 
Some of these films were commissioned by the charity ʻUkraine-3000,ʼ closely associated with 
former President of Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko, who lobbied for international recognition of the 
Holodomor as genocide. Survivor testimonies included in the films, however, mention mass 
participation of the locals. We see local perpetrators – ordinary people like Demchenko in Khlibna 
Hilliotyna and Kolesnik in Zhyvi – but they do not speak. They are represented. 
Chapter VII
Representation of the Rank-and-File Perpetrators 
at National Museum ʻHolodomor Victims Memorial’
National Museum ʻHolodomor Victims Memorial’ is the largest institution of its kind in
Ukraine, dedicated to the victims of the 1932-33 famine as well as to the education of the public
about it. Like the majority of Ukrainian museums it is state-run and reports to the Ministry of
Culture. Built on the slope of a park in central Kyiv, its memorial part was opened by the then
president of Ukraine Victor Yushchenko in 2008. In July 2015 the memorial received its current
name: National Museum ʻHolodomor Victims Memorial.’ Its museum section is still to be built and
is currently located inside the memorial part. Having acquired its current national status not long
ago it therefore holds a monopoly in Ukraine over institutionalised remembrance of the Holodomor
in Ukraine. Therefore, the museum’s importance in memory politics in today’s Ukraine would be
difficult to overestimate. This chapter will explore how the perpetrators of the famine fit in within
the museum’s mission, site and narrative – through current and temporary exhibits and other
activities, before drawing conclusion on the museum’s role in cultural memory of the famine’s
perpetrators. 
Shortly before the museum received its current name, Kyrylenko, Ukraine’s minister of
culture at the time, appointed a new director of the museum and declared that one of the key aims of
the new management is to ensure general recognition of the Holodomor as a genocide of the
Ukrainian people, by all visitors of the museum in particular. His words define the vector for the
museum’s narrative precisely: ʻThis museum is responsible for enforcing the policy of national
memory. And all its visitors must leave the museum with a clear understanding that the events of
1932-1933 were a deliberate destruction of Ukrainian people.’549 This aim is further elaborated by
the museum’s development objective for 2015-2020: ʻthe museum strives to become a world-class
institution and an influential agency in forming civil society in Ukraine. Through research,
education and cultural activity the museum will inform society about the act of genocide of the
Ukrainian people and honour everybody who perished or was not born as a result of the tragedy.
The museum will also help consolidation and development of the Ukrainian nation, its historical
consciousness and culture as well as the accumulation of regional and local history research of the
Holodomor. All this will help us to understand this tragedy better and to develop necessary skills to
549 ʻOlesiu Stasiuk pryznacheno novym dyrektorom Natsionalʼnoho muzeiu “Memorial pamʼiati zhertv Holodomoriv v 
Ukraiini”ʼ, Ministerstvo Kulʼtury Ukraiiny 26 March 2015. Accessed on 01 October 2017: 
http://mincult.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=244921364&cat_id=244913751
prevent similar crimes taking place in the future.’550 The perpetrators of the famine, therefore, ought
to be interpreted as perpetrators of the genocide.
The museum of the Holodomor could not be attached to a central location, nor to a
particular site that speaks for itself like the famous memorials of Hiroshima or the Normandy
beaches. Neither are there sites specifically associated with the Holodomor perpetrators like the
House of the Wannsee Conference Memorial and Educational Site, the Topography of Terror and
Wewelsburg District Museum with the Final Solution. Neither can the museum silently remind us
of the perpetrators like the memorials of Buchenwald and Auschwitz through its premises or
exhibits. It is not here that the famine took place, but its location is important. The site is dramatic
and unusual. The memorial complex itself is deeply metaphorical beyond the symbolism imbued by
its designers. The artist Andrii Haidamaka, the architect Iurii Kovaliov and sculptors Mykola
Obeziuk and Petro Drozdovsʼkyi tried to tell the story of the famine in the facade and sculptures in
the park near the museum.551 Nestled inside a hill in the park of Glory (Park Slavy) over the river
Dnipro, its location is rather telling of the complicated history of Ukraine. On one side the museum
borders a Soviet monument of Eternal Glory to the soldiers fallen during the Great Patriotic War,552
while on the other side it borders the Orthodox church of the Saviour at Berestove. This church was
a former residence of Kyivan Rus princes and hosts a tomb of Monomakh dynasty, including that of
Iurii Dolgorukii who founded Moscow. Therefore, while the Red Army and the Holodomor sites
mark the events that took millions of lives, the church emphasises by its presence the Russian
influence throughout the history of Ukraine.
An alley leading to the museum from the street through the park of Glory starts with two
stone angels – the solemn guardians of the souls of the victims. The alley is paved with black
cobble stones which symbolise the black fertile earth of the Ukrainian countryside, also serving as a
tilled soil of memory. It also reminds visitors that a devastating famine on the fertile Ukrainian soil
is an absurdity. While some symbols might not be obvious to the onlooker, the others are telling. In
the beginning of the path one meets a life-size sculpture of a young, emaciated girl holding five ears
of wheat. She embodies the famineʼs youngest and most vulnerable victims. The number of ears is
not accidental – the law on the theft of socialistic property, passed in 1932 was widely referred to as
ʻThe law of Five Ears of Wheat.’
550 ʻKontseptsiia rozvytku muzeiuʼ, Memorial zhertv Holodomoru 23 September 2015. Accessed on 01 April 2016: 
http://memorialholodomor.org.ua/uk/aboutthemuseum/2015-09-23-06-07-3
551 ʻIstoriia Natsionalʼnoho muzeiu “Memorial zhertv Holodomoru”ʼ Memorial zhertv Holodomoru. Accessed on 1 
October 2017: http://memorialholodomor.org.ua/
552 The term ʻGreat Patriotic War’ refers to the period in the Second World War between 22nd June 1941 and 9th May 
1945 used in Soviet historiography. The starting date of 22nd June 1941 marked the German Army crossing the 
border of then Soviet Union.
At the end of the alley one faces a white-washed 30 meter high bell-tower in the shape of a
candle with an intricate gilded flame and steps down to the museum underneath it. The bell tower
also features glass crosses of different sizes symbolising the victims – larger crosses for the adult
souls and smaller for the children. At the base of the bell there are four black crosses with lead
storks trying to fly away. The birds symbolise life and peace in Ukrainian folklore and here in the
museum they are intended to mean the rebirth of the Ukrainian people. Adorning the pathways
leading to the museum are milling stones. During the famine they were broken by the local officials
to prevent peasants from milling grain at home. Here they have also acquired a second meaning –
the mills of history. On the first Saturday in November, the official day of the Holodomor
commemoration in Ukraine, almost all surfaces around the entrance and the slopes of the hill on its
right side are covered by candles. 
Inside the museum that serves as a metaphorical tomb to the victims, there is a small room
which hosts themed collections of posters occasionally exhibited for a limited amount of time and
an interactive audio screen explaining the posters in Ukrainian and in English. After the poster
room, the route follows into the Hall of Memory – a large round room underneath the tower with
many volumes of the Book of Memory with the names of the victims, current exhibitions and a
permanent ethnographic collection in the room. Finally, visitors are reminded of the Holodomor
presence: there is a bell they can ring in memory of the victims – similar to the one at the Hiroshima
memorial complex.
The perpetrators are absent spatially. They are implied to be the agency behind the removal
of provisions from the country with the black fertile soil or who prevented children eating like the
one epitomised by the sculpture of the emaciated girl; their actions resulted in the colossal number
of victims in many volumes of the Book of Memory. If not spatially, how is their role explained in
the narrative?
The museum’s narrative was clearly defined by Ukraine’s minister of culture in 2015 as
the story of a genocide against the Ukrainian people. As presented in the texts in the memory hall,
the narrative identifies the victims and the aggressors – the famine is the result of the Communist
policies designed by Stalin and his close associates. Had Ukrainians defended their own state after
the revolution in 1917, the famine would not have occurred. The regime targeted Ukrainian
peasants and the current citizens of Ukraine are the offspring of the survivors or those who were
murdered, deported or repressed. Ukrainian peasants were not passive victims in the years
preceding the famine – they actively resisted collectivization but their resistance was brutally
suppressed. Under current circumstances, the tie between the survivors and their descendants is not
only personal and historical but political, it bonds all Ukrainians to each other as survivors of a
catastrophe who are still under threat in their country. Now that Ukraine is independent, the
memory of the victims should be preserved and their experience retold. The Ukrainian state is the
appropriate entity to convey the memory of the famine in the teleological narrative of the
victimhood and resistance in the struggle of the Ukrainian people for independence and nation-
building. Such narrative can be seen as reductive, based along ethnic lines and dichotomy of
interpretation of the past. This is further revealed by close reading of the story provided in the
exhibition and online, events organised by the museum and publicity created by these events.While
locating an aggressor at the top level is rather straightforward – Stalin and his functionaries in the
Kremlin.
 When people on the ground are mentioned in the posters and electronic chronicle inside the
museums, they are reduced to the poor stratum of the village, Communists from the cities and
security services devoid of the agency. Alien to the village, they organised the famine-genocide
against the Ukrainians, took all the grain for export and kept the peasants under control. In this way
the existing narrative legitimises the discourse of anonymous perpetration on the middle and lower
level. So does one leave the museum with a sense of justice when none of the rank-and-file
perpetrators have been put on trial since Ukraine became independent, or with a clear understanding
of how this famine was possible on the ground? The answer is likely to be negative.
The absence of the rank-and-file perpetrators possibly lies in seeking to avoid controversy
in the memorial devoted to the victims. Moreover, as with Holocaust memorials in general, there is
ʻa universal willingness to commemorate suffering experienced rather than suffering caused,’553 so
including local participation in the narrative could challenge its current premises and prove to be
rather sensitive for public discussion. It might also stem from the persistant lack of detailed and
nuanced approach in assessment of the past, viewing it still in black and white while appealing to
collective suffering. Politicians as well as the general public are still debating who should be
designated official heroes and villains554 as part of the dichotomy in this reductive reading of the
past. Yet explaining why people participated in the Holodomor by using the latest research on the
perpetrators of mass violence, genocides and crimes against humanity might offer exactly what the
museum is trying to achieve – a better understanding so that similar crimes do not take place in the
future. Reducing the lower rank perpetrators to outcasts, outsiders or the alien Other is not
supported by the latest research, nor does it encourage further studies or a better understanding of
the genocide.
553 S. Milton, cited in E. T. Linenthal, Preserving Memory: The Struggle to Create America’s Holocaust Museum (New
York: Viking, 1995), p. 199.
554 See David R. Marples, Heroes and Villains. Creating national history in contemporary Ukraine (Edmonton: 
University of Alberta, 2008); C. J. Levy, ʻHero of Ukraine’s Splits Nation, Inside and Out,’ New York Times, 1 
March 2010.
The other challenge for better understanding of the Holodomor in the current narrative is its
reliance on the corpora of oral memory and research of rather limited number of historians. The
representation of the famine is intrinsically tied with the memory of those who experienced the past,
travelled to that foreign country555 and shared their impressions or post-memory. It also uses the
memory of those who experienced the later 1946-1947 famine, like the artist Haidamaka, one of the
museum’s designers. Thus, this collective narrative is comprised of impressions or a perception556
of the foreign land, not what that land actually was, even if some of the survivors who participated
in the organization of the exhibition or their memories were used as sources. Naturally, visitors
might adopt this narrative depending on how effective the message is transmitted, especially if they
did not have any, or only limited, prior knowledge of the event. Based on the perceptions offered
they can also construct or revise their impression of the Ukrainian history and the state.
A genocidal narrative does not have to be reductive, omissive nor ethnocentric. Neither are
its artefacts required to be authentic, but conceptual and thought-provoking.557 The currently used
identification with the victims method558 in the museum through the ethnographic objects is
problematic as more and more visitors might not identify with the life of the victims – the peasants.
Today two thirds of Ukraine’s population is urban. Research shows that if children are not engaged
during museum visits, they do not necessarily visit museums as adults; in particular, if the museum
visits are put in place of their lectures on the subject in what school students refer to as
ʻmausoleum-museums.’559 Moreover, the museum site, rich with Ukrainian symbolism, tells an
independently visiting foreigner less than it does to the Ukrainian one. How will the gap in time and
context will be bridged when the distance between firsthand experience and subsequent visitors is
only going to increase over time? While symbolism can be explained during a guided tour,560 with
audio guides in several languages already adopted in some of the Ukrainian museums,  adopting a
dialogue rather than projecting an insulated message might be a possible option.
The state narrative which presents an independent nation-state Ukraine as the ultimate
answer to the Holodomor-genocide can still argue in favour of any human life as the highest value
and against totalitarian regimes. Genocidal and universalist narratives are not mutually exclusive,
555 The reference to the past as a foreign country was made by L. P. Hartley in his work The Go-Between (London: 
Penguin Modern Classics, 2004).
556 O. Bartov, Chambers of Horror in Israel Studies, vol. 2, no. 2, p. 70.
557 D. Rank, Na vidkryttia museiu Polin u Warshavi, Ukraina Moderna 04 December 2014.
558 J. K. Ochsner, Understanding the Holocaust Through the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Journal of 
Architectural Education 48.4 (1995), pp. 240–249.
559 L. Norris, Who Are Museums For? in History News, Vol. 65, No. 4 (Autumn 2010), p. 8.
560 The following examples are drawn from almost 95 reviews left by the museum's visitors: ʻNational Museum “The 
Memorial in Commemoration of Famines” Victimsʼ, Tripadvisor. Accessed on 1 April 2016: 
https://www.tripadvisor.co.uk/Attraction_Review-g294474-d3229223-Reviews-
National_Museum_The_Memorial_in_Commemoration_of_Famines_Victims-Kiev.html.
though they correspond to the social and intellectual environment in which they tend to be
disseminated.561 Both narratives, Bartov argues, omit such aspects of the mass killing as the political
and socio-economic conditions that acted as major factors in generating and perpetuating the killing
of millions. Narratives tend to evolve around emotion and mourning, but can still encourage
questions and analysis. 
This is where its recent exhibits and publicity activities play an important role. In May 2016
it held a temporary exhibition of elaborately embroidered shirts, called vyshyvanky, worn in rural
Ukraine and exchanged for food during the Famine. The exhibition ʻVyshyvanka Worth of Life,’562
featured authentic shirts from private and institutional collections and provided an explanation of
how these personal items were exchanged for food by the starving. The power of the shirts as
artefacts comes in part from their ordinariness and contemporariness. They are still fashionable and
are easily readable as personal items. They look very similar to the shirts worn in Ukraine today.
The similarity between the old shirts and the ones worn on the streets of Kyiv today can create a
sense of the reality of the victimsʼ despair, as well as identification with them.
The museum screened a documentary entitled ʻNational Heritage’ on the vyshyvanky, but
the exhibition did not elaborate on the fate of the owners of the shirts. One might ask how these
shirts were preserved – were these exact garments exchanged for bread by the starving peasants
and, if so, who preserved them until they were purchased by the museum or collectors? The
descendants of the bystanders or the perpetrators? Moreover, peasants’ personal jewellery such as
rings, earrings and crosses can be displayed together with the artefacts from TORHZIN – a state
network of stores in 1931-1936 that purchased gold, silver and foreign currency from the Soviet
population at considerably lower prices in exchange for foodstuffs. An exhibition on the chain’s
activity in Chernigiv oblast’ was presented at the oblast’ historical museum in winter 2016 and
featured many authentic artefacts, including jewellery and store equipment.563 Thus the most
ordinary personal items in the museum can be the most powerful in overcoming the sense of
otherness, especially if they are put in the context of an understandable human struggle for survival.
Adopting new approaches like identification by the museum is not incidental. Over the last
year the museum’s management has been changing the museum dramatically: it became vocal and
visible. Its staff participates in international exchange programmes, takes part in programmes on
561 Bartov, Chambers of Horror, p. 82.
562 ʻU Kyievi v muzeii Holodomoru vidkryly vystavku “Vyshyvanka vartistiu v zhyttia”ʼ, Radio Svoboda 18 May 2016.
Accessed on 15 May 2018: https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news/27743219.html
563 ʻPohrabuvannia po-radiansʼkomu (video): U istorychnomu muzeii vpershe na postradiansʼkomu prostori rozkazaly 
pro zdyrnytsvo “Torhzinu”ʼ, Gorod. Portal Chernigova 3 February 2016. Accessed on 1 October 2017: 
http://www.gorod.cn.ua/news/foto-i-video/69991-pograbuvannja-po-radjanskomu-video.html; ʻ“Pohrabuvannia po-
radiansʼkomu” v istorychnomu muzeiiʼ, Svoboda FM 2 February 2016. Accessed on 1 October 2017: 
http://newvv.net/culture/Culture/243781.html
TV, radio and online, their presence in social media is towering564 and their plans for the future are
even more ambitious. The museum’s current curator, Olesia Stasiuk, puts a lot of effort and
enthusiasm in to her daily work by organising exhibitions, seminars, workshops, themed lectures
and other events. The museum’s media work is outstanding, their ongoing projects like collecting
data and family photographs of the victims and the survivors could only be praised. Many reviews
left online and in the museum suggest that the museum’s representation of the past is what the
public expects to experience. Overall, the museum meets memory expectations of the
overwhelming majority of visitors.565 
Some of the museum’s exhibits, however, lack accuracy which, in turn, compromises the
efforts of the museum in pursuing their agenda. One such instance is the exhibit of the archival
documents on re-settlement of over 100,000 peasants from Russia and Belarus in Ukraine after the
famine in May 2015.566 While the museum’s researchers commented on this state-organised
migration impacting the events in east and south Ukraine,.567 Ukrainian historians from the Institute
of History at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine immediately pointed this out as a
misleading interpretation of archival documents as later documents demonstrate that most settlers
returned to Russia and Belarus.568 Another crucial point made by the Institute’s historians was that
almost the same number of settlers to the east and south Ukraine came from the northern oblast’s of
Ukraine.569 The other recent instance of inaccurate facts is the data on the demographic loss in the
exhibit ʻ163. Art for the Memory’ by the artist Rostyslav Bortnyk in September 2016570, that in
2017 toured in other cities in Ukraine. The number ʻ163’ is the amount of grains in the five ears of
wheat for which, according to Bortnyk, people were shot or sentenced to 10 years in camps,
whereas the number of victims he used was provided by the museum.571 The Institute of
564 For instance, there are two webpages of the museum on one social network alone, both last accessed on 01.04.2016: 
https://www.facebook.com/Національний-музей-Меморіал-жертв-Голодомору-853746961369758/ 
https://www.facebook.com/pages/Holodomor-Famine-Museum-Kyiv-Ukraine/547255545309987
565 ʻKnyha vidhukivʼ, Memorial zhertv Holodomoru. Accssed on 1 April 2016: 
http://memorialholodomor.org.ua/uk/visitors/visitors-books
566 Ievheniia Oliinyk, ʻUkraiintsi pislia Holodomoru maly zakupyty dlia rosiian-pereselentsiv patefony – istorykʼ, 
Radio Svoboda 15 May 2015. Accessed on 1 July 2018: https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/27018943.html
567 ʻU muzeii Holodomoru pokazaly dokumenty pro zaselennia Donbasu rosiianamy v 1930-tiʼ, ZN.UA 15 May 2015. 
Accessed on 1 September 2017: https://dt.ua/UKRAINE/u-muzeyi-golodomoru-pokazali-dokumenti-pro-
zaselennya-donbasu-rosiyanami-v-1930-ti-172819_.html
568 A. Zanuda, S. Dorosh, ʻRozkrytiia arkhiviv: iak pislia Holodomoru na Donbas pereselialy rosiianʼ, BBC News 
Ukraiina 2 June 2015. Accessed on 1 April 2016: 
http://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/society/2015/06/150522_holodomor_donbass_russia_az
569 H. Iefimenko, ʻNaselennia Donbasu – tse perevazhno nashchadky rosiian, pryvezenykh eshelonamy v 1933-1934 rr. 
pislia Holodomoru?ʼ Likbez. Istorychnyi front 23 April 2015. Accessed on 1 September 2017: 
http://likbez.org.ua/ua/russian_farmers_1933-34.html
570 I. Bortnyk, ʻ163. Mystetstvo zarady pamʼiatiʼ, 163. Accessed on 1 September 2017: http://163.com.ua/
571 The artistʼs comments: http://intb.te.ua/2017/03/оригінальну-виставку-присвячену-жер/ last accessed 01.09.2017
Demography at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine has repeatedly addressed the ongoing
use by the museum of unverified numbers of the victims,572 and this dispute remains unresolved.
Conclusion
The museum ʻHolodomor Victims Memorialʼ is a national institution where foreign
dignitaries are taken as well as school trips take place. To use Foucauldian analytic to read
museums as texts,573 any museum is a part of discourse formation. Hence the museum responds to
the discourse by displacing or effacing perpetrators in the museumʼs current narrative. This goes
inline with the schematic narrative template of victimhood which prevails in the museums in the
former Soviet states.574 Indeed, reducing victims and perpetrators to ethnic groups in the case of the
Holodomor risks turning such narrative nationalistic, as pointed out by Wersch: ʻThose who insist
only on their own memories of the past are condemning the rest of us to avoid it.ʼ575 
The fundamental moral dilemma for the museum would be to accept the fact that human
beings of any race or nationality are capable of everything under certain circumstances. The
Holodomor was devastating and this devastation will be felt if visitors can understand how it was
possible on the ground. In the last years this museum has demonstrated its ability not only to
preserve memory of the famine and raise awareness of it, but also construct collective memory of
the past and including universalist understanding of the Holodomor and the latest scholarship in this
work might be a possible option.
Similar to the sites of the perpetrators of the Holocaust, the difficulty with explaining the
mechanism of the Holodomor lies in conveying the actuality that the perpetrators were in the
majority ordinary men and women. Welzer argues that they should be placed within the context in
which normality altered to an extent that they perceived themselves as acting in the best interests of
the state. So most did not think of themselves as perpetrators, even after the war.576 Identification
with victims ultimately reassures the audience, somewhat ambitiously, of their ontological
innocence. This reassurance is unwarranted, according to Ernst van Alphen, and unhelpful in
education and preventing genocides and mass killing in future. He suggests partial and temporary
572 ʻDemografy nazvaly tochne chyslo vtrat naselennia Ukraiiny pid chas Holodomoru v 1930-kh rokakhʼ, UNIAN 23 
November 2017. Accessed on 1 February 2018: https://www.unian.ua/society/2259489-demografi-nazvali-tochne-
chislo-vtrat-naselennya-ukrajini-pid-chas-golodomoru-v-1930-h-rokah.html last accessed 01.09.2017
573 C. Wright, ʻMyth, Rhetoric and Human Tragedy in Lithuanian Museums and Sites of Memory,ʼ Acta Turistica, Vol.
25, No. 2, Celebrating 25th Anniversary (December 2013), pp. 191-209.
574 E. Ivanova, ʻChanges in Collective Memory: The Schematic Narrative Template of Victimhood in Kharkiv 
Museums,ʼ The Journal of Museum Education, Vol. 28, No. 1, Sociocultural Perspectives on Museums Part 1 
(Winter, 2003), p. 18.
575 S. Crane, ʻMemory, Distortion, and History in the Museum,ʼ History and Theory, vol. 36, No 4, (Dec. 1997), p. 44.
576 Quoted in C. Pearce, ‘The Role of German Perpetrator Sites in Teaching and Confronting the Nazi Past', 
Memorialization in Germany since 1945 ed. B. Niven and C.Paver (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 
169.
identification with the perpetrators to make ʻone aware of the ease with which one can slide into a
measure of complicity.ʼ577 
Perhaps the prime example is the House of the Wannsee Conference578 near Berlin where
senior government officials of Nazi Germany and Schutzstaffel (SS) leaders met to discuss the Final
Solution and its implementation on 20th January 1942. A possible equivalent in the Holodomorʼs
history is the old building of Kharkiv opera house (now the building of Kharkiv oblastʼ
Philarmony), where the III KP(b)U conference on grain procurement took place in July 1932. Of
course, neither the meeting in Wannsee, nor the conference in Kharkiv were the starting point of the
catastrophes that were to unfold. The memorial near Berlin elaborates on the evidence showing the
knowledge (and tacit approval) by the senior officials of discrimination of the Jews. Many
published collections of the archival documents on the Holodomor show similar, if not better,
awareness of the already existing devastation and violence in the countryside by the republican
officials in 1932. Yet some district officials found the courage to criticise the quotas leveraged to
them in Moscow in front of Molotov and Kaganovich in July 1932. This could be pointed to as
alternatives for action the perpetrators on the ground could resort to, rather than explaining their
compliance by fear of repression. 
The methods in the Wannsee Memorial focus on independent inquiry rather than the 
museumʼs interpretation of the events and its perpetrators. The school classes research a specific 
theme and than deliver a presentation on their finds – an approach different to a lecture on ʻhow it 
really was.ʼ Moreover, the House of the Wannsee Conference offers seminars aimed at professional 
groups like the Bundeswehr or medics that learn how people of their profession responded to the 
inhumane policies of the Third Reich like mass shootings of the Jews or euthanasia programme.579 
Likewise, the soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine could learn how the soldiers of the armed 
forces at the time participated in the logistics of the famine – rounding up peasants, summary 
executions, guarding the supplies etc. and consider the scope for action while not at the time of war.
The medics, in turn, can examine how the cause of death was forged in death certificates. Like in 
the first chapter of this work, the approach in the House of the Wannsee Memorial is to analyse one 
perpetrator group or various roles to establish how perpetrators behaved.
The pedagogical value of including ordinary people as perpetrators in the narrative comes
from the principle Adornoʼs adage that ʻthe roots of perpetration lie with the persecutors, not the
577 E. van Alphen, ‘Playing the Holocaust' in Mirroring Evil, ed. N. L. Kleeblatt (New York: The Jewish Museum and 
Rutgers University Press, 2002), p. 77.
578 ʻEducational Work in the House of the Wannsee Conference Memorial and Educational Siteʼ, House of the 
Wannsee Conference. Memorial and Educational Site. Accessed on 1 October 2017: 
https://www.ghwk.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf-wannsee/bildung/faltblatt-engl.pdf
579 Pearce, ‘The Role of German Perpetrator Sites...’, p. 172.
persecuted.ʼ580 Including personal stories of field guards, chairmen of the farms and collective
farmers that proceeded with orders and led ordinary lives after the famine will individualise them;
juxtaposing their stories with a number of victims in their respective villages would stress the
magnitude of their actions: such an approach will help to avoid reductiveness in explaining the
motivation of the perpetrators or how the famine was possible by drawing attention to perpetrators
belonging to society, no matter how difficult it is to accept. Placing them within the context of other
examples of mass killing could prevent us from dismissing them as deviant elements of Ukrainian
society or the Other. It is the evidence of ordinary people capable of starving their neighbours to
death, albeit on someone else’s orders, that might have a large impact and stimulate reflection.
580 Ibid, p. 175.
Conclusion
Who were the rank-and-file perpetrators of the Holodomor, and how is their participation 
represented in cultural memory? These are the central questions that I sought to answer by using a 
criminological framework in my examination of archival texts, soures of oral memory, and cultural 
works. My approach has been interdisciplinary: firstly, I identified the perpetrators by institutional 
affiliation and explicated located perpetration more closely by way of two case studies, showing 
how the rank-and-file perpetrators of the famine were predominantly ordinary Ukrainian men and 
women who, under certain circumstances, facilitated the famine for a variety of rather banal 
motives. 
I then contrasted these findings against the largely prosopographical representations of the 
perpetrators in the nationalist and Soviet narratives, which predominate in most cultural texts 
created after the famine. Yekelchyk argues that a new historical memory in Ukraine ʻrelied on the 
tropes inherited from the Soviet discourse of national identityʼ.581 Indeed, dogmatic blueprints of 
Socialist Realism and ethnic nationalism – which Grabowicz likens to ‘national realism’582 – can be 
found in the most recent cultural works oriented on the event of the famine. I have analysed the 
perpetrators of the famine in a deconstructive vein similar to the one employed in a study of Soviet 
texts by Katerina Clark.583 If in Soviet literary works related to collectivisation and the famine, 
activists are fighting for the socialist cause under the tutelage of more experienced Communists, in 
the nationalist narrative they are villains who are ʻinfluencedʼ by the Other. 
The constituent components of the nationalist narrative, according to Tsvetan Todorov, 
adopt the theme of good and evil584, a dichotomy observed in the discussion of what I term 
embraced and displaced agency. Todorov also adds to this mix the division between us and them, 
which in this case manifests itself either as Soviet versus ʻkulakʼ or as Ukrainian versus foreign 
Other. The ethnicisation evident in the latter can be found in the majority of uses and expressions of
traumatic collective memory. What is Ukrainian is romanticised: the pre-modern Ukrainian village, 
for example, is celebrated for its strong social bonds and high moral values. This conventional 
reduction inevitably affects the quality of the texts themselves, as such schematic representations 
leave little room for the development of complex human characters as ʻthe good and the evil flow 
from the same source’. As Todorov observes, ‘in the worldʼs best narratives they are not neatly 
581 S. Yekelchyk, ‘National Heroes for a New Ukraine: Merging the Vocabularies of the Diaspora, Revolution, and 
Mass Culture,ʼ Ab Imperio, 3/2015, p. 99.
582 Hryhorii Hrabovych, ‘U poshukakh velykoi literatury,ʼ Do istorii Ukraiinskoi literatury (Kyiv, 2003), pp. 535-574.
583 Using this analytical approach to nationalist narrative is suggested by Yekelchyk in ‘National Heroes for a New 
Ukraine ... ʼ, p. 108.
584 T. Todorov, Memory as a Remedy for Evil (Calcutta: Seagull Books, 2010), p. 8.
divided.ʼ585
At the same time, I seek to do more than deconstruct Soviet and nationalist narratives in my
analysis of the perpetrators of the Holodomor in cultural memory. What I term dispersed agency in 
the texts by dissident writers is evidence of a concerted attempt to understand the perpetrators and 
their actions from social psychological and historical perspectives. As Adorno argues in the case of 
the Holocaust – and Grossman repeatedly draws parallels between the Holocaust and the 
Holodomor – the old power structures of the Kaiserreich, after being toppled, failed to prepare 
people for democracy.586 Authoritarian structures fill such voids. Taught to obey orders in the 
parochial patriarchal society, people accommodate themselves and at times prostrate themselves 
before authorities. Such accommodation and prostration is at the centre of the novels by Dimarov, 
Grossman and Hutsalo, which feature all the types of perpetrators whom Alette Smeulers 
enumerates in her typology.
Ideological perpetrators loom large in cultural memory, but only a few could be found in 
archival sources, including some of the accused in Orikhivʼs case. Adorno calls them ʻmanipulative 
charactersʼ who treat others as an amorphous mass.587 Such perpetrators are unable to feel and long 
to belong to an agency. They pursue action to change and shape the world to their expectations, 
regardless of the means. They are exemplified in many characters in preceding chapters – Obushnyi
in Avanposty, Lohvyn in Persha Vesna, Danylo in Chotyry Brody, Davidov in Podniataia Tselina, 
Marko in Povorot Marka, or Mortko in The Grain Store. They blindly identify themselves with the 
collective. Todorov describes how the Khmer Rouge were once seen in France as young people 
who would modernize their country. In fact, the depiction of the Duch by French anthropologist 
Bizot could fit a portrayal of a party plenipotentiary from a Soviet film or novel: ʻa serious young 
man, looking for truth, deeply concerned with justice, and ready to sacrifice his life for the goals of 
the Revolution.ʼ588 Despite their devotion to the cause, they could still act like a normal people. 
Their ‘normality’ was often precisely what entrapped them in the cycle of violence: a perception of 
danger to their familyʼs well-being or a fear of being killed that justified the suffering and deaths 
inflicted on the ʻkulaksʼ. 
As we have seen, compromised perpetrators with little power to resist are also present in 
cultural texts. Adorno warns that fear or silence under condition of terror is only a consequence of 
participation in violence, not a reason for it. Only a few people object to the authorities before the 
initiation of violence, and fewer still object afterwards. Here we can see the characters of Phonia in 
585 Ibid, p. 83
586 T. Adorno, Critical Models. Interventions and Catchworlds (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 191.
587 Theodor W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel Levinson and Nevitt Sanford. The Authoritarian Personality, 
Studies in Prejudice Series, Volume 1 (New York: Harper & Row, 1950).
588 T. Todorov, Memory as a Remedy for Evil, p. 26.
Le’s Istoriia radosti; Tania, Olʼha and Tverdokhlib in Dimarovʼs The Hungry Thirties; Oktiabryn in
Doliakʼs Chorna doshka; Volodymyr in the film Povodyr; and countless officials in Muzhukʼs 
documentary Ukraiinsʼka Nich 33-ho. Such individuals ʻforfeit those [eternal] qualities by virtue of 
which they are able to pit themselves against [the established authorities] what at some moment 
might lure them again to commit atrocity... so long as it is in the name of some ideal in which they 
half or not at all believe.ʼ589 
Perpetrators with what I term displaced agency in Ukrainian cultural memory tend to be 
more prominent in cultural discourse. They are either monsters or passive figures coerced into 
sociopathic violence: Bykov in Rozkolote Nebo; TIurin in Plan do dvoru; Maksym in Maria; 
Kaliuzhnyi in Chorna doshka; or Davidov in Podniataia Tselina. In constructing images of 
perpetrators as abnormal characters, writers, poets, playwrights, film-makers, and other ‘memory 
makers’ seem to struggle to accept the possibility of a similarity between the perpetrators and their 
audience – or the possibility of our equal capacity for good and evil. These characters are all 
removed from the village; at least in a fair world, it seems, they must be cast out. But this cultural 
representation is not in line with the sad historical reality. Like the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia or 
the perpetrators of mass killing of Communists in Indonesia, the perpetrators of the Holomodor 
lived for decades alongside the people they tortured and whose loved ones they killed. Todorov 
therefore advocates for restorative justice over legal justice, arguing that any stigmatization of 
perpetrators of mass violence should be aimed more at their crimes rather than the individuals 
themselves. After all, the memory of heroes and innocent victims and ʻthe agents of evilʼ serves no 
constructive purpose. But this is ʻprecisely what we usually doʼ, as he concludes. In this respect, 
Ukrainian cultural memory of the Holodomor is no exception.
Indeed, in cultural texts related to the Holodomor, we see little condemnation of the crimes 
themselves. Kononovychʼs Tema dlia medytatsii is one such example. Iur uses his post-memory to 
bring the perpetrators to justice who, he concludes, are inhuman bloodthirsty profiteering 
Communists. He conflates the crimes with the criminals. His enemies, former activists, plead a 
collective amnesia, but Iur instists on establishing the truth, which is not legally confirmed but 
subject to ‘an agreement between the two parties.ʼ590 Yet Iur refuses to accept the fact of his 
grandfather’s murder of perpetrators, nor does Bahrii see the crimes of starving people in his village
as atrocities. The reason they both fail to reconcile is that neither is guided by a pursuit of the 
welfare of the community. Iur seeks revenge; Bahrii pursues concealment. 
This task of this restoration is impeded by another prominent obstacle – the salacious 
589 T. Adorno, Critical Models. Interventions and Catchworlds, pp. 193-194.
590 T. Todorov, p. 57.
figuration of the DPU officer and the witch-like female perpetrator. In the cinematic representation 
of the Holodomor, with the exception of Olexandr Kobzar as Volodymyr in Povodyr, the schematic 
portrayal of the DPU officer as ethnically Other man in black leather jacket is ubiquitous. Indeed, 
the cinematic representation by Tamer Hassan of the DPU officer Sergei in Bitter Harvest 
reinforces the cliché of the unflinching, almost robotic Bolshevik. Similarly, despite their capacity 
to engage in perpetration in the Holodomor, women are often reduced in cultural texts to titillating 
examples of ʻthe deadlier of the speciesʼ – to ʻmothers, monsters or whoresʼ.591 They are the female 
activists in, for instances, Kononovychʼs Tema dlia Medytatsii, who can be compared to the account
of Ilse Koch in Fiasco by Imre Kertesz. 
There was no single ʻperpetratorʼ of the famine. Some enthusiastically procured grain and 
confiscated foodstuffs from starving families; others refused and risked repressions; but most 
acquiesced and followed orders from above. As in Browningʼs study of the men of Unit 101, most 
perpetrators participated out of an obedience to authority and out of peer pressure, not out of sadism
or class hatred. While the specifics of Browningʼs study were performed by otherwise ordinary 
men, perpetrators of the Holodomor also included women and children in a variety of roles. The 
famine shows, again, that when placed in a coherent group setting, most people will adhere to 
instructions, even if they are aware that their actions will lead to the death of others.  
Such a study of the rank-and-file perpetrators of Holodomor does nothing to downplay the 
role of Stalin and the Kremlin in the deaths of millions of Ukrainian and Soviet citizens, nor does it 
reject the pivotal role of decision-making in the centre that deliberately sought to subjugate the 
peasantry through violent repression and mass killing. It merely focuses attention on the execution 
of these catastrophic orders on the ground. As Lynne Viola makes clear in her latest book on the 
perpetrators of the Great Terror in Ukraine, there was a broader complicity in the mass violence of 
the 1930s beyond the action sof trained perpetrators. Rural activists played vital roles as state 
witnesses in the 1937-1938 repressions592 and remained in Ukraine afterwards. Their families mixed
with families of the victims, whom taught at school, or with whom they worked at collective farms, 
or for whom they wrote recommendations to conduct their studies or to leave the village. Inevitably,
these perpetrators proceeded to shaped cultural memory, displacing, embracing or effacing their 
agency. In fact, some of them, like Ivan Havryliuk, became local amateur historians. To examine 
and confront their actions is, in part, to interrupt and dismantle this legacy, which has tormented 
Ukrainians for generations.
591 Sjoberg and Gentry, Mothers, monsters, whores, p. 98.
592 Viola, Stalinist Perpetrators on Trial, p. 176. 
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